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Stefan Lorenz Sorgner 
Metaphysics without Truth 
On the Importance of Consistency 
within Nietzsche's Philosophy 
The thesis deals with the question: Is there any good reason to beheve in Nietzsche's 
metaphysics even though he himself claims that it is not THE TRUTH in correspondence with 
the world? The traditional replies given by Danto, Nehamas, and Poellner are that Nietzsche's 
metaphysics is only valid for Nietzsche himself, and they, thereby, turned his philosophy into 
a form of relativism. However, this answer does not take into consideration Nietzsche's claim 
for the general superiority of his philosophy. In addition, Nietzsche's view seems inconsistent 
- on the one hand he claimed all perspectives are equally false in respect to THE TRUTH, but 
on the other hand he regarded his views as superior. I explain in which respect Nietzsche 
justifies his claims, that Nietzsche's position is not inconsistent, and why consistency is 
important for him. 
In the first chapter, I present Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will to power and the eternal 
recurrence of everything. 
In the second chapter, I show how Nietzsche's metaphysics led him to his perspectivism, i.e. 
that all views are interpretations, his denial of THE TRUTH, that all perspectives are equally 
false in respect to THE TRUTH, that it is essential for human beings to have a defined 
perspective (e.g. to have a consistent worldview) and his presentation of nihilism. These 
claims, however, seem to contradict the claims in main part one. 
In chapter three, I explain why Nietzsche thinks that his metaphysics will come to be regarded 
as superior for a certain period of time, as transcending the long dominant but declining 
world-view of Christianity. The claim for the superiority of his philosophy is supported by the 
belief not that it is true, but that it contains elements which will appeal to people in the future. 
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NOTE ON T E X T AND CITATIONS 
In order to minimize footnotes and to eliminate the inconvenience of endnotes, I have 
incorporated almost all references to secondary sources into the text, citing only theauthors's 
name (unless it is clear from the context), and the publication date (unless I cite only one work 
by the author). I f necessary, I also mention the page (P.) or chapter (chap.) number. The works 
cited are listed in the Bibliography. 
For Nietzsche's work I have used Sdmtliche Werke in zwdlf Bdnden von Kroners 
Taschenausgabe (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Verlag, not one edition. See individual books to 
find out which edition I used). I generally follow the excellent translations into English listed 
below. I am grateful to Dr. Paddy Fitzpatrick from University of Durham for the translation of 
certain aphorisms, these translations are signified by the 'PF' after the reference. 
I cite Nietzsche's works by the Initials of their English titles and the section number. I list 
here the abbreviations in the text and the works to which they refer. 
BT = Die Geburt der Tragodie 
PTG = Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen 
HC = Homers Wettkampf 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Die Geburt der Tragodie ; Der griechische Staat" (Stutgart: Alfred 
Kroner Verlag, 1976) 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „The Birth of Tragedy ; The Case of Wagner" translated into English by 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967) 
UM = Unzeitgemdsse Betrachtungen 
TLN = Uber Wahrheit und LUge im aussermoralischen Sinne 
UP = Wir Philologen 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen" (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Verlag, 
1938) 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Untimely Meditations" translated into English by R. J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univerrsity Press, 1983) 
HAH = Menschliches Allzumenschliches 
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*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Menschliches AUzumenschliches" (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Verlag, 
1993) 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Human, Al l too Human" tranlated into English by R. J. HoUingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
D = Morgenrote 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Morgenr6te" (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Verlag, 1991) 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Daybreak" translated into English by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982) 
GS = Die frdhliche Wissenschaft 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Die frohliche Wissenschaft" (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Veriag, 1986) 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „The Gay Science" tranlated into English by Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Random House, Inc., 1974) 
Z = Also sprach Zarathustra 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Also sprach Zarathustra" (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Verlag, 1988) 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „The Portable Nietzsche" selectet and translated into English by Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1954) 
BGE = Jenseits von Gut und Bose 
GM = Die Genealogie der Moral 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Jenseits von Gut und Bose; Die Genealogie der Moral" (Stuttgart: 
Alfred Kroner Veriag, 1989) 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „0n the Genealogy of Morals; Ecce Homo" tranlated into English by 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967) 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Beyond Good and Evil" translated into English by R. J. Hollingdale 
(London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973) 
NW = Nietzsche contra Wagner 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „ Richard Wagner in Bayreuth; Der Fall Wagner; Nietzsche contra 
Wagner" (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun. GmbH & Co., 1973) 
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*Nietzsche, Friedrich „The Portable Nietzsche" selectet and translated into English by Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1954) 
WP = Der Wille zur Macht 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Der Wille zur Macht" Nachwort: A. Baeumler (Stuttgart: Alfi-ed 
Kroner Veriag, 1964) 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „The Will to Power" translated into English by Walter Kaufmann and 
R. J. Hollingdale (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968) 
IB 1 = Unschuld des Werdens I. Teil 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Die Unschuld des Werdens: Der NachlaB 1 .Teil" (Stuttgart: Alfred 
Kroner Verlag, 1991) 
TI = Gdtzenddmmerung 
AC = Der Antichrist 
EH = Ecce Homo 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „G6tzendammerungerung et alt." (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Verlag, 
1990) 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „0n the Genealogy of Morals; Ecce Homo" tranlated into English by 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967) 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „The Portable Nietzsche" selectet and translated into English by Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1954) 
IB 2 = Unschuld des Werdens 2. Teil 
*Nietzsche, Friedrich „Die Unschuld des Werdens: Der Nachlafi 2.Teil" (Stuttgart: Alfred 
Kroner Verlag, 1978) 
*Oehler, Richard „Nietzsche Register : Alphabetisch & systematisch geordnet von Richard 
Oehler" (Stuttgart: Alfi-ed Kroner Verlag, 1978) 
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INTRODUCTION 
A 
a. THE PROBLEM & MY SOLUTION (IN BRIEF) 
The problem which I wil l solve within this thesis is how Nietzsche can consistently put 
forward a metaphysics, while also holding that whatever he says is not true. The problem is an 
important one, because with his denial of the truth Nietzsche had a significant influence on 
philosophy in the twentieth century - he became the inspiration of Post-modernism whose 
proponents deny the possibility that human beings ever get to know the truth. Al l post-
modernist philosophers have to have a reply to the liar paradox, and they also have to explain 
why what they have to say matters, because i f they themselves claim that what they say is not 
true, it is not obvious why one should listen to what they have to say. Nehamas showed 
convincingly that in Nietzsche's case the liar paradox does not apply, for within his 
philosophy 'no one is obliged to believe' [Nehamas (1985): P. 67] what Nietzsche said 
[Nehamas (1985): chap. 2]. However, Nehamas, as well as all the other interpreters, does not 
have a suitable reply to the second question. Al l he says is that Nietzsche's philosophy implies 
that 'one's own views are the best for oneself without implying that they need be good for 
anyone else' [Nehamas (1985): P.72] which is not a satisfying reply because it does not 
explain why anyone should listen to what Nietzsche has to say. I will be more explicit about 
this in the last main part, when I also present my complete reply to this question; this will lead 
to the conclusion that Nietzsche regards his philosophy as superior because he expects it to 
appeal to the Spirit of future times. 
As the problem which I will solve with this thesis already suggests, the thesis is principally 
exegetical. I will not discuss whether Nietzsche's philosophy is plausible or not, and I also 
will not point out where Nietzsche, according to my mind, has gone wrong. Al l I wil l do is to 
put forward a new interpretation of the areas of Nietzsche's philosophy relevant to the 
problem in question, and I will apply Augustine's principle of charity: „what is read must be 
diligently turned over in the mind until an interpretation is found that promotes the reign of 
charity" [Beardsley (1966): P. 109], for I think that this is what a good interpreter has to do. 
Before I can begin with any further details of my thesis, I have to clarify the use of some 
ambiguous or unclear notions. Although, I try to give a clear definition whenever it is 
13 
necessary within the text, I wish to state some definitions at the outset, e.g. the meanings of 
the notions of the title of the thesis. 
b. SOME DEFINITIONS 
Metaphysics: Metaphysics can have (at least) two different meanings. It can mean either 
philosophy of two world theories, or philosophy of the nature of the world. In the first case, 
metaphysics refers to such philosophies as put forward by Plato or Kant. In the second case, it 
simply refers to any ultimate description of the world. Nietzsche is a critic of metaphysics, i f 
the notion is used in the first sense; but he is putting forward one of his own, i f we take the 
second sense of the notion. The expression „metaphysics" in the title of this thesis has to be 
read using the second of the above mentioned senses. 
Truth: Truth can refer to many different theories; the pragmatic, coherence, and 
correspondence theories of truth are the most common ones. Within the thesis, I will always 
clarify which theory of truth I am referring to. In the title of the thesis, I am referring to (a 
version of) the correspondence theory of truth. 
Ontology: Ontology is another expression for and can be taken as equivalent to the second 
sense of the notion „metaphysics" (philosophy of the ultimate nature of the world), for it 
means the teaching/word (logos) of Being (ens). Nietzsche puts forward a number of 
distinctive claims which comprise an ontology. 
Apollo: The first main part is entitled 'Apollo' and this means the creative force. It includes 
the creative force in human beings, as well as that in the rest of the world. However, I will 
mostly be concerned with it in respect to human beings. Still, I do not define it in such a 
restrictive way, because it is essential that it applies to all kinds of creative forces. 
Dionysos: The second main part is entitied 'Dionysos' and this refers to the destructive force. 
It includes the destructive force in human beings, as well as in the rest of the world. However, 
I wil l mostiy be concerned with it in respect to human beings. Still, I do not define it in such a 
restrictive way, because it is essential that it applies to all kinds of destructive forces. 
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Platonism: Platonism always implies the concept of a two worid theory. The expression 'two 
world theory' means a theory which puts forward that two separate worlds exist. 
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B 
a. ON NIETZSCHE'S UNPUBLISHED WORK 
It has been a much discussed topic which attitude one should take in respect to Nietzsche's 
unpublished work, and due to the vast amount and possible significance of this work every 
interpreter has to take a clear position in that respect. One can distinguish three main camps 
which the principal Nietzsche interpreters have taken. Firstly, there are the interpreters like 
Maudemarie Clark who rely almost exclusively on Nietzsche's published work. Secondly, 
there are the ones who agree with Derrida's position which accords an equality of value 
between the published, and unpublished work. Thirdly, there are the followers of Heidegger 
who regard the unpublished work to be of superior value in comparison to the published work. 
I belong to the last group of interpreters; but before I mention my reasons for this position, I 
wish to present a couple of facts. 
After Nietzsche finished writing „Thus spoke Zarathustra" (1884), he intended to write a 
philosophical work which would present his philosophy in a systematic manner. He was 
concerned with the creation of such a work until the end of his active life (end of 1888). For a 
certain period of time (1886/1887) this proposed work was supposed to be called „The Will to 
Power". However, what was edited as the work „The Will to Power" consists of a selective 
choice of aphorisms within an arbitrary arrangement. Of course, the editors tried to compose it 
in accordance with Nietzsche's overall plan, but to pick out and to favour one of the planned 
arrangements is the result of an arbitrary choice. It is also a fact, that Nietzsche himself had 
given up his plan to compose a main work with the title „The Will to Power". There is also no 
reason for us to favour the aphorisms selected by the editors to the other unpublished 
aphorisms. So, i f one has good reasons to use Nietzsche's unpublished work, these reasons 
seem to have to apply to all of Nietzsche's unpublished work, and not only to the arbitrary 
selecfion of aphorisms selected in the „Will to Power". 
My main reason for according superiority to Nietzsche's unpublished notes over his published 
work is that Nietzsche intended to compose his main philosophical work throughout his active 
life, for he constantly wrote new outlines about which form this work was supposed to take. 
He composed his last plans for his main work in autumn 1888 (the title then: „Transvaluation 
of all Values"). Since Nietzsche had never given up intending to compose his main 
philosophical work, we have to conclude that his mature philosophy was only contained in an 
incomplete manner in his published work. We can also conclude that Nietzsche intended to 
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use many of the notes which he started to collect from when he first planned to write his main 
philosophical work in 1884, because he wrote them in order to include them in his main work. 
It was Nietzsche's typical way of working to use his insights which he scribbled down in a 
brief form, to build up a work for publication, for which he spiced up his notes with his grand 
rhetorical abilities, and his subtie style. This provides a couple of good reasons to regard his 
unpublished notes as containing Nietzsche's mature philosophy in its immediate form, and to 
regard his unpublished notes to be superior to his published writings. 
The interpreters who belong to the other categories in respect to their attitude towards 
Nietzsche's unpublished work, put forward the following arguments against the superiority of 
the unpublished notes. According to Clark, „it seems a good idea to hold off on the use of the 
Nachlass as long as possible since the published writings provide much more of a context for 
specific passages and therefore many more checks on the accuracy of interpretation." [Clark 
(1990): P. 26]. This, however, is not an argument which explains why we should regard 
Nietzsche's published work as containing his mature philosophy. The most it establishes is 
that his published writings provide interpreters with a more accurate basis for interpretation, 
than do his unpublished writings. I am not denying this, but all I have tried to show was that 
his unpublished work contains a philosophy which is fiirther developed than the one in his 
published work, and the fact that the latter is more easily and accurately interpretable does not 
have any bearing on the point I was making. 
Another argument Clark put forward was that Nietzsche's unpublished notes contain a 
philosophy which „is usually philosophically weaker" [Clark (1990): P. 26] than the one in his 
published work, which she tries to establish with her interpretation. Besides the reasons I have 
already put forward in favour of the superiority ofNietzsche's unpublished writings, all I wish 
to reply to this point is that one should read the competing interpretations of Nietzsche, take 
into consideration how many rather unambiguous statements Clark has to explain in a rather 
strange manner, and how the very same statements are integrated within my own 
interpretation (best example: Nietzsche's denial of the truth), and then one should judge for 
oneself which position is the more plausible. I am certain that the decision will not be a 
difficult one. 
The most interesting and informed discussion ofNietzsche's unpublished work which defends 
the superiority ofNietzsche's published work can be found in Bemd Magnus' essay „The Use 
and Abuse of the Will to Power" [ed. Solomon (1988): P. 218 -235]. He points out that by the 
end of 1888 Nietzsche no longer wished to publish a work called „The Wil l to Power" and 
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that the available text is based upon one of Nietzsche's plans for his main work - but not even 
a very special plan. A l l this is correct as I have argued before. I agree with Magnus that the 
notes contained in the current text of „The Will to Power" are in no way superior to his other 
unpublished notes. This is, however, all Magnus can establish with his previously mentioned 
position. Yet, Magnus also puts forward arguments against the position I am taking, for he 
claims that ,,'Der Antichrist' displaces the 'Umwerthung' as the title of that 'major' planned 
work" [ed. Solomon (1988): P. 230]. This, however, is not correct. „Der Antichrist" 
represents the first part of the major philosophical work, Nietzsche was working on, for 
Nietzsche tried to stick to the overall plan for this which he made in autumn 1888. This is the 
reason, why Nietzsche did not write any further overall plan by the end of his active life. The 
four sub headings mentioned in his overall plan of autumn 1888 for his major work are called 
„Der Antichrist", „Der freie Geist", „Der Immoralist" and „Dionysos". This cleariy supports 
my position in respect to Nietzsche's unpublished work, because it presents „Der Antichrist" 
as the first part of Nietzsche's main philosophical work, and it was „Der Antichrist", on which 
Nietzsche was working last. 
This short philological discourse with a justification of the material which I am using was 
essential, due to the enormous amount of additional information which is contained in his 
unpublished works, and which greatly influences interpretations. Yet, after I have explained 
and justified my attitude towards Nietzsche's unpublished work, I can shift my attention from 
the philological concerns to the philosophical ones. 
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C 
a. ON SOME OTHER INTERPRETATION'S OF NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY 
I wil l mention other interpreters of Nietzsche's work within my own interpretation, whenever 
I regard the reference as clarification of my own position. However, most of the traditional 
great interpretations of Nietzsche are so different from my own that here at the outset I will 
only point out the essential differences and problems they have to face. I wil l always focus my 
main attention on the overall categories of TRUTH and METAPHYSICS. Each interpreter 
stresses different categories in Nietzsche, however these two are usually dealt with, whereas 
such special sub-categories as NIHILISM, to which I attribute a lot of weight, are often left 
out in many interpretations. 
The first, and arguably, greatest interpreter of Niezsche with whom I will briefly be concerned 
is Heidegger [1961]. He claims that Nietzsche's theory of the will to power (= WP) and his 
theory of the eternal recurrence of everything (= ER) are metaphysical theories which make a 
claim to correspond to the truth. However, he also holds that Nietzsche was a critic of 
metaphysics; so on Heidegger's account Nietzsche's philosophy is inconsistent. According to 
him, Nietzsche aims to overcome nihilism by overcoming metaphysics, but does not manage 
this. It is correct that Nietzsche tries to overcome nihilism, and it is also correct that he was a 
critic of metaphysics in one sense of the word, though not the sense in which I am using it. 
Nietzsche is only a critic of metaphysics in the sense that he attacks two world theories, as 
they are popular in the Platonic-Christian tradition. Yet, he tries to overcome nihilism by 
putting forward a new metaphysics in the second sense of the word [main part 3 of this 
thesis]. Heidegger failed to realise that whenever Nietzsche crticised metaphysics, he was 
using the term to mean philosophy of two world theories, but that the metaphysics Nietzsche 
put forward was a one world theory and that metaphysics in this case has to be taken to mean 
the philosophy of the ultimate nature of the world. In this case, it does not follow, as it does in 
Heidegger's interpretation, that Nietzsche's philosophy is inconsistent. One reason in favour 
of my interpretation is the fact that Nietzsche values consistency extremely highly [WP 515]. 
Although Nietzsche holds that our intellect cannot provide us with THE TRUTH, he claims 
that our intellect is essential for our survival, and that his philosophy is life enhancing [WP 
1052]. Therefore his philosophy has to appeal to the intellect, i.e. it has to be consistent. 
According to Heidegger's interpretation Nietzsche's philosophy is inconsistent. This is one 
main reason which goes against Heidegger's interpretation. 
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The next interpreter I wish to mention is Danto [1965]. According to him, Nietzsche denies 
the correspondence but affirms the pragmatic theory of truth. Yet, Danto also realises that WP 
and ER are metaphysical theories, which are supposedly making a claim to correspond to the 
truth. This, however, is something he cannot reconcile with the former claim. I regard Danto's 
to be one of the best interpretations so far, because the WP and ER are metaphysical theories, 
and what Nietzsche puts forward can be seen as a pragmatic theory of truth, although I would 
be reluctant to put it like this. Yet, Danto fails to link these positions, because his 
understanding of what the WP implies has been too limited. Nietzsche refers to the WP and 
ER as NIETZSCHE'S TRUTH, which is a sub-group of TRUTHS, which are all false in 
respect to THE TRUTH (in the absolute sense)'. Yet, this is what is essential, because THE 
TRUTH is not life affirming, and cannot be had by anyone or anything. In this way,Nietzsche 
does reject the correspondence theory of truth. Yet, I would be hesitant to attribute to 
Nietzsche the pragmatic theory of truth, because what he puts forward is false in respect to 
THE TRUTH. On the other hand, Nietzsche himself refers to his theories as NIETZSCHE'S 
TRUTH, so one could be justified in seeing it as an illustration of the pragmatic theory of 
truth. At this stage one has to ask what the pragmatic theory of truth implies. According to 
Danto it implies „whether it works in hfe" [Danto (1965): P. 230], but he is not certain 
himself whether this is an appropriate criterion or not, because he is unclear about this point 
himself [Danto (1965): P. 230]. What does this „whether it works in life" mean and whose life 
does it refer to? Given Nietzsche's perspectivism, it can only refer to Nietzsche's own life, but 
then the quesfion arises why anyone else should believe in it. This clearly poses a problem for 
Danto's account which I will be able to solve by showing that Nietzsche thinks that his 
philosophy will be regarded as superior, because it appeals to the Spirit of our times. Muller-
Lauter and Grimm have a deeper understanding of what the pragmatic theory of truth implies. 
According to them, Nietzsche holds the pragmatic theory of truth, which means that for him 
what is pragmatic is true, what increases the feeling of power is pragmatic and Nietzsche's 
philosophy increases his feeling of power. This is correct, as I will show. However, both of 
them fail to explain why the WP and ER do let the feeling of power increase in Nietzsche, and 
why Nietzsche puts forward his theories, i f they mainly increase his feeling of power. This I 
wil l set out in detail within my thesis. 
A completely different Nietzsche can be found in France. There he was cultivated heavily by 
all sorts of thinkers and philosophers who have used him rather idiosyncratically. According 
' l clarify the several meanings of 'truth' later in the thesis. 
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to Derrida metaphysical assumptions are built within our grammar, so we cannot utter a 
proposition without affirming a metaphysical statement (metaphysics meaning philosophies of 
two world theories). Nietzsche, by rejecting metaphysics, is bound to be caught in 
metaphysics by default. This, however, Nietzsche has pointed out himself [TI ,,'Reason' in 
Philosophy" 5], yet he is not putting it as strongly as Derrida does, but merely hints at the 
possibility of this being so. I think that Nietzsche's position is superior to Derrida's, because 
Derrida's statement seems to me to be simply false. I f Derrida was correct, then it would be 
impossible to put forward a monistic philosophy within our language and our grammatical 
structures. However, it seem to me that Spinoza managed to put forward a monistic 
philosophy, and this should count as a reason against Derrida's statement in question. 
After these brief summaries and discussions of some of the better known interpretations of 
Nietzsche, the direction of my own interpretation should have become obvious. I wish to 
stress that I will try to make far more distinctions of some key notions than have traditionally 
been made, especially in respect to truth, and nihilism. Of course, I also adapt points from 
other interpretations. This applies for example to Jasper's statement that something has to be 
true for it to be regarded as true [Jaspers (1947): P. 198], or to Nehamas claim about 
perspectivism that it concedes that no one is obliged to believe its thesis which implies that it 
is not self-reftiting [Nehamas (1985): P. 67]. I think that the only case where I am most 
probably on my own is in respect to ER, for usually this theory is interpreted as an ethical test, 
and that whenever it was taken in an metaphysical manner, then it is generally regarded to be 
Nietzsche's greatest failure, an unbearable view in respect to modem science, and too absurd 
to be considered seriously. However, I take Nietzsche seriously. He regarded ER to be his 
deepest insight, and I will show that ER as a metaphysical theory has to be taken seriously. Of 
course, I am not excluding the ethical aspect from my considerations, but I regard the 
metaphysical to be the level on which the theory is of primary importance. 
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D 
a. PHILOSOPHERS AS THE DEFENDERS OF THEIR OWN PREJUDICES 
In this section I will introduce my understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy by dealing with 
two different topics. Firstly, I will try to set out and explain what Nietzsche meant when he 
made the statement that philosophers are just defenders of their own prejudices, as he does in 
the following aphorism, for in this way one can get access to Nietzsche's manner of thinking: 
„...while what happens at bottom is that a prejudice, a notion, an 'inspiration', generally a 
desire of the heart sifted and made abstract, is defended by them with reasons sought after 
the event - they are one and all advocates who do not want to be regarded as such, and for 
the most part no better than cunning pleaders for their prejudices, which they baptize 
'truths'..." [BGE 1,5] 
While interpreting the above mentioned aphorism I will criticise some claims philosophers 
tradifionally made, and try to lay open what philosophers at most can do. Secondly, I will deal 
with Nietzsche's approach to philosophy which does not have to face the criticism I made in 
respect to other philosophers. 
I wil l set out the implications of the above mentioned claim that philosophers are just the 
defenders of their prejudices by dealing with the question of what the sole ultimate starting 
point of philosophy is. 
In the history of philosophy one broadly finds two different approaches to philosophy. Most 
philosophers, especially since Descartes, regarded epistemology to be at the heart of 
philosophy, i.e. the sole ultimate starting point of philosophy. In very recent times a second 
approach was rediscovered by Heidegger, who regards metaphysics as being at the centre of 
philosophy, an approach which can also be found in many Pre-Socratic philosophers. 
I wish to mention the following problem these two approaches have to face. However, I do not 
have the space to prove what I am putting forward. I am claiming that neither epistemology 
nor metaphysics can be used as a sole ultimate starting point, so that it is deceptive to speak of 
either of them as the sole ultimate starting point to philosophy from which everything else is 
derived. I will defend the thesis that no discipline of philosophy is prior to the other. After I 
have given some examples which support this thesis I will put forward a fiirther hypothesis, 
which had its origin in Schopenhauer in „The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason" [Schopenhauer (1977)]. This ftirther hypothesis contends that all philosophers not 
only carmot have started from one ultimate starting point, but that every great philosopher had 
to have some special, (fairly) coherent insights in the different disciplines of philosophy (e.g. 
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metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics) and all they did was to present them in long 
lines of argument, as i f one was necessitated by the other, although actually the basis of their 
whole philosophy consisted of a few (or many) (fairly) consistent insights in the separate, but 
inter-related disciplines, which I have just mentioned. The separateness of epistemology and 
metaphysics on the one hand and ethical and aesthetical values on the other wil l be supported 
by Hume's argument that one carmot derive an 'ought' from an 'is', and I wil l try to make the 
separateness, but interrelatedness of the disciplines of metaphysics and epistemology obvious 
in the following. After that I will combine the claims that there is no sole ultimate starting 
point to philosophy, and that all philosophies are based on insights, and this will lead me to 
the conclusion that the insights out of which all philosophies are constructed are not insights 
into the truth, but prejudices of the individual philosophers. 
I f the following points seem plausible and the problems mentioned serious enough, then 
Nietzsche's approach to philosophy offers an appropriate alternative understanding of 
philosophy which goes round many of the problems traditional philosophies have to face. Of 
course, this new approach creates new problems. The main parts of this thesis will then try to 
state some replies to the new problems. 
What is the appropriate starting point to philosophy? 
In the history of philosophy one main party has claimed it is epistemology, another that it is 
metaphysics. First, I will explain why it carmot be epistemology, then why it carmot be 
metaphysics and in the end I will describe the starting point, which philosophers are left with; 
namely the personal prejudices of the philosophers in respect to the different disciplines of 
philosophy (e.g. metaphysics, epistemology, ethics). 
The first problem epistemology has to face is an argument by Hegel which goes against the 
possibility of epistemology - Nietzsche's philosophy provides an answer to this problem as 
well. It can be stated as follows: 
Whenever one starts an epistemological enquiry, one is looking for a way to gain knowledge 
of the world. Yet, to be able to realise that one has actually found what one is looking for (a 
way to gain knowledge of the world) one needs a criterion, on whose basis we can decide 
whether we have found it or not. However, this criterion is actually what we are looking for. 
Therefore we carmot even get started. 
This argument goes against the possibility of epistemology. I will mention an appropriate 
reply to it later; what I am claiming now is something fiirther. I f one accepts the possibility of 
23 
epistemology, then one also needs to have a metaphysical system, which does not come after 
epistemology. Let me state one example: empiricists hold that all our knowledge comes from 
our sense perceptions. Prior to any sense perception our mind is empty; it does not contain any 
innate ideas. There cannot be anything within our minds which has not been perceived by the 
senses before. Our mind is a blank tablet (tabula rasa) prior to any sense impression. John 
Locke was one of the first philosophers to formulate this clearly. 
The problem with this position is how this can be the basis of a philosophy. It clearly 
presupposes the notion „mind" and therefore must also presuppose a picture of the mind and 
with this some sort of metaphysics. Locke regarded the mind to be an immaterial thing, 
whereas the objects it perceives are physical things. So epistemology cannot be the sole 
ultimate starting point to this philosophy, because to be able to deal with epistemology it 
needs a metaphysics declaring that there are immaterial and material objects (IfLocke had 
regarded the mind to be a material thing, then my argument would have applied as well, only 
with a different metaphysics as a basis). The metaphysics does not come after the 
epistemology, so epistemology carmot be the sole starting point. This, according to my mind, 
applies to all other epistemologically based philosophies as well. 
Secondly, there are philosophers who regard metaphysics as the sole ultimate starting point to 
philosophy, e.g. the Pre-Socratics, Heidegger. 
The method of starting philosophical enquiry with metaphysics was brought back into our 
consciousness by Heidegger. „He demands, first, a reversal of the 'modem' priority of 
epistemology over ontology - of enquiries into knowledge over ones into existence. 
Knowledge 'in the usual spectator sense... presupposes existence' (BP 276), since no account 
of knowledge is possible without a prior understanding of the nature of knowers and what 
they know. The cmcial issue is begged when it is assumed that we are simply 'thinking things' 
confronted by extended ones, the only problem then being how we escape from our 'irmer 
spheres' so as to acquire knowledge about these extemal objects. A second, related reversal 
Heidegger demands is the move from 'the considerations of beings [entities] to the... 
thematization of Being' (BP 227)." [Cooper (1996)]. 
Yet, Heidegger only brought this approach towards philosophy back into the forefront of our 
philosophical concerns. I f something was brought back into our consciousness, then it must 
have been there before. When was this the case? 
In the pre-Socratic era, philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes were aware 
of this. Especially these Milesian natural philosophers provide us with prime examples for this 
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sort of approach to philosophy. Thales for example regarded water to be the one original 
substance, out of which everything else developed. For Anaximander Being was something 
indefinite and unlimited (Greek: apeiron). Anaximenes held that air is the original substance. 
Yet, what all of them had in common was that they tried to explain the creation of all 
„Seienden" (beings, entities) by reference to an ultimate original substance. 
In all of these cases metaphysics is regarded as the basis of philosophy. Still, it seems to me 
that this could not be the sole ultimate basis of a philosophy. Of course, someone could hold 
that the world is a physical devil. Yet, no one would regard this person to be a philosopher, 
merely by asserting this. A philosopher needs justified epistemic reasons for holding this view 
as in the case of Parmenides who claims that there is only Being and no Becoming. To defend 
this metaphysics, which was Parmenides' ultimate starting point in philosophy, Zeno of Elea 
(Paremnides' pupil) put forward arguments, which showed that every other view leads to a 
contradiction, e.g. an „arrow cannot move, because it is always in a place equal to itself, and 
i f it is in a place equal to itself, then it is at rest - so it is always at rest" [ed. Grayling (1995): 
P. 351]. This, supposedly, implies that every other metaphysical view is untenable or 
incorrect; an allegedly syllogistic argument is used by Zeno to support the metaphysics of 
Parmenides. Again it is not the metaphysics which serves as the sole uUimate foundation and 
brings about the epistemology, because it is assumed that what is contradictory cannot 
correspond to reality. This is the epistemological assumption, without which Parmenides 
could not have built his metaphysics. Therefore epistemology in this case as well carmot have 
come after the metaphysics, because it provides us with the reasons to hold his metaphysical 
view. 
So far, I have stated some reasons in favour of the position that neither metaphysics, nor 
epistemology can serve us as the sole ultimate starting point to philosophy. It seems necessary 
that one discipline demands the other. Concerning the relationship of epistemology and 
metaphysics, there are two possibilities: it could either be the case that one is prior to the 
other, but then the other would have to be prior to the first as well (This would render any 
approach ad absurdum, as I have just tried to show), or neither is prior to the other, but both 
belong to the same level and are separate, though inter-related, i.e. not completely separate. 
The latter option seems to me to be the only defensible one. 
^They have to be separate, because metaphysics describes the ultimate reality, but epistemology tells us how we 
get to know it. These are clearly separate categories. Still, they must be inter-related, because the content of these 
two categories must not be inconsistent. Consistency is the basis for the evaluation of a philosophy. 
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This leads me to the next point that philosophy is not mainly about arguing, but about 
insights (prejudices) in the different branches of philosophy (epistemology, metaphysics et 
cetera). This must now be clarified. 
Firstly, I would briefly like to reconsider what a deductive argument consists of An argument 
consists of the premises, the method of inference and the conclusion. Where do the premises 
come from? From another argument perhaps. Yet, how can one justify the initial premises and 
the initial method of inference? One can only refer to their intemal plausibility and their 
consistency in respect to the other premises we hold. There cannot be any further justification 
as it seems to me. These premises provide one with the basis of ones philosophy. From these 
each philosophy derives all the details of its content. So a great philosopher seems to be one 
who had many irmovative, consistent insights. His arguments do not seem to be as important 
for philosophy as they are taken to be, because in an argument one can only derive something 
as a conclusion, which was already contained in the premises. So the conclusions of 
arguments cannot provide us with any new insight which has not been in the premises before. 
An argument can only show whether a system is internally consistent and which view a 
philosopher could or would take in respect to a certain question, but the basis of each 
philosophy can only be a set of insights with the aforementioned characteristics. How else 
should he get the initial method of inference and the initial premises? Let us apply this point 
to Hegel's critique of epistemology. I f it is correct, as it seems that in arguments a philosopher 
cannot gain any knowledge which was not implicit in the initial premises and method of 
inference, then epistemology carmot be about trying to find the correct theory of knowledge 
through arguing, because the one which one ends up with clearly has to have been contained 
in the premises. 
Of course, philosophers need to be able to make inferences (i.e. need to argue) to think 
through their system, so that it contains as few inconsistencies as possible (or even none in the 
ideal case). Another reason why philosophers use arguments to present their views is that one 
can in this way represent the system, its consequences and its iimer relations, so that its 
plausibility becomes obvious. However, one should always bear in mind that arguments 
cannot provide us with new knowledge. The conclusion always is already contained in the 
premises. We cannot derive anything new via an argument. It can only lay bare the 
consequences, which are already contained in the premises and the method of inference. 
Now we have to remember what I have tried to make plausible before, namely that neither 
metaphysics nor epistemology can serve us as a sole ultimate basis for philosophy. In this 
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way, I have come to the conclusion that it is most plausible that both of them belong to the 
same basic level and are separated, but inter-related. We can now apply our recently gained 
understanding about the importance of insights in philosophy to this. Doing so, we have to 
declare that a great philosopher has to have many, irmovative, consistent insights in respect to 
the two separate, but inter-related categories of metaphysics and epistemology (and probably 
also logic and methodology, so that he is in a position to make further inferences from his 
initial insights). 
Still, this obviously does not yet provide us with the basis to answer all questions of 
philosophy, because the disciplines of ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy, i.e. the 
branches which deal with value questions, are not dealt with yet. That we cannot derive these 
disciplines from the former was explained fairly convincingly by David Hume „A Treatise of 
Human Nature" (3,1, 1). There it was shown why we cannot derive an „ought" from an „is" 
(values from facts). So a philosopher who also deals with value questions has to have had 
some more insights in respect to these branches. This would lead us to the position that every 
great philosopher has had, as a basis, a number of insights in respect to the different 
disciplines he was dealing with, which traditionally were epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, 
aesthetics and political philosophy. These categories and their insights were separate, but 
inter-related. 
This analysis does not yet refute the traditional philosophies. It only attacks their claim that 
either epistemology or metaphysics are at the heart of philosophy. Defenders of the traditional 
philosophies could accept my analysis and say that the insights are not personal, but they are 
related to a realm of absolute knowledge. I cannot exclude this possibility, but i f one takes 
into consideration how many philosophies there are, and how much they differ from one 
another, then this provides us with a genuine reason to reject this possibility. 
I f I wanted to sound polemical, I would say that all the different TRUTHS philosophers have 
put forward are nothing but certain personal prejudices (insights) and the arguments were 
just a means to make these plausible (among other things). Of course, defenders of this system 
have to face new problems, problems which I will deal with later. 
This summary wil l , I hope, be fairly useful, for an appreciation ofNietzsche's philosophy, for 
I think this is what Nietzsche meant when he explained that what philosophers do is the 
following: 
„...while what happens at bottom is that a prejudice, a notion, an 'inspiration', generally a 
desire of the heart sifted and made abstract, is defended by them with reasons sought after 
the event - they are one and all advocates who do not want to be regarded as such, and for 
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the most part no better than cunning pleaders for their prejudices, which they babtize 
'truths'..." [BGE 1,5] 
Since Nietzsche applies the same principles which he uses for other philosophies to his own 
philosophy as well, Nietzsche cannot and does not claim that he is putting forward THE 
TRUTH. How he can consistently do this should have become clear by the end of my thesis. 
b. NIETZSCHE'S APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY 
To be able to understand what Nietzsche was after, we first have to give an insight into 
Nietzsche's own way to philosophy. Why did he start to philosophise? What does his way to 
philosophy imply for his definition of philosophy? 
Originally, „Philosopher" means lover (philos) of wisdom (sophia). However, many 
philosophers seem to have presupposed that „philosopher" has to be understood as lover 
(philos) of the tmth (alethia), although this is cleariy the wrong way to translate it. The correct 
translation of philosophy as love of wisdom is one modem philosophy seems to have 
forgotten. I wil l now also be concerned with the question which implications these two 
maimers to understand the notion „philosophy" has on the way philosophy is pursued, and 
what the aims of the philosophers are. By the way the pre 600 B. C. Greeks who have thought 
about the world, life, tmth and wisdom had not called themselves „philosophos", but 
„sophos", which means „wise man". Pythagoras was the first to practise some sort of humility 
and introduced the term „philosophos", which means „friend / lover of wisdom / the tmth". I 
will show that for Nietzsche philosophy was the love of wisdom, and wisdom was related to 
value statements. 
To be able to grasp Nietzsche's understanding of philosophy, we have to have a little bit of 
knowledge about his background and his development towards being a philosopher. He was 
bom on the 15. October 1844 in Rocken into a traditionally Lutheran family. His father and 
both of his grandfathers were Lutheran clergyman. His father died at the age of 36 when 
Nietzsche was only four years old. From then on all the other members of the household, in 
which he was living, were female. There was his mother, his (in)famous sister, and two aunts 
(two unmarried sisters of his father). Al l of them were strict believers and so the values and 
the world view, on which he was brought up, were Lutheran. Lutheranism is the original form 
of Protestant Christianity. The Lutheran understanding of the world is diametrically opposed 
to the ones he became familiar with at Pforta, the all-boys boarding school, which Nietzsche 
attended, and which produced many leading German intellectuals (Novalis, Fichte, 
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KJopstock, Ranke, the brothers Schlegel). At Pforta he received a brilliant classical education. 
Classics, religion and German literature were the subjects he did exceptionally well in. The 
classics, however, which were strongly represented in this school, presented a completely 
different picture of the world and values from the one he used to believe in. In this way 
Nietzsche realised the arbitrariness of the present Christian metaphysics and value system, 
which was the philosophy or rather theology that he was brought up on^ During the years at 
Pforta he gradually abandoned Christianity; the content of what was taught at Pforta was 
especially influential, because it took place during his teenage years, which is usually the time, 
in which one is looking for one's own values, in which one tries to free oneself from the 
constraints of one's family to become an individual. This is the time when one abandons ones 
„Uber-Ich" and creates an ,Jch Ideal", which one then tries to achieve in the future. It is not so 
much that Nietzsche replaced the Christian system with the Ancient Greek one, but rather that 
the realisation of the arbitrariness of these systems made him abandon Christianity. This 
process is best represented in ,yZur Genealogie der Moral" in which exactly this process is 
demonstrated. By the time he left Pforta the process of the abandormient of Christianity was 
more or less completed. 
The process was probably supported by the fact that the history of his illnesses already begun 
when he attended Pforta (he was short-sighted and often plagued by migraine headache 
[Kaufmann (1974): P. 23]). The Lutheran church teaches that whatever happens corresponds 
to the wil l of God. It is of course hard to love a God who is the reason for one's own 
suffering; even harder i f one realises that the God does not necessarily exist. Yet, this is of 
course only one factor which brought about Nietzsche's rejection of Christianity. 
The insight that the values and the metaphysics he was brought up with are not necessary, 
made him face the problem of his own belief system. It created in him the will to find a new 
system - one that he could relate to -, because i f one believes in some metaphysical and value 
system, then one always knows how to act. It provides a basis, upon which one can decide 
what is the right choice for oneself, and a sense of stability, which all of us need to survive. 
Nietzsche was aware of this: 
„...the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an 
individual, of a people, and of a culture." [UM 2, 1] 
^Although, he had the possibility of deciding that Christianity is the highest form of a belief system - the closest 
we can come to the truth, yet. However, as he drew the inference that it is just one out of many, one can see that 
he does not think that the world has a determined form .... This remark could lead me mto a far reaching 
discussion, which I do not wish to start at the moment, because the problems will clarify itself within my thesis 
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The historical refers to the awareness of the great variety of systems which have been most 
powerful (in the section 'DIONYSOS'), and the unhistorical refers to some stable system or 
perhaps better interpretation of the world, which one needs oneself (in the section 
'APOLLO'). While Nietzsche was at university he discovered Schopenhauer, but his system 
also did not correspond to his demands, so in the end he had to transcend it as well. Yet, I do 
not now wish to concern myself with his personal development, but with the question I had 
asked before: What made him turn to philosophy? The answer to this is the loss of his old 
Lutheran faith by realising the contingency of metaphysical and value systems. The belief 
system and the values he used to live by he considered were no longer universally valid. This 
made him wonder whether there were no other systems or values, which were better (in 
whatever respect) for himself Primarily, it was not the metaphysics, but the value system he 
needed, because this one needs at every moment. Whenever one makes a decision, by 
choosing one thing rather than another, one evaluates this thing higher than the other thing. So 
what he was in need of was a new value system: 
, A l l the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the ftiture task of the 
philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination 
of the order of rank of values." [GM 1. Essay note] 
Although the theory of value was Nietzsche's main concem, he also had to deal with 
metaphysical questions, because value systems always find their ultimate justification in a 
metaphysics. Nietzsche who has traditionally been referred to as the major critic of 
metaphysics acknowledges this himself: 
„In regard to philosophical metaphysics, I see more and more who are making for the 
negative goal (that all positive metaphysics is an error) but still few who are taking a few 
steps back; for one may well look out over the topmost rung of the ladder, but one ought not 
to want to stand on it. The most enlightened get only as far as liberating themselves from 
metaphysics and looking back on it from above; whereas here too, as in the hippodrome, at 
the end of the track it is necessary to turn the comer." [HAH 1, 20] 
What he means when he says that one has to go beyond the state, in which one rejects all 
positive metaphysics, should become clear soon. It should however already be clear that it is a 
return to some sort of metaphysics. 
Why did Nietzsche tum to philosophy? 
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So far we can say that Nietzsche's primary concern was to find a value system for himself (so 
he probably would have understood philosophy as love of wisdom rather than love of the 
truth). Since value systems always have their ultimate justification in some sort of 
metaphysics (although one carmnot derive them from them), as one can see in the examples of 
Plato and Aristotle in the best way, it seems clear that he has to deal with the traditional 
questions of philosophy as well. In contrast to most of the thinkers prior to him, he would 
have agreed with the analysis of what philosophers actually do, which I gave earlier on. I have 
said earlier that a great philosopher has to have many special and consistent insights in the 
different disciplines of philosophy. Traditional philosophers might have agreed with this as 
well, but they would have added that the insights are related to either another world of eternal 
truth or the sense perceptions that all of us supposedly have in common. Both of these cases 
imply that the philosophy, which comes out in the end, must be the same for everyone who 
fulfils this task properly, e.g. there is only one truth and the true philosophy reveals it. This, 
however, is something Nietzsche denies. He takes into consideration how many philosophers 
have lived and how many different systems were brought about by them. This made him 
believe that all philosophies are contingent. However, as he would subscribe to the analysis of 
philosophy I have stated before, he realises that all philosophies have in common that they 
were created by human beings who are related in some way to what they have created. He 
denies that there is an absolute realm of knowledge, which is independent of its perceiver, 
whether it is the realm of physical objects or the realm of eternal truth. Whatever a person 
says or does always expresses something about the person in question. This is one of his basis 
insights. Because this is his position, he also carmot and does not put his own views forward 
as the truth. He claims that all he says simply represents his own perspective, based on his 
own insights. Why does he put it forward then, i f he just regards it as his perspective, one 
might wonder? Well, he regards it as superior in some respect, but not in respect to the truth. 
He thinks that his perspective represents what the Spirit of the times will make one think in 
the next centuries. This might sound very prophetic at the moment, but I wil l not clarify this 
point any further at this stage. As I have said before, the way in whichNietzsche replies to this 
question is what this thesis mainly is supposed to demonstrate. 
So let me come back to Nietzsche's starting point. Although he is mainly concerned with 
values, he also has to deal with the other traditional questions of philosophy for the sake of 
justification of his values. After he realised the variety of philosophies in the world, he 
thought that there cannot be an absolute realm or objective external world to which all of 
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these diverse thinkers have access, but that the expression of a philosophical view was always 
mainly influenced by the one who expressed it. The position was also held by Fichte who 
claimed that what philosophy one adopts depends upon what kind of person one is. Nietzsche 
always sees the wholeness of a person when referring to a philosopher, because of his 
conception that all the different drives and aims in a person always have to interact with each 
other. The necessary conclusion given these observations is that the whole person is 
responsible for the philosophy a person creates. The whole person for him is what he calls the 
whole body, because a human being, for him, is the person's body and nothing else. This is 
what he uses as the starting point for his philosophy, as I will show now. 
Since Nietzsche regards the body as being responsible for bringing about whatever one thinks 
and does, he calls the body the „great reason" and opposes it in this way to our intellect, which 
is our „small reason", according to him. This „great reason" is the basis for his philosophy'*. 
He regards it as superior to the „small reason" of the intellect. The „latter [intellect] is a mere 
'tool or toy' of the former [body]" [ed. Parkes (1991): P. 214] All the onfollowing Nietzsche 
quotations with the reference to the Kritische Studien Ausgabe = KSA have been taken from 
the article, from which I have taken the last quote]. Yet, Nietzsche's understanding of the term 
„body" is very different from its normal meaning, as is made clear in „Thus spoke 
Zarathustra" [Z 1 „0n the despisers of the body"]: 
„But the awakened, the enlightened man says: 1 am body entirely, and nothing beside; and 
soul is only something about the body. 
The body is a great reason, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a 
herdsman. 
Your small reason, which you call spirit, is also a instrument of your body, a little 
instrument and toy of your great reason. 
You say 'I ' and are proud of this word. But greater than this - although you will not believe 
it - is your body and its great reason, which does not say T but does T . " 
This Statement goes directly against the westem philosophical (rationalist) tradition prior to 
Nietzsche, thinkers who mostly despised the body. It was typical for the earlier thinkers to 
believe that the „I" is a non-physical entity which contains our reason or intellect, with which 
we can get to know the eternal tmth about the world (Descartes). - In addition Nietzsche was 
not much interested in the empiricist tradition. However, his relationship to empiricism is not 
This way of thinking was taken up again by Peter Sloterdijk who stresses the importance of the whole body. 
[Sloterdijk(1983)] 
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that easily categorised. This should become clearer in the main parts of this thesis.- Referring 
to the rationalist tradition he said [KSA 13, 14 [96] in ed. Parkes (1991): P. 221]: 
„Their insanity was that one could carry around a 'beautiful soul' in a misbegotten corpse." 
An even clearer characterisation ofNietzsche's approach to philosophy is given in the preface 
2 of the „Gay Science": 
„The unconscious disguise of philosophical needs under the cloaks of the objective, ideal, 
purely spiritual goes to frightening length - and often I have asked myself whether, taking a 
large view, philosophy has not been merely an interpretation of the body and a 
misunderstanding of the body. Behind the value judgements, which have hitherto guided the 
history of thought, there are concealed misunderstandings of the physical constitution - of 
individuals or classes or whole races." 
Nietzsche later in his work did reject the thesis that the body was physical, because then he 
held that everything is the will to power, but I think at the moment that we can leave this point 
aside. To prove that the aforementioned approach actually turns up fairly often in Nietzsche I 
will cite a couple of more passages, in which he expresses his approach to philosophy fairly 
clearly: 
Nietzsche maintains that the body is 
„By far the richer phenomenon, affording much clearer observation" [KSA 11, 40[15] in ed. 
Parkes (1991): P. 221]. 
„It is therefore methodologically permissible to take the richer phenomenon as a key to the 
understanding of the poorer" [KSA 12, 2 [91] in ed. Parkes (1991): P. 221] 
„The human body, in which the whole of the farthest and nearest past of all organic 
becoming again becomes vitally incamate, through which and way beyond which an 
enormous inaudible river seems to flow: the body is a far more amazing idea than the old 
'soul'" [KSA 11, 36 [35] in ed. Parkes (1991): P. 222] 
„The entire development of the spirit is perhaps a matter of the body: it is the story - now 
becoming perceptible - of a higher's body shaping itself The organic climbs up still higher 
levels. [KSA 10, 24 [20] in ed. Parkes (1991): P. 222] 
Perhaps the clearest rejection of empiricism and rationalism is the following statement: 
„Sense and spirit are instruments and toys: behind them still lies the Self It rules and is also 
the I's ruler. 
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Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a mighty commander, an unknown 
sage - he is called Self. He lives in your body, he is your body." [Z 1 „0n the despisers of 
the body"] 
Another point which should be stressed in this respect is that he does not contradict himself 
when he claims that he is a psychologist and on other pages that he is a physiologist, because 
he believes that the opposition of body and soul is nearly completely abandoned [UP 168f. 
This is the reason why he can say that 
„Proper refutations are physiological - bodily - ones, - and so the setting aside of ways of 
thought" [IB 2, 858 PF] 
and also defend that: 
„Never yet has a deeper world of insight revealed itself to daring travellers and advenmrers; 
and the psychologist who in this fashion 'brings a sacrifice' - it is not the sacrifizio dell' 
intelletto, on the contrary! - will at least be entitled to demand in return that psychology 
shall again be recognized as the queen of the sciences, to serve and prepare for which the 
other sciences exist. For psychology is now once and again the road to the fundamental 
problems." [BGE 1,23] 
To summarise the argument so far: 
Nietzsche realised that in different times and at different places different philosophies have 
been regarded as true. 
This observation convinces him that none of these philosophies is true. 
He explains the existence of the different philosophies by reference to the different types of 
human beings the philosophers who created them were. 
The whole of a human being brings about their philosophy. 
(Of course he is not claiming that what the philosophers think was not at all influenced by the 
time they were living in) 
The whole of a human being is its body. 
The body brings about what philosophers regard as necessary. (This is also the reason 
Nietzsche uses ad hominem arguments and, in contrast to other philosophers, is justified in 
^ Although Freud denies that he had read Nietzsche when he was young, he acknowledged the similarity of 
Nietzsche's insights to the discoveries of his own psychoanalysis [Storr (1989): P. 120]. 
At this point, I also wish to stress that Lou Andreas-Salome, to whom Nietzsche proposed when he was in his late 
thirties and who Nietzsche regarded as having a similar outlook onto the world as himself, later on became a 
close friend of Freud (he kept a picture of her in his study room until he died), a student of psychoanalysis, and a 
psychoanalyst. She was also acquainted with Tolstoy, and Rilke, to name only a few of her many famous friends. 
34 
using them. What he does not do, however, is commit the genetic fallacy, i.e. he does not claim 
that he can disprove a theory by explaining how it came about. All he can do is to give 
plausible reasons to show why his thoughts are so appealing.) 
Nietzsche's body brought about his views, since his views also apply to himself. 
There are, however, certain significant problems raised by this approach which I want to 
explore in some detail at a later stage. In brief these are as follows: 
Since no human being has a better justified perspective (because each human being has only 
one body), all philosophies are equally false in respect to THE TRUTH. 
Still it is clear that we do not regard all philosophies as equally false, because we could not 
survive if we did this (we could never make any decision), and therefore our bodies developed 
a certain faculty (the intellect), which provides us with a basis upon which we can create a 
hierarchy of philosophies. 
Our intellect tells us that what is contradictory cannot be correct. 
So what is least contradictory is regarded as the best philosophy. (Nietzsche thinks the 
scientific Spirit (with the intellect) will govern the next centuries and this will make his 
philosophy inevitable. The past centuries, according to him, were governed by the religious 
Spirit, which then served the body as a means to survival.) 
These, however, are only principles of our intellect (principle of coherence, which enables us 
to survive, but which does not correspond to reality - given Nietzsche's definition of the truth, 
which I will describe in the main parts of the thesis). 
The last part of this argument will be set out in much more detail in the main part of the 
thesis. The following couple of lines are intented simply to show how Nietzsche gets from the 
insights just mentioned to the thought that the world is the will to power. It is important to 
bear in mind that the Will to power is different from the will to life in Schopenhauer, because 
the will to life in Schopenhauer is a close approximation to the „thing itself (the noumenon), 
but Nietzsche cannot make sense out of the expression „the thing itself, since all the things 
he is acquainted with stand in a relation to himself and therefore cannot be „the thing itself or 
the „things themselves". From this he concludes that the apparent world, i.e. the world he is 
acquainted with, is the only possible and thus the only real world. This should become clearer 
in the section on the will to power: 
Why does the body want to survive? or Why did the body develop the intellect? 
For only if the body survives can it be powerful and power is what the whole body is aiming 
for, according to Nietzsche. Everything which happens within the body aims for power. 
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There is a permanent power struggle between the different parts of the body, which are part 
of the body's struggle for power in the world. 
A further insight, brought about by Nietzsche's own body, told him that his body is within the 
world (is a part of the world).^ 
From this he concludes that not only his body is will to power, but that the whole world is will 
to power and nothing else. ^  
However, he remains consistent with what he said before by holding that this insight again 
was brought about by his body^ and is therefore only his philosophy (However, he thinks this 
will be regarded as necessary during the next centuries, because it was created via the help of 
principles of the intellect, the decisive capacity in making a decision about what most human 
beings think about the world in the forthcoming centuries). 
With this background, I can now start to describe what the will to power is, according to 
Nietzsche, in the next chapter (the beginning of the first main part). 
* ,JVIan, in his highest and most noble elements, belongs completely to nature and carries its strange dual 
character within himself" [HC 1, my own translation] 
„Will can naturally only have an effect on will not on anything else [other materials]." [Nietzsche in Jaspers 
(1947): P. 312, my own translation] 
' „Only where there is life is there also will; not will to life but - thus I teach you - will to power.... Thus life once 
taught me; and with thisi shall yet solve the riddle of your heart, you who are wisest." [Z „0n Self-Overcoming"] 
^ „There was no psychology at all before me" [EH „Why I am a destiny", 6] 
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APOLLO 
I have baptised this part APOLLO by reference to Nietzsche's earliest work „The Birth of 
Tragedy" in which he described how through the union of the opposing forces, APOLLO and 
DIONYSOS, tragedy was created. APOLLO and DIONYSOS stand for the creative and the 
destructive force in a human being as well as in nature. However, Nietzsche alters his position 
in his mature works on these forces. But at the moment there is no need to go into more detail 
about what these forces stand for in the „Birth of Tragedy". The headings of my main parts are 
not meant to correspond exactly to the meanings Nietzsche attributed to them at the time. 
Still, the sense which they have in my thesis is closely related to Nietzsche's, and shortly I 
will spell out what they are supposed to mean. One should also bear in mind that DIONYSOS 
in Nietzsche's latest works is a nearly perfect synthesis of APOLLO and DIONYSOS from 
his earlier ones. APOLLO in this thesis mainly refers to the outcome of the creative force in 
human beings irrespective of what is created. (It refers to ones own perspective or world-
view). In our case the human being meant is Nietzsche. DIONYSOS mainly refers to the 
outcome of the destructive force in human beings irrespective of what is destroyed. (Here ones 
own perspective is taken just as one of many in the history of thought, irrespective of one's 
own special relation to it). 
In this part I wil l describe the metaphysical side ofNietzsche's „artistic metaphysics" and in 
the next main part, I will be concerned with the artistic aspect itself The notion that 
metaphysics is artistic implies that Nietzsche does not put it forward as THE TRUTH. 
Metaphysics has to be read not in Nietzsche's sense of the word (as referring to a philosophy 
which postulates a real world, beyond the physical one), but meaning a description of the 
world, an ontology. I will show that Nietzsche does put forward an ontology in the literal 
sense of the word - the only contrast to the traditional ontologies being that it is not referred to 
as the true one. 
' The reason why I am adding „nearly perfect" is the same as why I hold that my use of APOLLO and 
DIONYSOS does not exactly correspond to Nietzsche's in his earlier work. In the „Birth of Tragedy" there was 
a third force, which he referred to as SOCRATES. SOCRATES was connected with logic, reason and 
Christianity and was opposed to APOLLO and DIONYSOS. Later on, Nietzsche revised his position in respect to 
logic and reason and integrated both of them in his own views, but he kept his antagonistic position in respect to 
Christianity. Due to his altered views towards logic and reason, I had to say „nearly perfect" and that his use of 
APOLLO and DIONYSUS in the „Birth of Tragedy" is slightly different to the one I attribute to them. Yet, I can 
say that the synthesis of my use of the notions APOLLO and DIONYSOS does correspond to Nietzsche's use of 
the notion DIONYSOS in his latest works. 
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In the last section of the introduction I tried to justify why I am starting my thesis with 
Nietzsche's metaphysics. The last point I was dealing with then was that for Nietzsche „the 
world is will to power and nothing besides". This I have to clarify in the first secfion of this 
main part. This main part of the thesis is divided up into two sections: the first one deals with 
the will to power and the second one with the eternal recurrence. Both of these topics are 
essential for an understanding of what the world is like for Nietzsche. There is one main 
element of Nietzsche's metaphysics which I will leave out here, his view that a thing is 
nothing but the sum of its effects, because it is more useful for my purposes to deal with this 
in the section on truth and perspectivism in the second main part of the thesis. 
U 
a. WILL TO POWER 
There have been many philosophers who regarded the striving for power to be the basis of all 
human actions, and the ones in question are not not limited to a certain period of time or area. 
This one can see from the following examples: Thrasymachus, Hobbes, Adler, Foucault. 
However, Nietzsche went fiarther than them, for he held that the whole world is will to power 
[WP 1067]. What does this mean? 
Firstly, I want to mention some other expressions which Nietzsche sometimes uses instead of 
will to power. The most important ones are „organic", „life", and „force". However, one must 
be carefiil here, because some of these notions are ambiguous in Nietzsche's work; he 
employs the notions „organic" and „life" in various ways. In this thesis they only concern me 
when they are predicated of the whole, e.g. that everything is alive and organic, because 
everything is will to power. There is at least one other meaning of „life" and „organic" to be 
found in Nietzsche which is used to distinguish things with the conmion mode of (what one 
normally understands as) nutrition from the ones without. Even nutrition has two meanings in 
Nietzsche; firstly, the normal meaning, and secondly a slightly altered one which applies to 
the whole world. Because I do not have the space to deal with all of the conotations of this 
word, I will restrict my discussion to the one relevant for my purposes and simply point to the 
fact that there is another meaning of the notion to be found in Nietzsche. The justification for 
what I have just said will come up when it is needed in every individual case. 
I wil l use the different notions which are equivalent to the will to power to be able to collect 
the qualities claimed for the will to power and his justification for these claims. In this way we 
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can slowly build up our understanding of the will to power. I wil l start with the qualities 
Nietzsche attributes to the will to power, when he talks about the „organic", then with the 
notion „life", and „force". After that, I will briefly discuss his justification of why these 
qualities have to be thought of in connection with the will to power. 
b. THE ORGANIC 
We usually divide the world into the organic and the unorganic. However, Nietzsche does not 
believe that this distinction makes much sense, because everything, according to him, is 
governed by the will to power: 
„- that the will to power is what governs the inorganic world as well - or rather that there is 
no inorganic worid," [IB 2, 266, PF] 
So one could say that for Nietzsche the whole world is organic. This does not imply that there 
is only one organism, because this contradicts the assumption that the whole world is organic: 
„An infmite Becoming is a contradiction in terms, as it would call for an ever increasing 
force, and where would that mcrease come from? What would it feed on, so as to leave a 
remainder? The supposition that the universe is an organism contradicts the nature of what 
is organic." [IB 2, 1312, PF] 
All we have to consider at the moment is that something organic is an organism and needs 
nutrition in some way. Yet, i f we assumed that the whole world was one organism, this would 
contradict the assumption that it is an organic being, because it could not nourish itself 
Nutrition is a function which needs an organism and something external to it with which the 
organism can nourish itself So it cannot be that individual organisms grow together to the 
point where the whole world is one organism. There is something else we can infer from this 
aphorism, namely that Nietzsche applies his intellect to his thoughts and insights. I f something 
is contradictory it cannot be correct for him. This seems to go against what he claims 
elsewhere: 
„In the formation of reason, logic, the categories, it was need that was authoritative... the 
utilitarian fact that only when we see things coarsely and made equal do they become 
calculabel and usable for us... The categories are 'truths' only in the sense that they are 
conditions of life for us... The subjective compulsion not to contradict here is a biological 
compulsion... But what naivete to extract from this a proof that we are therewith in 
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possession of a 'truth in itself!- Not being able to contradict is proof of an incapacity, not 
of'truth'." [WP515] 
Here he clearly says that not being able to contradict a statement does not show that 
something is true, but earlier he also said about a statement that it is NIETZSCHE'S TRUTH, 
because the opposite claim would be contradictory. Here we already realise the apparent 
tension within his thought which needs to be resolved. As I said before what I am putting 
forward in APOLLO is HIS (NIETZSCHE'S) TRUTH. Of NIETZSCHE'S TRUTH Nietzsche 
does not claim that it is THE TRUTH. He has got NIETZSCHE'S TRUTH, because 
something stable is essential for ones own survival. We cannot survive i f we take our own 
beliefs to be as valid as all the others in the history of thought. Historical awareness is not 
enough to resolve the issue. APOLLO deals with what is stable (unhistorical) for Nietzsche, 
and DIONYSOS with his historical awareness. APOLLO just contains NIETZSCHE'S 
TRUTH. So far it seems that NIETZSCHE'S TRUTH is meant to and does appeal to the 
intellect, e.g. logic and the categories of reason, because he used the law of non contradiction 
to establish that even i f (or because) the whole world is organic, it cannot be the case that the 
whole world is an organism. He has even given us one reason already why he wanted 
NIETZSCHE'S TRUTH to appeal to the intellect by saying that it is necessary for our 
survival, as he said before. Yet, this is not the essential point, as I will show in the last part of 
the thesis. 
Which qualities does Nietzsche attribute to the world by saying that it is organic? 
„I take it for granted that every thing organic has memory and a sort of mind [spirit]. Only 
the the apparatus of it is so delicate that for us it seems to be non-existent." [IB 2, 300, PF] 
So the whole world or rather all organic things have a memory and a mind and he also 
explains why it does not appear to us like this by holding that the apparatus in many cases is 
too little, so that we carmot perceive it. Memory is the „amount of experience of all organic 
life" [IB 2, 303] There is no forgetting in the organic realm, only some sort of digestion of 
what was experienced. [IB 2, 302]. This means that everything a thing (an organism) was 
involved in is still contained in that thing. I will soon clarify what Nietzsche means when he 
refers to a thing (an organism). Yet, all organic things (all organisms, the whole world) not 
only have memory, but also has some sort of mind. Nietzsche just wants to say that one has to 
attribute perception to all the objects in the world [IB 2, 286]. I will soon explain why this has 
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to be the case. The necessity of attributing the quality of a mind to the whole world makes his 
metaphysics appear to be very similar to Leibnitz', Spinoza's or some panpsychic world 
view.'^ In addition to the two qualities of the organic world mentioned, Nietzsche thinks that 
„the organic process presupposes permanent interpretation" [WP 643]. I wil l dedicate a whole 
section to explain the process of interpretation. 
c. LIFE & FORCE 
Another way to refer to the „organic world" is to say „life". The whole world is living, is 
organic, is will to power. The notion „life" implies many characteristics, e.g. order 
(hierarchy), striving, growth: 
„the order of rank, merely formulates the highest law of life". [AC 57] 
„In order to understand what 'life' is, what kind of striving and tension life is, the formula 
must apply as well to trees and plants as to animals." [WP 704] 
„It is part of the concept of living that it must grow - that it must extend its power and 
consequently incorporate alien forces." [WP 728] 
Order (Hierarchy), striving, tension, growth, is characteristic of life, and implies inequality 
between the different things. To live is to be will to power [Z „0n Self Overcoming"; BGE, 1, 
13; BGE 9, 259; WP 55; WP 254; IB 2, 878], so the inequality of things has to be seen in 
respect to their power, combined with their wil l . That one is justified in distinguishing the wil l 
and the power becomes obvious in Nietzsche's work, where he talks about the wil l or power 
only; for example when he explains that a certain quanta of will corresponds to a quanta of 
force [GM 1,13]. This seems to imply that whenever he talks about force, he is talking only 
about the will as something seperate from its goal - power. This is not so, because in the „Will 
to Power" [WP 688] he equates force with the will to power. So, „force" again is an 
ambiguous notion which one must handle very carefully. Most of the time he uses force to talk 
about the will to power. For the time being, I wish to leave the expression „will to power" 
again, and focus on „force". „Force" and „space" are different expressions for the same thing 
'°a. C. G. Jung took up these notions from Nietzsche's philosophy, and combined them with Schopenhauer's 
Platonic forms. In this way, he formed his theory of the archetypes which are permanently changing, unlike the 
Platonic forms. 
b. For a comparison ofNietzsche's and Leibnitz' metaphysics see Poellner [Poellner (1995): P. 277], and for a 
study on Spinoza and Nietzsche see Wurtzer [Wurtzer (1975)]. 
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[IB 2, 282]", so that it is obviously senseless or rather contradictory to talk of „empty space". 
Nietzsche tells us even more about „force", e.g. the amount of force always remains constant, 
force is not infinite, force has only a certain number of possible properties: 
„At one time, it was thought that to an infinite activity in time there pertained a force that 
was infinite and that no employment would use up. Now, the force is believed to be 
unvarymg, and so not needing any more to be infmitely great." [IB 2, 1310, PF] 
„we forbid ourselves the notion of an infmite force; it is incompatible with the concept 
'force'" [IB 2, 1313, PF] 
„There have been infinitely many layers of force, but not infinitely different layers. That 
would presuppose an indeterminate force. Force has only a 'certain number' of possible 
properties." [IB 2, 1311,PF] 
Human beings have to think that the whole amount of force always remains constant, and is 
finite, and force can appear only in certain amounts, Nietzsche claims. These characteristics 
will be very important in the next sub-part [1.2]. At the moment they confirm that Nietzsche's 
metaphysics appeals or is supposed to appeal to the intellect, because he regards it as 
inevitable for us to hold these positions. 
What can we say so far? 
For Nietzsche the world is organic, is life, is force, is the will to power. The qualities he 
attributes to the organic things or organisms which constitute the world (the whole world 
carmot be one organism, but it is completely organic, so it has to be constituted out of 
organisms), are as follows: organisms have a mind, memory, the ability to digest the 
memories, and interpretative capacities. The whole amount of force or will to power is finite 
and always remains the same; things in the world can only be constituted out of certain 
amounts of force; the relationships these things have among each other are relationships in 
respect to their strength; and the central notion which underlies all the other ones is will to 
power, of course. In addition to this there is no such thing as „empty space" [IB 2, 282], 
because the world is „will to power and nothing besides" and „will can only act upon wi l l" 
[BGE 2,36]. 
" „That 'force' and 'space'are merely two expressions and different perspectives of the same thing: that 'empty 
space' is a contradiction in terms, in the same way as 'absolute purpose' (in Kant), 'the thing in itself (in Kant), 
'infmite force', 'blind will' -" [IB 2, 282, my own translation] 
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We have already gained some understanding ofNietzsche's metaphysics. His justification for 
some of the qualities of will to power are still far from clear however and these I wil l turn to 
next. 
These qualities fall under two separate categories of justification. They either follow by 
necessity from his initial insight that the world is will to power and organic, or they are 
justified logically - by means of the intellect. Let me start with the first category of 
justification. 
Since the world is will to power, it is organic. This step does not need any further justification; 
it is just the way it is. But the world cannot be one organism; it has to consist of many 
organisms, each one willing for power. For the time being let us assume that each organism 
aims for the greatest power increase at any instant. To do this each organism has to fight the 
best suited opponent for this purpose. To find out which one the best suited one is, it has to 
estimate the strength of the other organisms. This process Nietzsche calls „interpretation". 
Therefore all organisms must have the quality of being able to interpret. To interpret or to 
estimate the strength of opponents an organism needs to perceive them. For this purpose it 
needs a mind. Therefore, Nietzsche had to hold that all organisms have a mind. Yet, a mind on 
its own is not sufficient for interpretation. An interpretation can only be made on a basis; this 
basis is constituted out of past experiences and ones own qualities (vaguely). This is one 
reason why organisms in Nietzsche's theory needed a memory. Nietzsche has a very broad 
understanding of memory, as not only containing the experiences one has had oneself, but also 
those from one's forefathers [BGE 264] (Again Nietzsche's views are much closer to Jung's 
than they are to Freud's). The relations between organisms, e.g. hierarchy, and the qualities 
within them, e.g. strife and growth, are derived from the principle of the will to power itself 
Since the world is the „will to power and nothing besides" and that „will can only act upon 
wi l l " [BGE 2,36], there can be no such thing as empty space. From this short passage one can 
get an idea ofNietzsche's justification of some of the qualities of will to power. 
Turning to the second category of justification, this concerns qualities justified by reference to 
the intellect rather than by direct reference to the will to power; in these cases, it would lead to 
a contradiction i f one tried to reject them. The second category (intellect), is based upon the 
first category (will to power). 
Firstly, we can mention the claim that „will can only act upon wil l" . This also belongs in the 
first category, because it follows from the claim that everything is will to power. But it can 
also be justified on its own as appealing to the demands of one's intellect. Spinoza also used 
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this claim. In him it can be found as a premise of his reductio ad absurdum argument which 
he, however, employed to show that there can be only one substance: PI = Two substances 
can only interact i f they have a quality in common. P2 = I f they have a quality in common, 
their essence is identical as well. C = Therefore there can only be one substance. PI and P2 
imply that substances can only interact i f their essence is identical, which in Nietzsche is 
expressed as „will can only act upon wil l" . This premise in Nietzsche as well as in Spinoza 
brings about an ontology consisting of one kind of substance. Yet, the difference between 
them is that in Spinoza the substance is unified, whereas in Nietzsche it cannot be unified, but 
has to be multiple.'^ Since the phrase „will can only act upon wi l l" can be taken as a self-
evident statement, I think that it is justified to put it in the second category of justifications. 
Secondly, there is the claim that the overall amount of force or will to power always is the 
same - the preservation of force or will to power, which can also be regarded as self-evident. 
Thirdly, Nietzsche's remarks that the notion of force is incommensurable with the notion of 
infinity which appeals to the intellect, and the point that force can only appear in certain 
quanta is in agreement with modem physics, for according to them energy can only appear in 
a quantity which is the integral multiple of the Planck constant. I will come back to this point 
in more detail in the next sub-part (1.2). 
The second category of justification makes it clear that his theory is supposed to appeal to the 
intellect. Why this is necessary for him will be explained later. So far, we should only bear in 
mind Nietzsche's remark from earlier on, that what cannot be thought otherwise does not have 
to be THE TRUTH. Nietzsche thinks that some things are necessary for us to think, because 
they are essential for our survival. Of course, the will to power is the basis for our drive for 
survival. In this way the second category follows from the first category, the basis of which 
can be traced back to the argument in section D. There I explained howNietzschee got the 
insight that the world is will to power. The first category completely depends on this. 
d. WILL TO POWER 
POWER-OUANTA & POWER-CONSTELLATION 
Having dealt with the qualities of the world mentioned in relation to the organic, life, and 
force, we can now turn to the „will to power" to get a better grasp of what have been referred 
to as „organisms" until now. 
'^In addition in Spinoza the amount of substance is unlimited, whereas in Nietzsche it is limited. This, however, 
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How then can we imagine this will to power? 
According to Grimm the will to power is discontinuous and „consists of discrete, separate 
power-quanta which differ from one another only quantitatively (i.e. in degree of power), 
qualities being derivative of these quantitative differences." [Grimm (1977): P. 3]. He cites 
some passages to support this interpretation: 
„... there is no will: there are treaty drafts of will that are constantly increasing or losing 
their power." [WP 715] 
„My idea is that every specific body'strives to become master over all space and to extend 
its force (-its will to power;) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it 
continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies, and ends by coming to an 
arrangement ('union') with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: - thus they then 
conspire together for power. And the process goes on..." [WP 636] 
Grimm is right that Nietzsche does not hold that there is one unified wil l , but he definitely 
holds that the power-quanta are not completely discrete and separate. Of course, each power-
quanta is defined by reference to its focus'\ but its borders are not as clearly defined as 
Grimm claims, because they are permanently interacting with their surrounding. Nietzsche 
cannot have held a position compatible with Grimm's interpretation, because Nietzsche holds 
that there is no such thing as „empty space" [IB 2, 282], for „will can only act upon wi l l " 
[BGE 2,36], and therefore a power-quantum always has to interact with another one. 
However, there would have to be „empty space", i f Grimm's theory was correct and the 
power-quanta were completely separate and discrete. Therefore, it should be clear that what 
Nietzsche had in mind was a continuum (like most of the traditional metaphysical systems), 
though, in his case it was modified around certain centres which are in a permanent struggle 
with each other. The radius of each centre is fairly clearly defined, yet there is a certain area at 
the outer end of the radius, where the interaction with the other power-quantum takes place, 
which is more or less determinate, depending on the strength of the surrounding power-quanta 
and the relation one has with them. I f a power-quantum works together with surrounding 
power-quanta, i f it is far superior to them, or i f they are indifferent to it, then its borders will 
(in most cases) be fairly stable, because then the struggle between the power-quanta is at a 
is not relevant to the point in question. 
'•'Willens-Punktationen -trans, as power-quanta- seems to imply that the will to power is just at a point. This 
however is misleading. The notion just includes the reference to the will. The will of the organism is a point, but 
the power is structure around it, one could say. This point has most probably misled Grimm to his mistaken 
interpretation. 
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minimum. However, i f there are two hostile power-quanta fighting with each other, both being 
equally strong, then their borders will usually be less clear. Imagine two boxers fighting 
against each other, bleeding, losing their ear lobes, in contrast to a couple in love which would 
be an example for the prior case'"*. This will soon become clearer. 
Grimm argues that for Nietzsche qualities are derived from the quantitative differences of 
power-quanta, because i f the world is will to power then it seems there cannot be any 
qualitative difference between worldly things. But this analysis cannot be right. It should be 
remembered that will to power has a memory. Now we can enquire how the memory is 
distributed. I f each power-quantum has a memory of its own then there could be qualitative 
differences in will to power as well, in which case Grimm would not be right. I cannot find 
anything definite in Nietzsche on this topic, but one can infer what he probably would have to 
say. Each power-quantum has its particular experiences which it can keep in its memory. It 
does not seem possible that these experiences can be accessible to all power-quanta straight 
away, given Nietzsche's denial that the world can be one unified organism. Yet power quanta 
permanently react with each other and thereby exchange parts of their will to power, so that 
the accompanying memory is also being exchanged. From this we can infer that there should 
be some memories which are universal, but others which can only be found in certain regions 
and again others only in one particular power-quantum. This again suggests Grimm is wrong, 
because Nietzsche must have held that there are not only quantitative differences between 
power-quanta but also qualitative ones, since the different histories of the power-quanta and 
therewith the different contents of their memory must also have brought about different 
qualities. Thus Grimm's explanation for differences with respect to qualities does not seem 
right. 
To get a better grasp of what will to power is, we should consider the following passages [WP 
1067; WP 715]: 
„And do you know what 'the worid' is to me?...a monster of energy, without beginning, 
without end; a frnn, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does 
not expend itself, but only transforms itself; as a whole of unalterable size... set in a defmite 
space as a defmite force, and not a space that might be 'empty' here or there... at the same 
time one and many, increasmg here and at the same time decreasing there... eternally 
changing... out of the simplest forms striving toward the most complex... and then remming 
14 In Sun Tzu's „Art of War" [Tzu (1990)] one can fmd some of the possible relationships between powers. Many 
of Sun Tzu's insights can also be found in Nietzsche's work 
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home to the simple out of this abundance... This worid is the will to power - and nothing 
besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power - and nothing besides!" [WP 1067] 
„- There are no durable ultimate units, no atoms, no monads... there is no will: there are 
treaty drafts of will that are constantly increasing or losing their power." [WP 715] 
Because Nietzsche holds that everything is permanently undergoing change, he had to say that 
there are no ultimate lasting entities. Even power-quanta (Willens-Punktationen) are not 
eternal, for they can dissolve and come into existence, as he explicitly states [WP 715]. 
Although Nietzsche rejects the concept of the Leibnitzian monad in respect to stability, it must 
be acknowledged that Nietzsche's power-quanta have a lot in common with the Leibnitzian 
monads. In the same way, as everything for Nietzsche is constituted out of power-quanta, 
everything for Leibnitz is made out of monads (stones, plants, human beings...) which implies 
that in both cases the world is organic, and monads as well as power-quanta have 
„perceptions", i.e. mental states, of which not all are conscious. Yet, one should not press the 
similarity too far, because in Leibnitz all the monads have the same initial cause because they 
were created by God, whereas Nietzsche rejects the possibility that the world can be one 
organism, and in Leibnitz the monads cannot interact with another, but are where they are, and 
perceive whatever they perceive due to a pre-established harmony, whereas in Nietzsche 
interactions among power-quanta, and perception actually takes place. 
So far I dealt with the power-quantum which is an individual will to power. Now I briefly 
have to mention the „power-constellation" („Machtkonstellation") or „organism" which is no 
longer a single power-quantum, but a collection of power-quanta. Grimm correctly said that 
„power-quanta arrange themselves into groups or ... power-constellations...in order to 
collectively increase their individual power." [Grimm (1977): P. 4]. As I have said before, 
every power-quantum tries to maximally enhance its own power at each instant. I f this can be 
done more effectively in a power-constellation, i.e. together with other power-quanta, then the 
individual power-quantum will take this option. „The unity which these power-groups display 
is analogous to that of a political federation , in which each member is primarily concerned 
with ftirthering his own ends, but finds that his own ends are better accomplished by 
combining forces with others" [Grimm (1977): P. 4]. 
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The question which comes to mind is whether each power-quantum in every moment tries to 
attain the greatest increase of power or whether power-quanta can refrain from aiming for the 
greatest increase at one moment in order to have a higher increase in the fiiture? 
It seems most likely that a single power-quantum always has to try to attain the greatest 
increase of power for itself at any moment, for it does not have the capacity to delay striving 
for power, because it cannot reflect about it very well. Yet, some significant sort of reflection 
takes place in higher, more complex power-constellations. In them one can find the 
phenomenon of consciousness which according to Nietzsche was developed in human beings 
to a very high degree. One can get a good understanding of the importance of such 
consciousness from Owen [1995]. 
It is mainly human beings (not excluding over-men) who have the capacity to strategically 
refrain from maximally increasing their power at every instant. Thus an athlete who is training 
400 m sprints might run 400 m ten times. Unlike an unreflective power-quantum he will not 
always go fiill speed, not only because then he would not not even complete ten runs but 
because he knows that he will in the end achieve a higher overall increase of power. Only a 
power-constellation with a high enough degree of consciousness has such options. 
e. WILL TO POWER 
WILL & POWER 
After having dealt with the more general structures of the will to power, I can finally analyse 
the basic constituents of a power-quantum, namely will and power. 
Each power-quantum is will to power and this means that it is will and power and it can never 
not be will and power. Nietzsche talks about the strength of a will and the amount of power 
separately, so I assume that one can make this distinction and deal with these two notions 
separately, although they cannot exist independentiy of each other [HAH I , 460; TI 
„Skirmishes of an Untimely Man" 14; GS 5, 347). That this distinction is sensible can easily 
be grasped, i f we consider the following example: Jim who was bom in the slums of Hariem 
has got a very strong wil l . He is working hard at his ambition to become an influential drug 
dealer. Still, it is not very likely that one regards him as a very powerfiil person. Gordon, on 
the other hand, was bom into a family in Beverly Hills and is listed in the Forbes 400 list 
every year. He was educated at the best schools and universities. Yet, he was always just about 
doing enough, so that he can get through. This seems to show that he does not have a very 
48 
Strong will . Yet, he is regarded as very powerfiil. These two examples show that the 
distinction between will and power is a sensible one. However, it is only an intuitive way of 
showing it. In order to elucidate the theory of the will to power in Nietzsche we have to be 
concerned with the concept of the will and the concept of power in Nietzsche's writings. This 
I shall do next. 
What then is the concept of a will and the concept of power? 
Before considering some longer passages in order to find an answer to this question, let me 
say this first. It seems clear that for some thing to be a power-quantum implies that it already 
has some power and that it has a will (this will does not have to be a unified one. It is only 
unified in the case of an individual power-quantum. In a power-constellation, there are always 
several wills which constitute the overall will). Each power-quantum at any instant has to 
have a certain amount of power and it also has to have a certain strength of wil l . And given 
this distinction, we can hold that the form of a power-quanta is its will and its content is its 
power. In one context [WP 715] he describes the will as a point and from what was said 
before we can infer that the power is somehow structured around that wil l . This we should 
only take as a metaphor and not a depiction. The will can be stronger or weaker, but there are 
only degrees of strength, no absolutes. The same applies to the amount of power a power-
quanta can have [HAH 2, 67]. Now we can deal with the concepts of the will and the power. 
f WILL 
Still it is unclear what the strength of the will depends on. How can the strength of the will of 
a power-quanta increase and decrease? 
„I also want to make asceticism namral again; in place of the aim of denial, the aim of 
strengthening; a gymnastics of the will; abstinence and periods of fasting of all kinds, in the 
most spiritual realm, too;... One should even devize tests for one's strength in being able to 
keep one's word." [WP915] 
This passage shows that there is a certain rationality in the wil l . A wil l , of course, is always a 
will to something [IB 1, 587]. I f the will to X has been deprived of discharge for some time, it 
will be even stronger when it can actually act again. So one can educate or strengthen ones 
will to X, by making oneself not discharge it. 
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However, i f one is deprived from everdischarging the will to X, then one has to attribute to X 
so little value that one no longer has the will to X. This process is perhaps best called 
sublimation, because the will itself does not vanish, it now simply has to find a different 
outlet. Under such reinterpretation an activity which one might not have valued before 
receives value. Still this remark would lead us too far astray, and demands a discussion on its 
own. I merely wished to establish here that there can be a certain rationality in the will, and 
that the will can increase and decrease'^ That a will is nothing eternal I have shown before 
[WP 715]. 
g. POWER 
What is to be seen as high power, according to Nietzsche? I will begin by making some 
distinctions in order to present Nietzsche's understanding of the highest power as clearly as 
possible. Firstly, that between external and internal power. External power depends upon the 
relation a power-quantum has with its environment. In the case of a hereditary aristocracy, for 
example, the only authority for someone's power is that he was bom into a certain family; it 
has nothing to do with their personal qualities. Internal power, on the other hand, depends 
upon the abilities of the respective power-quantum. One might just possess these (e.g. a girl 
with a slim figure), but to keep and increase them one has to work at them (e.g. diets and 
exercise to keep and improve her figure). 
External power clearly is independent of the strength of one's will (of course the strength of 
one's will can influence one's external power, but it does not have to). Internal power, 
however, is not independent of one's strength of will . The stronger one's will the more 
internal power one can gain. 
The will to power in Nietzsche's account in the begirming aims for internal power. From a 
certain stage - once one feels as i f one belongs to the strongest power-quanta - the will might 
turn to external power, but it does not have to. Internal power includes the possibility or even 
likelihood of external power, but does not ensure it. External power depends either on internal 
power or on one's origin, e.g. simply by belonging to a family with external power. Internal 
power is a capacity a body has, though this need not does be obvious. For example someone 
might be a very quick logical thinker; but might hide this capacity in some social settings. It is 
The similarity to Freud's theory of sublimation has to be noted here, and the close resemblance to Spinoza's 
theory of passions cannot be overlooked either. 
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completely different with external power. For example the son of the British Queen has 
immense external power, independent of his internal capacities. 
Still one has to bear in mind that each power-quantum has some power, yet whether this is 
publicly recognised or not is a different question. Someone might know the names of players 
of all European football clubs. This does not normally count as a manifestation of great 
power. Yet, it might in some settings. At a football quiz in a pub this person might be able to 
answer the most difficult questions. In this setting, and probably only in this, his knowledge 
could count as a great power. At a job interview this ability no longer would count as a great 
power. This shows that not all abilities are equally recognised. Someone might have a strong 
will and have worked hard at some activity, without anyone recognising this ability as a great 
power. Thus a strong will does not necessarily lead to power. 
The ability at which one works to enhance one's internal power has to be well chosen. There 
has to be an environment in which it counts as a power. In the best case this would have to be 
the whole world. (The difference between the notion „ability" and the notion „power" is that 
the latter one implies an evaluation, whereas the former does not, but simply describes an 
activity). Each power-quantum, of course, tries to become excellent at an activity, for which it 
is suitable and which is well regarded in an influential setting. Nietzsche also posits a concept 
of highest power which is an essential constituent of this thesis; its fiiU significance will 
reveal itself only in the third main part of this thesis. He justifies this concept by reference to 
his theory of evolution. This would need a ftill scholarly interpretation and is beyond my 
thesis, but I will give it a brief outline below and then set out what the highest power is for 
Nietzsche. One has to bear in mind that the concept of the highest power in Nietzsche is valid 
only relative to the present time and the near future, a point taken up in main part three. Let 
me give a brief summary of Nietzsche's theory of evolution then, in order to clarify his 
concept of the highest power. 
For Nietzsche struggles for power were originally decided according to the physical strength 
of competing organisms. Each organism is will to power and can be viewed from a physical 
and from a mental perspective and as more complex organisms evolved, more importance was 
attached to their mental perspective. Physical strength remained decisive in the case of 
„inhuman" [Owen (1995): P. 73] or animals. In an inhuman society the physically strong were 
able to do whatever they desired (the absolute masters), while the physically weak had to do 
whatever they were told (the slaves). The slaves who had a strong will could not discharge it 
outwardly so they turned inward. Their inwardness created consciousness, and with this the 
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human race and recognition of the superiority of the masters, which in turn led to resentment 
of them. Since men would rather will nothingness than not will at all, this is what slaves with 
strong wills, the priests, did. They willed nothingness by inventing a „real world" which is 
distinct from this world of change and into which one will enter having died. According to 
the priests only people with a slavish lifestyle would be granted a blissfiil life in that real 
worid. Those with a masterly lifestyle would have to suffer for ever in this after-worid. The 
priests, of course, knew there was no such world, but they were also aware of the power of 
this theory, because they knew that only they had a consciousness of what goes on in souls or 
inside a person, whereas the masters did not. Upon acquaintance with these after-worldly 
theories the masters became frightened at the threat of everlasting torture. The priests were 
very convincing in their role, because after they developed an after-worldly theory all the 
slaves accepted their suffering willingly and happily ftilfilled their tasks. This, of course, made 
them more convincing. Frightened, the masters with weak will even gave in straight away and 
became followers of this movement. After some time this slavish theory governed wide parts 
of the world. There no longer was a strict hierarchical system, but from now on everyone had 
an equal right in their societies. In this way everyone had to turn inwards in some respect -
human beings are sick animals (AC 3). No one was able to do as he pleased anymore. 
Everybody had more or less expanded consciousness - the stronger healthier ones as well as 
the weak ones (weak or strong in respect to their bodily capacities). Of course there have 
always been people who were closer to the old aristocratic system, but the new slavish one 
was usually superior. After a long period the former masters, the strong and healthy, also had 
a consciousness comparable to the former slaves. This made them realise what was done to 
them and how they sacrificed their abilities for nothing, an after-world which does not exist. 
So a new race had to come into existence, one with a consciousness as powerfiil as the 
dominant one, but instead of hoping for an after-worldly life, trying to achieve immanent 
goals and with that an immanent gratification.These are the over-human beings, who by 
working for a goal that can be achieved are healthier than sick humans whose aims are non-
existent. This over-human race obviously is not a return to the old aristocratic society, but a 
fiirther step in the evolution of the human race'^. 
'^ The similarity of Nietzsche's Ubermensch in respect to traditional values to Dostoevsky's overman, as 
represented in his „Crime and Punishment" are striking. Both believe they are justified in rejecting traditional 
morality, due to their superiority in comparison to most of mankind. 
I will discuss Nietzsche's relationship to Darwin later in this thesis, and a short comparison of Nietzsche's and 
Hegel's philosophy of history follows at the end of main part three. 
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What Nietzsche puts forward as the highest power is what the over-human beings would have 
to achieve. That is the reason why this concept is only valid for a certain time. I will now set 
out the concept of what the highest power is, according to Nietzsche: 
„To impose upon becoming the character of being - that is the supreme will to power. 
Twofold falsification, on the part of the senses and of the spirit, to preserve a world of that 
which is, which abides, which is equivalent, etc. 
That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of 
being: - high point of the meditation." [WP 617] 
The best means to become the strongest is by creating a philosophy which turns the world of 
Becoming into a world of Being. The highest will to power is to establish a great world view 
of one's own. Primarily for the sake of values, as said before because philosophy is the love of 
wisdom [IB 2, 263], but also because they need their ultimate grounding in a metaphysics. 
Yet, this procedure is only the highest will to power, not the highest feeling of power. To 
create such a world-view is only of instrumental value to achieving the highest feeling of 
power which is itself of intrinsic value. The person who performs these sort of deeds is the 
philosopher who creates a culture [BGE 6, 207] which means that he creates new forms [IB 1, 
150], and in this way also creates values [BGE 6, 21; GM 1, notes]. Philosophy is the most 
Spiritual'^ wil l to power [BGE 1, 9], and i f the most Spiritual ones or their theories govern in 
the political sense, then we have reached the highest culture [HAH 1, 261]. Spirituality is the 
only possibility to become master of everything [IB 2, 204], because Spirit is the means to 
impose form on chaos [WP 658]. The most Spiritual ones are also the strongest [AC 57] and 
only they can reach the highest feeling of power: 
„The highest feeling of power and sureness finds expression in a grand style" [TI 11, 
„Skirmishes of an Untimely Man"] 
„The highest type: the classical ideal - as the expression of the well-constitutedness of all 
the chief instmcts. Therin the highest style: the grand style. Expression of the 'will to 
power' itself The instinct that is most feared dares to acknowledge itself" [WP 341] 
„The classical style is essentially a representation of this calm, simplification, abbreviation, 
concentration - the highest feeling of power is concentrated in the classical type." [WP 799] 
„To be classical, one must possess all the strong, seemingly contradictory gifts and desires -
but in such a way that they go together together beneath one yoke;" [WP 848] 
^Spirit is the combination of the mental qualities and consciousness. 
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„To grasp what a coldness, lucidity, hardness is part of all 'classical' taste: logic above all, 
happiness in spirituality, 'three unities', concentration, hatred for feeling, heart, esprit, 
hatred for the manifold, uncertain, rambling, for intimations, as well as for the brief, 
pointed, pretty, good-natured. One should not play with artistic formulas: one should 
remodel life so that afterward it has to formulate itself.." [WP 849] 
„Classical taste: this means will to simplification, strengthening, to visible happiness, to the 
terrible, the courage of psychological nakedness..." [WP 868] 
„The will to power appears... among the strongest, richest, most independent, most 
courageous, as 'love of mankind', of 'the people', of the gospel, of truth, God; as sympathy; 
'self-sacrifice', etc.; as overpowering, bearing away with oneself taking into one's service, 
as instinctive self-involvement with a great quantum of power to which one is able to give 
direction: the hero, the prophet, the Caesar, the savior, the shepherd; (-sexual love, too, 
belongs here: it desires to overpower, to take possession, and it appears as self-surrender. 
Fundamentally, it is only love of one's 'instrument', of one's 'steed' - the conviction that 
this or that belongs to one because one is in a position to use it)." [WP 776] 
I have said before that the process of creating necessities, a culture, and new forms is only a 
means to becoming the strongest. Yet once one has become the strongest, one does not stop 
enhancing one's powers, but can turn to different means of enhancing power, using ways 
unavailable when one was not so strong (If one had taken them then, one could always have 
blamed oneself that one only did so out of weakness). Using Spirit to impose Being on 
Becoming, increases the internal power of one's Spirit and eventually can produce a world-
view which corresponds to the classic ideal of style, because one can then experience the 
highest feeling of power. Once such a world-view is created, one can continue trying to 
enhance one's internal power (not only in respect to one's Spirit, but in whatever way the 
world-view demands), but one can also try to enhance one's external power, it just depends on 
what the world-view demands. Although the ideal of the classic style sets some restrictions on 
one's theory, I guess that there are still different versions possible. 
I hope that this paragraph has made clear Nietzsche's concept of the highest feeling of power, 
how one can reach it, and what the qualities are it has to incorporate. 
h. INTERPRETATION'* 
We have found out that individual power-quanta can group together to form power-
constellations, and we have also gained a better idea of what is meant by „will to power" by 
considering the concepts of will and power. We should bear in mind that a power-quantum, or 
'"The importance „interpretation" had in Nietzsche's philosophy, as well as the way he dealt with interpretation, 
had a considerable influence on twentieth cenhiry hermeneutics. 
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a thing, an organism, a power-constellation is will to power, and never only wil l or only 
power. 
Let us consider how change happens in Nietzsche's metaphysic. In this way we have to focus 
our attention on the concept of interpretation, for these two concepts are closely connected. 
One can get an intuitive understanding of this connection considering an example from the 
human world. 
John, a student, has to hand in an essay the next day. His girl friend asks him to go out for 
dinner and friends want to go to a pub with him. John knows that i f he does not complete the 
work he will be kicked out of college, because he had already received a written warning from 
the Head of Department. However, he wants to stay in college and get his degree. In addition, 
he thinks that i f his girl friend and his friends do not understand his reasons for not going out 
with them, and get angry with him, then they are not people he wants to be close to. These 
considerations brought about John's decision to stay in and work at his essay. 
John had to interpret the given situation and decide what was best for them. Now I have to 
show how the process of interpretation has to be seen more widely within Nietzsche's 
underlying theory of the will to power. Firstly, one has to bear in mind that every power-
quantum is a perspective, and every perspective an interpretation. At every instant every 
power-quantum interprets and has to interpret its environment, so that it can act in such a way 
that it believes it will attain the best possible outcome for itself. How does this work? 
Finally, we can understand why Nietzsche had to claim that he presupposes a mind and 
memory for everything [IB 2, 300]. The mind is essential for every power-quantum to 
perceive its environment and memory is necessary for it to make a judgement about its 
environment. Both capacities are essential for an interpretation or a perspective. A judgement 
about the environment implies an evaluation, and this can only be made on a certain basis. 
The basis in these cases is provided by the memory, by comparison with past events, 
sometimes by automatic reactions which are age-old memories transformed into instincts. So 
a power-quantum perceives its environment via its mental capacities and makes a judgement 
about it via its memory. It will find stronger power-constellations, equally strong ones and 
weaker ones. A power-quantum sometimes has to take into consideration the overall strength 
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of the other power-constellations, at other times only some particular abilities or even only 
one. To some power-constellations will it feel indifferent, to others hostile, and to others 
fiiendly. Al l of these evaluation turn up in degrees - hostility, superiority, inferiority can never 
be absolute. 
After having judged the different relations it has to its surroundings, it acts so that its increase 
of power is expected to be the maximum possible (the main exception here are human beings, 
as mentioned before). Whether it actually is the best possible option chosen is a completely 
different matter, because the perspective of the individual power-quantum is restricted (to its 
location, its memory...) and its judgement therefore subject to mistake. This applies to every 
judgement; whether another power-quantum is regarded as stronger, weaker or equally strong, 
depends upon what the power-quantum thinks the result of a fight against it would bring 
about. I f it thinks that it will win, then it regards itself as stronger. I f it expects to lose, then it 
regards itself as weaker. I f it foresees a hard fight, then it regards the other as having as much 
strength as itself. Because we have come to know how such judgement of other power-
constellations comes about, we can understand that what we desire is not the actual, 
unconditional superiority of oneself There cannot be such a thing since it all depends on 
judgements and enviroimients or circumstances only, but we will the feeling of power, as 
Nietzsche himself so often points out. The feeling of power is that according to our own 
interpretation of the world, we are justified in feeling ourselves superior to the other power-
constellations (what Nietzsche put forward as the greatest power that appeals to his existence 
most. Still, the exact relation to his theory will only be clarified in main part three). One can 
explain the feelings of hatred, fi-iendliness and indifference in a similar way as the feelings of 
superiority, inferiority and equality. So Nietzsche's will to power metaphysics offers a way of 
unilying the psychology of emotions'^. I f the other power-quantum aims for power in a 
completely different category than oneself, then one feels indifferent to it. I f it tries to achieve 
power in the same category as oneself, then one feels competitive and hostile towards it. I f it 
seems to offer oneself the chance to form a bond with it, in which one could gain more power, 
than one could on one's own, then one feels fiiendly towards it. 
Here one can see the underlying rationality of action in the exchange between power-quanta. 
Yet, the evaluafion of the respective situation solely depends on one's memory, one's self-
estimation and the judgements formed on that basis in comparison to what one perceives in 
'^This goes against Robert C. Solomon's claun in his book „The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life" 
[Solomon (1993)] that there is no single principle by virtue of which we can explain the rationality of our 
emotions. 
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one's environment. I f it compares itself with its environment in respect to the overall strength, 
then the overall strength is relevant for its current purposes (e.g. comparing the qualities of 
one's former girl friends). I f the comparison is only made in respect to one or some qualities, 
then only these are or seem to be relevant (e.g. chess competition). This is the most general 
account of interpretation which I can give; for a more detailed description, one has to consider 
individual instances. 
According to Nietzsche, a power-quantum is to be described as active, i f it can act according 
to its primary choice, and a power-quantum is to be described as passive, i f this does not 
happen, because it is being attacked by another power-quantum. 
i . THING = SUM OF ITS EFFECTS 
So far we have spoken about power-quanta and power-constellations as i f they were 
independent entities. Yet, now as we enter deeper into Nietzsche's metaphysics, we have to 
realise that for him a thing is never an independent entity. A thing, a power-constellation is 
always what it does, and what it does can be different in respect to different power-
constellations. So the thing in the end for Nietzsche can only be defined by the sum of its 
effects it has on other power-constellations. 
„A power-quantum is characterized by the effect it produces and it resists..." [Nachlass 
Friihjahr 1888, 14 [79], KGW VIII3 , 49 ff from Grimm (1977): P. 6 PF] 
„The properties of a thing are effects on other 'things'. Prescind from these, and no single 
thing will have any properties; that is, there is no one thing without other things; that is there 
is no 'thing in itself." [Nachlass, Herbst 1885-Herbst 1886, 2 [85]; KGW VIII 1,102 from 
Grimm (1977): P. 6 PF] 
These observations cleariy follow from what was said before and they are essential for his 
metaphysics, nevertheless I will not discuss this point at the moment, because it is more 
efficient to deal with this topic in the section on TRUTH. We can keep in mind that for 
Nietzsche a thing is only the sum of its effects, and that therefore a Kantian „thing i tself is 
counterintuitive. 
i . POWER. PLEASURE & PAIN (UNLUST MACHT LUST) 
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The following secdon deals with pleasure and pain and their relationship to the feeling of 
power. This might at first not seem to be relevant for an understanding of Nietzsche's 
metaphysics, but this is not correct. One has to bear in mind that, according to Nietzsche 
everything has a mind. Therefore everything has to be able to feel pleasure and pain in the 
same way that everything must be able to have the feeling of power, because everything is will 
to pov/er and aims for a feeling of a superiority of power. In addition, this section makes us 
aware of the consequences the theory of the will to power has and is also relevant for an 
understanding of Nietzsche himself Furthermore, this section provides an additional tool 
towards answering the question „Why does Nietzsche put forward his philosophy, i f he does 
not regard it as absolutely true?". 
In the concluding paragraphs of this section, I will deal with the relationship between the will 
to power theory and hedonism, traditionally the main theory of motivation, declaring that we 
desire pleasure and try to avoid pain (which of these two strains was stressed more was 
different in every particular theory)?°. Nietzsche offers a different theory of motivation which 
claims that all we desire is power, or more accurately the feeling of internal power. He does 
not deny that we can feel pain and pleasure, but that these are ever motives for our actions. 
I wil l now try to explain how the notions of pain and pleasure are intertwined with the theory 
of the wil l to power. I will collect some passages and then show which standpoint Nietzsche 
takes: 
„To exercise power costs efforts and demands courage." [HAH 2, 251] 
„What is a pleasure but: an excitation of the feeling of power by an obstacle... so it swells 
up. Thus all pleasure mcludes pain.- If the pleasure is to be very great, the pains must be 
very protracted and the tension of the bow tremendous." [WP 658] 
„Pain is the feeling in face of an obstacle: But smce we can be aware of power only in the 
face of obstacles, pain a necessary part of all activity - (every activity must be directed at 
something that has to be overcome). So the will to power also strives for resistance, for 
pain. There is a will to suffering at the root of all organic life." [IB 2, 311, PF] 
All these excerpts tell us the same, namely that willing implies suffering. As long as 
something exists, it is will to power, and therefore wills something all the time. To gain what 
it wills, it has to overcome obstacles which is painfiil. The more a thing or power-
constellation wills, the more pain it has to be able to endure, yet the more pleasure it can gain 
"^Other theories of motivation were put forward by Schopenhauer, Darwin, and Freud. According to Darwin 
human beings are motivated by their desire to survive, Freud believed (at some stage of his career) that the sex 
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in the end. However, it is not the pleasure we are aiming for, it is the power, according to 
Nietzsche. 
„The measure of failure and fatality must grow with the resistance a force seeks to master; 
and as a force can expend itself only on what resists it, there is necessarily an ingredient of 
displeasure in every action, but this displeasure acts as a lure of life and strengthens the will 
to power." [WP 694] 
„The decision about what arouses pleasure and what arouses displeasure depends upon the 
degree of power: something that in relation to small quantum of power appears dangerous 
and seems to require the speediest defense, can evoke, given the consciousness of greater 
power, a voluptous excitation and a feeling of pleasure." [WP 669] 
The last two paragraphs express the previous distinction between the different possibilities of 
relations between power-constellations. The stronger an opponent is, the more resistance one 
has to expect and together with this pain. In the case of human beings, one must not only think 
of another man as an opponent for one man, but rather a theory, or an ideal self which one has 
set for oneself, because the will to power primarily aims for intemal power which one can 
only gain via the process of self-overcoming. I f an opponent is weaker, then the fight wil l be 
easier, but the gain small. I f the opponent is equally strong, then one can expect a very hard 
and long fight, but (possibly) also a very rewarding one. I f the opponent is stronger, then one 
wil l lose. This is the reason why one fears stronger power-constellations. I have used stronger, 
weaker or equally strong in a general sense to refer to the overall power combined with the 
strength of will of the opponent. Who actually is stronger cannot be known with certainty by 
any of the opponents before the fight, but of course each power-constellation has a 
perspectival estimation of the strength of the other one, based on its own experiences, 
memory, world-interpretation, values and many other things. How exactly this perspectival 
estimation is constituted and what can be said about the differences between the apparent and 
the actual strength of the will and amount of power, can best be shown by some examples. I 
will not go into more detail about this here. 
„there exists displeasure as a means of stunulatmg the increase of power, and displeasure 
following an overexpediture of power; in the fu t^ case a stimulus, in the second the result of 
an excessive stimulation." [WP 703] 
drive was at the basis of all human actions, and Schopenhauer held that the will to life was the basic metaphysical 
drive. 
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The first case of pain we have already considered; it is the pain related to the strength of the 
opponent. The second sort of pain he is referring to in the last aphorism is the result of a fight 
with a stronger opponent. The temptation to fight it was too strong, but in the end it was 
unsuccessfiil. This obviously leads to pain which is either a result of willing, or of failing or 
losing against a stronger opponent, and there is probably also the case of simply feeling 
inferior which leads to the feeling of pain. Everything, however, aims for power; any feeling 
of pleasure is the consequence of this. 
„Every animal... instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions under which it 
can expend all its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power;" [GM 3, 7] 
„...pleasure is a feeling of power". [WP 434] 
„Pleasure appears where there is the feeling of power." [WP 1023] 
„pleasure is only a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of a 
difference." [WP 688] 
Pleasure is only the feeling of superiority of ones own power. Perhaps it can also make itself 
felt, i f one comes across a power-constellation whose abilities supplement one's ovm and with 
which one can enhance one's own power by co-operating with it in some way. I have not 
come across this case in his writings explicitly, but such a view does fit into his overall 
scheme, and is implicit in the comments he makes about fi-iendship. 
However, there are two comments which make me wonder whether Nietzsche himself was 
completely aware what his will to power theory would have to imply, because they seem to go 
against what was said before. 
„Pleasure as the growth of feeling of power, which makes itself felt." [IB 2, 310, PF] 
„Pleasure - any growth of power. Pain - any feelmg that we are not able to resist, not able 
to become master." [Nietzsche in Jaspers (1947): P. 300, PF] 
I f Nietzsche wants to say that we feel pleasure while we are fighting for the growth of our 
power, then I think this clearly goes against what he has said before, because while one 
power-constellation fights with another one the power-constellations have to experience some 
pain. I do not think that one can be consciously aware of pain and pleasure at the same time. 
They might both be present, yet one is always dominant. Yet, I think I know to which 
phenomenon Nietzsche was referring. Even while one is in the process of growth, one has to 
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relax for some time; i f one works at ones thesis (as I do) which is painfiil, one can gain 
temporary relaxation by looking out of the window and realising the feeling of the growth of 
ones insight/power/abilities. These brief periods of relaxation are the ones from which one 
gains pleasure. That Nietzsche refers to these brief periods of relaxafion becomes obvious in 
the first of the last two citations which has to be read as such: „If the feeling of the increased 
power can make itself obvious, then a power-quantum or -constellation feels pleasure." It is 
not during the process of growth that one can experience pleasure, unless the process of 
growth demands so little attention that one at the same time can also be aware of one's own 
power which might enable one to feel enough pleasure to outweigh the pain of the fight one 
has to bear. Still, in this case I do not think that one is jusfified in calling what happens to 
oneself an actual process of growth. A significant growth can only happen against fairly strong 
opponents, this however implies that one has to be focused on the fight and will therefore only 
feel the pain which one has to overcome, due to the other being an obstacle for oneself 
Up to now, I have merely focused upon Nietzsche's metaphysics of the wil l to power. This 
has consequences on what he thinks about the ftiture and the past of the world. I will deal with 
these in the next section which is entitled: The Eternal Recurrence of Everything. 
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a. ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF EVERYTHING 
In this section I will put forward a metaphysical interpretation^' of the „etemal recurrence of 
everything" (= ER), but I will not go through the ethical implications of this theor/^, for they 
are not relevant for the purposes of my thesis. Due to the limitations imposed on myself with 
respect to this topic, I am able to keep this section much shorter than the last one. However, it 
is necessary to include the metaphysics of ER in this part, because it is an essential part of 
Nietzsche's metaphysics, and APOLLO stands for Nietzsche's metaphysics. In addition to 
this, it provides us with further and very clear reasons for my interpretation of the 
reconciliation between APOLLO and DIONYSOS in main part three of this thesis. 
Firstly, I will show how the theory of ER is linked to the theory of the will to power, and 
what ER stands for. At this stage, I shall also make a few comments about the plausibility of 
Nietzsche's justifications for his positions. Secondly, I will briefly discuss the relationship 
between the wil l to power and ER, and whether or not these two theories are contradictory or 
mutually exclusive, as has often been suggested. According to my interpretation, these two 
theories are not mutually exclusive, but depend on each other, and describe different aspects 
of Being. I am inclined to say that ER is the form of Being, whereas the will to power is its 
content. This shall become clearer soon. 
b. FROM THE WILL TO POWER TO THE ER 
In the following interpretation I will be extremely charitable to Nietzsche - perhaps too 
charitable for the taste of some people. I am well aware that the interpretation of ER which I 
will attribute to Nietzsche is not the only possible one, because one can find many attempted 
proofs in Nietzsche's unpublished notes which are simply inconclusive, because they contain 
a non sequitur. However, I have also come across unpublished notes which contain the 
premises needed to demonstrate what he wishes to establish. These provide me with good 
"'This type of interpretation has not been popular among Nietzsche scholars, for it seemed to them that the 
Eternal Recurrence of Everything is too absurd to be taken seriously. Yet, one should in this respect bear in mind 
another theory which implies perplexing claims - the Chaos theory. The creator of the Chaos Theory was the 
mathematician Henri Poincare who was a contemporary of Nietzsche. The chaos theory describes irregular 
behavious, and it shows that very simple recurrences produce very complex effects, which appear random, but 
are not. 
A refreshing ethical interpretation of ER was given by Milan Kundera in his famous novel „The Unbearable 
Lighmess of Being". 
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reasons to attribute the following interpretation to Nietzsche's thought; as I have said before I 
regard the application of Augustine's principle of charity to be necessary for a good 
interpretation. Where Nietzsche got these insights from and whether they appeal to ones 
intellect which is what he wants them to do, as we have seen the section on the will to power, 
is a seperate question with which I will also be concerned. 
In the first section of this part we have shown that the world is will to power and what this 
means. To complete his metaphysics Nietzsche had to wonder whether this world was created 
or not. This question did not trouble Nietzsche a lot, because he could not make sense out of 
the expression that something was created ex nihilo. 
„We need not worry about the hypothesis of a created world. The 'create' is today 
completely indefmable, unrealizable". [WP 1066] 
This claim is fairly easy to understand, i f one bears in mind Nietzsche's conception of the 
world. The world is will to power [WP 1067] and will can only act upon will [BGE 2, 36], so 
how should will to power come into existence out of nothing? The will to power carmot have 
come into existence out of nothing. Therefore Nietzsche was able to rule out this option 
without hesitation. Yet, i f the world was not created, it must have always been. The problem 
with this is that we do not seem to be able to make sense out of the notion „always", so how 
should this claim appeal to our intellect? 
„An infmite process cannot be conceived except as periodic." [IB 2, 1304, PF] 
Nietzsche had a seemingly appropriate reply to the aforementioned question. We cannot make 
sense out of the expression „infinite process" unless we think of the process in question as 
periodic. I f the process was not periodic, we would have reached the end of an infinite series 
which clearly is a self-contradictory claim, at least it is meaningless and it does not appeal to 
one's intellect. Given his theory of the will to power and the demands of his intellect, 
Nietzsche had to hold that the world was never created and that it consists of a periodical 
process, an eternal cycle (a ring). I f this was the line of thought taken by Nietzsche to reach 
ER theory, then I would regard it as an argument worthy of consideration, because he could 
have used this conclusion and then continued reasoning to think through which demands this 
makes on the claims of the will to power and the world. The history of the world repeats itself 
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in certain periodical cycles, therefore the world has to be finite, and force can have only 
certain qualities. 
Yet, in the previous section I alluded to how Nietzsche derived the theories that the amount of 
force is finite and that it can only have certain qualities; these were arguments contained in 
some of his aphorisms. He could have taken them and used them as premises for fiirther 
enquiries, so that he reached ER theory via them. Given what I have written in section D, it 
should be clear that it is fufile to argue which line of thought Nietzsche has taken, because 
what is important is that the initial insights of his theory are consistent; it is not the argument, 
but the insights that matter, and Nietzsche's insights are consistent. This is also the reason 
why there are several possibilities for setting out Nietzsche's philosophy. 
That the history of the world repeats itself in periodical cycles is supported by the claims 
which we have dealt with in the section on will to power - e.g. the amount of will to power is 
finite. 
„At one time, it was thought that to an infinite activity in time there pertained a force that 
was infmite and that no employment would use up. Now the force is believed to be 
unvarying, and so not needing any more to be infmitely great." [IB 2, 1310, PF] 
„We forbid ourselves the notion of an infmite force, it is incompatible with the concept 
'force'" [IB 2, 1313, PF] 
Nietzsche claimed that the amount of will to power is finite, because he regarded it as 
unthinkable that the world is infinite. Infinity has to be taken in the theological sense to 
include claims of unlimitedness, unboundedness, and being beyond the possibility of measure. 
In „The Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greek", Nietzsche already pointed out that this 
notion cannot apply to the world within our conceptual framework, because it is self-
contradictory to hold that one has completed an infinite series: 
„Nothing infmite can exist: the resuh of such a supposition would be the contradictory 
concept of a completed infmity." [PTG 12, PF] 
So the rejection of the traditional understanding of infinity which was being made in many 
sciences since the end of the 19th century can already be found in Nietzsche. He used it to 
claim that the world can only be thought of as finite (and that time can only be regarded as 
cyclical, as I have said before). That the world is finite means that the sum total of energy in 
the world is finite. (If we accept that energy is force or will to power, for the time being). 
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„There have been infinitely many layers of force, but not infinitely different layers; that 
would presuppose an indeterminate force. Force has only a 'certain number' of possible 
properties." [IB2, 1311,PF] 
This citation clearly says that force can only have a limited number of possible qualities. It 
seems that he reached this insight in a similar way to the previous one. Given that we carmot 
make sense of the notion of „infinite amount of qualities", an expression which does not 
appeal to the intellect, he rejects its possibility, and holds that force can have only a finite 
amount of qualities. This might be thought to correspond to modem physical theory which 
holds that energy can only appear in a quantity which is the integral multiple of the Planck 
constant (Energy can only appear in a quantity = n * Planck constant; n = 1, 2, 3,...). Of 
course, what Nietzsche says does not imply the exact Planck constant, but the consequences of 
this modem physical theory are that force only has a limited a mount of qualities, i f the whole 
amount of force is limited, a point which Nietzsche held. Nietzsche's theory as well as the 
modem physical theory turn out to have the same implications in the end. Modem physics, of 
course, has formulated it much more accurately, but does not contradict Nietzsche's 
statement. This last section also shows that Nietzsche had good reasons to hold that force has 
only a limited amount of properties or in exact terms: the total number of energy states in the 
universe is finite^^ 
These premises together with Nietzsche's metaphysics justify his claim to the validity of ER. 
This is implicit in Nehamas remark that „in order to reach the conclusion that the history of 
the universe is eternally repeating itself, at least two premises are necessary 
1: The sum total of energy in the world is finite 
2: The total number of energy states in the universe is finite." [Nehamas (1985): P. 143] 
The phrase „at least" implies that even i f both of these premises are given, it still depends on 
the ordering of the energy in question whether ER is necessary or not. Nehamas' claim can be 
made explicit in the following equation: ER = (1) + (2) + an appropriate metaphysics. 
Nietzsche held both of these premises and provided genuine reasons to believe in them, 
^^ To attribute to Nietzsche an interpretation which has implications, similar to the ones held in modem physics 
might seem anachronistic, but one should bear m mind that firstly, many philosophies contain theories, which 
were later supported and justified through scientific research (the unconscious and Schopenhauer, perhaps 
already Spinoza or even Plato), and secondly I would also grant Aristode a similar interpretation of the point in 
question, because he held that there is nothing „acmally" infmite, but all mfinity was solely „potential". I hope 
this clarifies my interpretation and renders it more appropriate and plausible. 
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namely that we cannot comprehend an infinite amount of energy or an infinite number of 
energy states in the universe; in addition to this he held a metaphysics (WP) appropriate for 
ER. The wil l to power metaphysics is an appropriate philosophical framework because i f one 
combines it with claims (1) and (2), ER follows by necessity. Since Nietzsche defended both 
premises by reference to the intellect, and justified the WP metaphysics by means of his 
insight combined with the use of the intellect, he is justified in calling ER the most scientific 
of hypotheses [WP 55]. Science, according to Nietzsche is built upon the structure of our 
intellect [HAH I , 19]"^ 
Simmel [(1995): P. 396-397] tried to show the two premises above are not enough to conclude 
ER, though this is not what Nietzsche claimed - an appropriate metaphysics is also necessary. 
However, due to the enormous influence of Simmel's argument, I feel obliged to show where 
it goes wrong. To disprove the two premises establish ER, he gives the following example, 
which is quite well stated in Kaufmann [(1974): P. 327]: 
„Even if there were exceedingly few things m a finite space in a infinite time, they would 
not have to repeat the same configurations. Suppose there were three wheels of equal size, 
rotating on the same axis, one point marked on the circumference of each wheel, and these 
three points lined up m one straight line. If the second wheel rotated twice as fast as the 
fu-st, and if the speed of the third was 1 / pi of the speed of the first, die initial line up would 
never recur." 
Simmel's rejection of ER seems to be an accepted position among many Nietzsche scholars. 
Soli remarks [Nehamas (1985): P. 248] „that a random recombination of states might avoid 
Simmel's crificism, but rightly [according to Nehamas] concludes that Nietzsche's 
determinism does not allow such an interpretation of recurrence". Soil is right to point out that 
Nietzsche's „determinism" does not allow recurrence to be interpreted as a random process. 
However, Simmel's refiitation is wrong for different reasons. In how far does it go against 
Nietzsche's proof of ER (at least the one I attributed to him)? The metaphysics which is 
implicit in Simmel's counter-example is not one Nietzsche could and would have accepted. In 
Nietzsche's will to power metaphysics there could not be any permanent absolutely constant 
speed, for everything which comes into existence has to vanish eventually. Simmel's counter-
example, however, presupposes wheels which move at a constant speed for all time. Thus 
Simmel does not disprove Nietzsche reasoning for ER. Otherwise, Simmel is correct in most 
of his claims. Given his premises ER is indeed impossible because i f part of a state of the 
Interesting to note that in mathematics well behaved regularities can be captured in recursive definitions of 
infinity, which imply the recurrence of die same. 
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world cannot repeat itself, the whole cannot recur either. The two premises in question are 
necessary for ER, but in addition the energy mentioned in them has to be ordered such that it it 
does not exclude the possibility of ER. Nietzsche's will to power metaphysics is appropriate 
with the two premises it implies ER; the metaphysics in Simmel's so-called counter-example, 
however, already excludes the possibility of ER because part of the metaphysics cannot recur, 
and so the whole cannot recur either. So Simmel's counter-example does not work because he 
employs a metaphysics Nietzsche rejects (Actually, Simmel's metaphysics has implications 
hardly any sane person would want to hold, for it must leave one part of his universe in such a 
state that bodies can move at a perfectly constant speed for all times). 
However, I was only able to attribute this argument to Nietzsche, because I applied the 
principle of charity to his texts. Actually, I was thinking that this is what a good interpreter 
does: He proposes the best possible theory which can be attributed to the philosopher in 
question. (Many interpreters do not do this, especially in the case of Nietzsche). 
There are other arguments for ER in Nietzsche and most of them are pretty bad and invalid. 
However I have found passages out of which a rather good argument (mentioned above) could 
be reconstructed. For balance I will now show some of Nietzsche's bad arguments, and that 
this (most probably) indicates that Nietzsche was not entirely certain about how he should put 
the argument best or whether he could state it as a valid argument at all: 
„The amount of force in the universe is determinate, nor anything 'infinite'. We must guard 
against such conceptual extravagances. And so the total of layers, changes, combinations 
and develoments of this force is enormous for practical purposes 'immeasurable'; but it is 
determinate and not infinite. To be sure, the time over which the universe exercises its force 
is infinite. That is, the force is ever the same and ever active; an infinity has already gone by 
before the present moment - that is, all possible developments must already have gone to 
pass. So the develoment here and now must be a repetition - so must the development that 
led to it, so must what comes from it, and so, forwards and backwards again. Everything has 
taken place countless times, in that the sum total of all dispositions of force recurs 
increasingly."[IB 2, 1309, PF] 
Here one can find the invalid inference from the above mentioned premise (1) to premise (2). 
Yet, it is clear that premise (1) does not imply premise (2) which Nehamas among others 
[Nehamas (1985): P. 144] has also pointed out. In addition to this Nietzsche was not using an 
appropriate terminology in this aphorism. The whole argument appears rather unclear, 
suggesting that Nietzsche's thinking was not too well organised on this topic. 
„The law of the conservation of energy demands eternal recurrence." [WP 1063] 
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In this phrase again an invalid inference was made. From the law of the conservation of 
energy alone one simply cannot infer ER; Nietzsche seems to have committed the same 
mistake as before. However, I do not want to go through the different mistakes in the several 
proofs of ER in Nietzsche. It seems to me to be enough to know that while Nietzsche's 
thinking about ER was not well ordered, one can find in his writings sufficient reasons to 
attribute to him the aforementioned interpretation of ER which renders his thinking on the 
matter consistent and is actually quite a fascinating theory. 
c. OBJECTIONS 
Many interpreters doubt that ER was meant to be a cosmological principle at all. The most 
common reason for this is that in Nietzsche's published writings ER mostly appears in an 
ethical context. This is a correct assessment of the place of this theory in Nietzsche's 
published work, but in the INTRODUCTION I have already explained why I regard myself as 
justified in attributing more weight to his unpublished notes than to his published material; 
namely, that his unpublished notes contain final versions of his philosophy which he had not 
been able to structure sufficiently well to publish. Therefore Nehamas' point that Nietzsche 
never published one of his proofs for ER [Nehamas (1985): P. 143], does not seem to be a 
serious objection to my interpretation. 
Some might point out that Nietzsche himself rejects the cosmological interpretation of ER in 
the second of his „Untimely Meditations" [UM 2, 2] and therewith in his published work. 
This is correct, but one must bear in mind that the „Untimely Meditations" belong to his 
earlier works, and his philosophy changes significantly between his earlier and his later works. 
This applies most significantly to ER and to Nietzsche's attitude towards the intellect, e.g. 
logic and the faculties of reason. Many divergent statements can be found in the whole of 
Nietzsche's work, but one could not say that he had two completely antagonistic philosophies: 
the Appolinian and the Dionysian force are clearly part of his early as well as his late 
philosophy. 
In one significant passage in Nietzsche's work which was ready for publication (,JEcce 
Homo"), he clearly says that ER is a cosmological theory, that he holds it to be true, and that it 
was probably already held in a similar form byHeraclitus and the Stoics: 
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„The doctrine of the 'eternal recurrence', that is, of the unconditional and infinitely repeated 
circular course of all thmgs - this doctrine of Zarathustra might in the end have been taught 
already by Heraclitus. At least the Stoa has traces of it, and the Stoics inherited almost all of 
their principal notions from Heraclitus." [EH „The Birth of Tragedy", 3] 
In „Thus spoke Zarathustra" one can also find clear statements which support the 
cosmological interpretation of ER which does not exclude the ethical one. e.g.: 
„you are the teacher of the eternal recurrence -, that is your destiny!... diat all things recur 
eternally, and we ourselves, too; and that we have already existed an eternal number of 
times, and all things with us. You teach that there is a great year of Becoming, a monster of 
a great year, which must, like an hourglass, mm over again and again so that it may run 
down and run out again;" [Z „The Convalescent"] 
These two passages should provide me with enough support for my interpretation. One might 
say that I have not given the same sort of evidence in respect to the will to power of the first 
section of this main part, although there are interpreters who doubt that the will to power is a 
metaphysical theory. I did not do it, because for me the amount of material inNietzsche's 
unpublished notes clearly suggests Nietzsche meant the WP as a metaphysical principle, in the 
sense I explained earlier on (e.g. WP 1067). 
d. IS IT SELF-CONTRADICTORY TO HOLD THE WILL TO POWER & THE ER 
THEORY? 
There have been quite a few interpreters who have rejected any position which holds that the 
wil l to power and ER are consistent metaphysical theories. In Heidegger's work ,JSfietzsche" 
one can find the position of a couple of philosophers besides Heidegger himself who deal 
with this problem. In his „Nietzsche 1" [Heidegger (1961): P. 30] he mentions Baeumler who 
held that the wil l to power was Nietzsche's main thought, but ER just his personal religious 
conviction. He tries to show the inconsistency of the two theories by putting forward the 
following argument: 
„Will to power is Becoming; Being is grasped as Becoming; that is the ancient doctrine of 
Heraclitus on the flux of things and it is also Nietzsche's genuine teaching. His thought of 
eternal recurrence has to deny the unlimited flux of Becoming. The thought introduces a 
contradiction into Nietzsche's metaphysics. Therefore, either the doctrine of the will to 
power or that of eternal recurrence, only one of them, can define Nietzsche's philosophy." 
[Heidegger (1979): P. 22] 
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This shows, according to Baeumler, that the will to power and ER are contradictory theories. 
But is this correct? I do not think so, because for Baeumler becoming through the will to 
power implies that everything which follows has never been present before. This is linked to 
an infinity of time which is not cyclical, whereas Nietzsche regards the infinity of non cyclical 
time as unthinkable, and also regards creafion ex nihilo as unthinkable. Therefore the only 
theory he is entitled to hold given his way of thinking is ER. In that case the will to power has 
to be incorrect according to Baeumler, because he regarded the will to power as a theory of 
permanent Becoming comparable to Heraclitus' which he interpreted as the permanent 
becoming of something which has never been before. According to Heidegger [Heidegger 1 
(1961): P. 30] this is not the best Heraclitus interpretation one can hold, because this sort of 
Becoming did not correspond to the Greek way of thinking. In addition, will to power and 
simple Becoming are not equivalent: Will to power is already an interpretation of Becoming, 
which is undetermined, and therefore is more than simple Becoming, because it already 
explains Becoming and gives Becoming determined features. One also should not forget that 
Nietzsche never did say explicitly that will to power implies that what has been cannot be 
again. He never claimed that the state which follows next is one which has never been here 
before. This gives us enough reasons to reject one premise of Baeumler's argument, namely 
that the wil l to power implies an infinity of new and different states of the universe. 
The last interpretafion of the relafionship between the will to power and ER which I wish to 
mention is Heidegger's: 
„If, on the contrary, we approach the matter in terms of the developed guiding questions, it 
becomes apparent that the word 'is' in these two major statements - being as a whole is will 
to power, and being as a whole is eternal recurrence of the same - in each case suggests 
something different. To say that being as a whole 'is' will to power means that being as such 
possesses the constitution of that which Nietzsche defmes as will to power. And to say that 
being as a whole 'is' eternal recurrence of the same means that being as a whole is, as being, 
in the manner of eternal recurrence of the same. The determination 'will to power' replies to 
the question of being with respect to the latter's constitution; the determination 'eternal 
recurrence of the same' replies to the question of being with respect to its way to be. Yet 
constitution and manner of being do cohere as determinations of the beingness of beings." 
[Heidegger (1984): P. 199] 
Here Heidegger tries to resolve the (apparent) tension between the theory of the will to power 
and the theory of ER by introducing a distinction. However, he does so in respect to Seienden 
(beings) and not to Sein (Being). He thinks that the will to power and ER are two modes of 
Seienden (beings). This however is not correct, for Seiende (beings) refers to something 
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which is becoming or striving or changing. The will to power can be viewed as something 
Seiendes (beings), but only from the perspective of some sensible perception. From this 
perspective, however, ER is ontologically non existent; it belongs to the category of Sein 
(Being) and can only be grasped through the intellect. This can also be seen in the marmer in 
which Nietzsche derived the theory of ER. The intellect tells us that ER can only be seen as a 
form which directs the history of the world. The ER being the great year, the ring, or the cycle, 
but always only the form which directs everything in it ( I introduce this distinction to clarify 
the concept of ER). However, in respect to Sein (Being) the will to power is the history of the 
world, that what goes on inside the ring, the content. We can imagine Sein (Being) to be a ring 
constituted out of form and content which, of course, are inseparable from each other, in the 
same way in which the will to power and ER are inseparable. Heidegger introduced a similar 
distinction, but in his case he did not take this to be a distinction of Sein (Being), but of the 
Seiendes (beings). This however cannot be correct, for the following reasons. I f we imagine 
Sein (Being) to be a ring, then this ring corresponds to the great year, or the whole history of 
the world which permanently recurs. Here we take an objective, external standpoint on the 
history of the world's being, a perspective the intellect enables us to have. We can only 
perceive Seiendes (beings) on the other hand, i f we get inside the ring and take part in the 
action, the change, the striving, the will to power. But from this perspective we carmot grasp 
ER; the senses do not provide us with a knowledge of it. Therefore Heidegger's interpretation 
is mistaken, for he tried to take a perspective onto ER in respect to the Seiendes (beings), and 
this cannot be done. 
With this discussion, I hope to have provided sufficient understanding for our purposes of ER 
as a metaphysical theory, and its relation to the will to power as a metaphysical theory. Both 
theories present Nietzsche's complete metaphysical philosophy, or one could say Nietzsche's 
ontology in the true sense of the word. Ontology meaning the teaching (logos) of Being (Sein 
or ens). The will to power being the content of Being, and ER the form. This insight 
completes the first main part of my thesis, APOLLO which aimed to present Nietzsche's 
metaphysics. The next main part is entitied DIONYSOS and will be concerned with the 
'artistic' aspect of Nietzsche's metaphysics. 
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DIONYSOS 
After the foregoing reconstruction of Nietzsche's metaphysics, I can now turn to the 
destructive part of his thinking or to the „artistic" dimension of the „artistic metaphysics" 
Nietzsche created. „Artistic", because it does not claim to be true, and this also explains why 
his other theories are not true either, but what really stand behind them. That is what is 
destructive about this part and is the reason why I have entitled this chapter DIONYSOS. As I 
said before DIONYSOS stands for the destructive force; and this side of Nietzsche's thinking 
follows from his constructive one. My way of progression might appear to be a bit unusual -
first having dealt with the constructive side, then with the destructive one. One usually thinks 
that first one has to destroy something, so that one can construct something new. This is 
correct, and this thought will play a main role in the third main part of this thesis, but for the 
sake of presentation I thought it would be easier to follow the opposite line of thought. Now, I 
have to show how this side of Nietzsche's philosophy follows fi-om his metaphysics. In the 
last main part „APOLLO & DIONYSOS RECONCILED" I will explain in detail how the 
destructive side of his philosophy does not in fact undermine the constructive one. 
I wil l divide this main part of the thesis up into two subsections: the first entitled 
„PERSPECTIVISM & TRUTH" and the second „NIHILISM". „NIHILISM" represents the 
unavoidable consequences in respect to value judgements which follow from the observations 
of the first section. Only after I have dealt with all these topics, can I show clearly the apparent 
inconsistencies of Nietzsche's thought, and that they are not in fact inconsistent, but 
embedded in a consistent underlying philosophy. 
2.1. 
a. PERSPECTIVISM & TRUTH 
I will begin this section by explaining how perspectivism follows from his metaphysics, 
outlining Nietzsche's understanding of perspectivism, and then discussing its relation to truth 
in all its various meanings in Nietzsche. 
b. PERSPECTIVISM 
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Perspectivism is the theory that „every view is an interpretation" [Nehamas (1985): P. 66]. 
How does perspecfivism follow from Nietzsche's metaphysics? First some reminders from 
part one. 
The world is „will to power and nothing besides". A single will to power is a power-quantum. 
Let us remember what a power-quantum consists of In the centre of each power quantum 
there is the will as a point, surrounded by power. These two constituents which never turn up 
on their own make up a power-quantum. Each power-quantum has a mind and memory. The 
mind enables it to perceive its envirormient, and the memory enables it to make value 
estimations. Individual power-quanta can group together and form power-constellations. Each 
of these power-quanta or power-constellations can be seen as an organism. Yet, there can 
never be an organism which consists of all the power-quanta presently in existence. The world 
can never be one organism. Each single power-quantum interprets its envirormient, that is, it 
has a perspective upon the world. 
What does Nietzsche say about perspectivism? 
„precisely this necessary perspectivism by virtue of which every center of force -and not 
only man- construes all the rest of the world from its own view-point, i.e., measures, feels, 
forms, according to its own force... Perspectivism is only a complex form of specificity. -
My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its 
force (-its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually 
encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies, and ends by coming to an 
arrangement ('union') with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: - thus they then 
conspire together for power. And the process goes on..." [WP 636] 
Here, Nietzsche describes the process I have referred to before, in the section on 
INTERPRETATION in main part one where he explains the purpose and the fiinction of a 
perspective. Each power-quantum has its own view of the world and applies it to the actual 
perceptions it has in every single instant in order to be able to act respectively. „To act 
respectively" means that the power quantum can attack another power quantum, that it can 
attempt to unite itself with another one, or decide that the surtounding power-quanta are either 
too strong or too weak to use them for an enhancement of its own power. A l l this I have 
described in more detail in the section just mentioned. Now, I will try to elucidate the theory 
of perspectivism fiarther from a variety of different angles. What we have to bear in mind is 
that each power-quantum has a mind and a memory. Yet, a mind and memory can be 
employed in various ways. Let us try to get a clearer picture of whatNietzsche means. 
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c. THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 
Firstly, I wish to explain why perspectivism is not a theory of knowledge in the traditional 
sense of the word, this must be seen in connection with Nietzsche's rejection of the traditional 
theories of knowledge. Secondly, I wish to elucidate the theory of the non-existence of a 
subject in Nietzsche's conception. Then, I will briefly deal with the role of consciousness in 
respect to Nietzsche's perspectivism. After having dealt with these various aspects of 
perspectivism, I will mention the link between perspectivism and truth. 
Let me start with the first point: Nietzsche's perspectivism is not a version of a traditional 
theory of knowledge. Traditional theories of knowledge are what they are, because they are 
regarded as enabling the person who applies them to grasp the truth as corresponding to the 
world. Empiricists base the principles of their knowledge on experience provided to us by the 
five senses, often referred to as sense-data, or the given (this is the information we get prior to 
any conceptualisation, or interpretation). Extreme Rationalists base the principles of their 
knowledge on reason only. However, there are weaker versions of rationalism which hold that 
reason is merely a necessary constituent of knowledge. Yet, both empiricists as well as 
rationalists hold that their respective methods provide them with knowledge, and knowledge 
was usually linked to the truth in correspondence with the world. Nietzsche rejects both 
theories, and even the possibility of a theory of knowledge in general. How does he attack 
these two theories? 
„Against positivism, which halts at phenomena - 'There are only facts' -1 would say: No, 
facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact 'in 
itself: perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing. 
'Everything is subjective', you say; but even this is interpretation. The 'subject' is not 
something given, it is something added and invented and projected behing what there is.-
Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretation? Even this is 
invention, hypothesis. 
In so far as the word 'knowledge' has any meaning, the worid is knowable; but it is 
intepretable otherwise, it has no meaning behing it, but countless meanings.-
'Perspectivism'. 
It is our needs that interpret the worid; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a 
kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other 
drives to accept as a norm." [WP 481] 
„Our perceptions, as we understand them: i.e., the sum of all those perceptions the 
becoming-conscious of which was usefiil and essential to us and to the entire organic 
process - therefore not all perceptions in general (e.g., not the electric); this means: we have 
senses only for a selection of our perceptions - those with which we have to concern 
ourselves in order to preserve ourselves. Consciousness is present only to the extent that 
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consciousness is useful. It caimot be doubted that all sense perceptions are permeated with 
value judgements (useful and harmful - consequently, pleasant or unpleasant). Each 
individual color is also for us an expression of value (although we seldom admit it, or do so 
only after a protracted impression of exclusively the same color; e.g., aprisoner in prison, or 
a lunatic). Thus insects also react defferently to different colors; some like [this color, some 
that]; e.g., the ants." [WP 505] 
„there is an interpretations already in sense perceptions." [IB 2, 18, PF] 
According to Nietzsche, all our sense perceptions are linked to experience of pain and 
pleasure (as well as value judgements, i f we have values) - all power-quanta have perceptions 
- and because of this they can never be pure sense perceptions. Pure sense perceptions provide 
as us with data which corresponds to the objects. Yet, all sense perceptions are impure, 
according to Nietzsche, because they always are bound to include an interpretation and 
evaluation of the objects perceived. This interpretation, however, is made on the basis of who 
one is (the power quantum or power constellation one is). I wish to restrict the domain of 
power-constellations to human beings, because they are the ones relevant for this discussion. 
So the human being, who perceives the world never has a pure perception of the world, but is 
always restricted to his own interpretation of the world which is based upon typical features of 
human beings, like the intellect [WP 515], his own memory (as shown before), the memory of 
his ancestors [BGE 264], the culture in which he is brought up [IB 1, 150; HAH 2, 188], his 
physiology [WP 676; IB 2, 858], and even the language he uses [TLN 1; WP 522; IB 2, 33]. 
One can explain this position at the following example: 
A computer is never only a computer. For John who studied computer sciences, the computer 
is essential for his survival. It is the object with which he spends most of his days. He knows 
how to give orders to the computer, so that it understands them and replies as it is expected of 
it. John loves Computers. Jim, on the other hand, hates computers. He used them in the past, 
when he tried to write his PhD thesis on one of them. However, just as he finished his PhD 
someone broke into his car and stole the backup disks of his thesis, as well as the copies he 
had printed out. At least I have got the thesis still on my hard Disk, Jim thought. He drove 
back home to print it out again, and to make new backup copies. Yet, when he turned on the 
computer he discovered that a virus has destroyed all his data. As a consequence of this, Jim 
lost all his material he had written for his PhD. He was so fed up that he never tried to rewrite 
it again. At the moment he is a taxi driver in London who hates computers. 
These are extreme examples of course, but Nietzsche thinks that this is the case for all our 
perceptions. It is no doubt that usually the values one attributes to perceptions are not as 
extreme as in these cases, but one always sees perceptions in relation to our own feelings and 
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values - the perceptions mean something to us. This does not only follow fi-om Nietzsche's 
metaphysics, but also corresponds to our intuitions. It is also implicit in modem forms of 
interior architecture (Feng Shui), where the colours and the forms for a room are chosen on 
the basis of which form of stimulus is beneficial for the work which has to be done in the 
respective room. Even our common sense tells us that the colour red makes people aggressive. 
Al l these points are reasons in favour of Nietzsche's theory. My intention here is not to claim 
that Nietzsche is putting forward a compelling theory, but I would prefer to make his theory 
sound plausible, to put it forward in the best light possible. 
Since sense perceptions always imply an interpretation, they do not provide us with 
knowledge of the truth in correspondence with the world, but only with an interpretation of 
the world. A similar point was made by Richard Rorty who brought together Sellars' attack on 
the given, and in Quine's rejection of the analytic / synthetic distinction. Quine holds that 
every statement is subject to revision, even the law of non-contradiction. He observed that 
there carmot be a „neutrar' synthetic observation, because every observation is infected by 
background assumptions, e.g. we perceive the world similarly to how our forefathers did, but 
we now longer hold that the world is stationary. From this he concluded: „The totality of our 
so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the 
profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic is a man-made 
fabric which impinges on experience only at the edges." [Quine (1953)]. However, Rorty goes 
even ftarther by combining this approach with Sellars attack on the given. Sellars introduces 
the distinction „knowing what x is like" and „knowing what sort of thing an x is". The first 
phrase implies only a pre-linguistic awareness, whereas the latter involves the ability to link 
the concept of a thing with other concepts so that one can justify claims about the first thing, 
e.g. it is a linguistic affair. However, i f both of these claims are correct, then we have to 
conclude that knowledge does not even depend on experience on Quine's edges, because all 
we need for knowledge is to combine concepts together. 
Rorty illustrates this as follows: „we can know what redness is like without knowing that it is 
different fi"om blue, that it is a color, and so on. It is urmecessary because we can know all 
that, and a great deal more, about redness while having been blind from birth, and thus not 
knowing what redness is like. It is just false that we cannot talk and know about what we do 
not have raw feels of, and equally false that i f we cannot talk about them we may nevertheless 
have justified true beliefs about them." [Rorty (1980): P. 184 - 185]. With this argument Rorty 
attacks empiricism as a basis for knowledge of the world. What is essential for Rorty [Rorty 
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(1989)] is that all the concepts are merely contingent and together with this all languages. 
What we regard to be a truth is only a quality of linguistic creatures/systems. Since truth is a 
quality of sentences, the existence of sentences depends on a vocabulary, and a vocabulary is 
made by men, truth also is only man made. Men make these truths on the basis of what is 
useftil for them. Rorty here agrees to the pragmatic definition of truth as put forward by 
William James. Thereby truth does not have an objective basis but only an ethical one. Rorty 
and Nietzsche agree in this respect. The difference between them is that Nietzsche gives an 
underlying analysis for James' statement about what is useful for men. Thereby he goes 
beyond Rorty. One might be tempted to argue at this stage that whatNietzsche puts forward as 
an underlying analysis of the respective phrase is only what is useful for Nietzsche, but I wi l l 
show in the third main part of the thesis that this is not the case in Nietzsche's conception. 
The similarity between Nietzsche's and Rorty's arguments should show us the significance of 
Nietzsche as a thinker, given that Nietzsche wrote his theories a hundred years before Rorty. 
As a conclusion we can say that Nietzsche rejects empiricism as a theory with which we can 
grasp truth in correspondence with the world, because we can only interpret our environment, 
yet it is impossible for us and everything else to get a pure picture of our environment, for 
there is no such viewpoint. 
Nietzsche's second attack on the theories of knowledge is his argument against the claim that 
rationalism can provide us with knowledge. I have alluded to this in main part one, and I wil l 
only say very little about it here, because I will treat it in depth in the section on TRUTH. One 
of the most important aphorisms in this respect [WP 515] tells us that our inability to 
contradict the categories of reason and logic expresses only our inability, but not a truth. The 
reason why we are unable to contradict them is that only i f we think within their categories we 
can have stability, and stability is necessary for our survival; our will to survive is an 
expression of our will to power. So i f we apply these faculties then we should get a theory 
suitable for our survival, but not one which provides us with the truth. Therefore rationalism, 
as well as empiricism is not suited to be a theory of knowledge, because knowledge is always 
knowledge of the truth in correspondence with the world a position which we cannot achieve 
with either empiricism or rationalism. 
These are Nietzsche's attacks on the traditional theories of knowledge, against which he puts 
forward his own perspectivism; however this is not a theory of knowledge, rather a theory 
which describes how everyone achieves their own apparent truths. Yet, I will come back to 
this point later in the section on TRUTH. The next point I wish to discuss is Nietzsche's 
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rejection of the standard picture of the subject which is closely inter-linked with his 
perspectivism. 
d. SUBJECT 
„The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as 
permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis 
of our thought and our consciousness in general? A kind of aristocracy of 'cells' in which 
dominion resides? To be sure, an aristocracy of equals, used to ruling jointly and 
understanding how to command? My hypotheses: The subject as multiplicity." [WP 490] 
The subject is a multiplicity, Nietzsche says, but what does this mean and why is this 
important for perspectivism? Again we have to bear in mind Nietzsche's metaphysics of the 
will to power, according to which, human beings are power-constellations which are build out 
of many individual power-quanta. One can also refer to such a human being, or power-
constellation as an organism which includes many smaller organisms and in the end individual 
power-quanta. Each power-quantum has its own interpretation of the world. The individual 
power-quanta gather together, i f they think their individual goals can be enhanced in a better 
way in the shape of a power-constellations with other appropriate power-quanta. The 
respective power-constellations form new interpretations of the world which are built together 
out of all the different power-quanta. In this way the human-being also forms an individual 
perspective on the world, i.e. an interpretation of the world. However, the subject who forms 
this interpretation is not a unified subject, but is constituted out of a multiplicity of individual 
power-quanta. This is a point worth stressing, because the subject is usually seen as a unified 
self, most often floating around in a non-physical realm. However, there are also some other 
thinkers who agree with Nietzsche on that point. According to Hume, the „concept of the self 
has no empirical basis [Hume (1967): I . iv. 6]. Al l we need do, he says, is to look within: we 
will find „nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions" in a state of continual 
change. No single persisting thing over and above particular occurent perceptions can be 
discerned among them. It immediately follows, says Hume, that we are mistaken i f we 
„suppose ourselves possessed of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole 
course of our lives.'" [ed. Grayling, A. C. (1995): P. 540]. For Hume, the bundle of 
perceptions is kept together by resemblance, contiguity and causation, whereas in Nietzsche it 
is the organism, the links between the individual power-quanta which keeps the subject and its 
experiences linked together. In addition to this, the bundle of perceptions is kept together by 
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our language, which presupposes a unified subject. A person is always referred to with the 
same name, although metaphysically there is nothing which justifies this habit. 
Another thinker very familiar with the psyche held that the subject is not unified - Freud. I 
take psyche and subject to refer to the same entity. Freud distinguished different components 
of a psyche; he „considered mental life as produced by the interaction of three psychic 
agencies (Instanzen), the ego [ICH], the id [ES], and the superego [UBER-ICH]. The ego was 
defined as 'the co-ordinated organisation of mental processes in a person'. There was a 
conscious and an unconscious part in the ego. To the conscious ego belonged perception and 
motor control, and to the unconscious ego, the dream censor and the process of repression. 
Language was an ego function; unconscious contents became preconscious through the 
medium of words. The id was... the seat of both repressed material and the drives, to which 
had been added unconscious fantasies and unconscious feelings, notably guilt feelings... The 
superego is the watchful, judging, punishing agency in the individual, the source of social and 
religious feelings in mankind. Its origin was in the individual's former ego configuration 
which had been superseded, and above all in the introjection of the father figure as a part of 
the resolution of the Oedipus complex." [Ellenberger (1970): P. 515-516]. Besides the three 
psychic agencies, there is another - the ideal self (ICH IDEAL). This should make it obvious 
that Nietzsche does not take a completely absurd and solitary position in that respect. One 
might even speculate that Nietzsche's „Genealogy of Morals" helped Freud to become aware 
of the superego. The last thinker I wish to mention concerning the concept of the subject is 
Wittgenstein. One does not usually think of him when one talks about the subject as a 
multiplicity. However, Wittgenstein does seem to hold that position in his Tractatus: ,,5.542 
This shows too that there is no such thing as the souls- the subject, etc.- as it is conceived in 
the superficial psychology of the present day." [Wittgenstein (1961, 1974)]. 
The next point I wish to discuss about Nietzsche's philosophy is related to the last - it is 
consciousness. This is an even more mysterious topic. According to Nietzsche, every 
organism thinks continuously, but only a small part of this is done consciously, and therewith 
also verbally. The development of language and consciousness go hand in hand, according to 
Nietzsche [GS 354]. Yet, we have consciousness only to such a degree as it is useful for us 
[WP 505]. I f it is needed, an evolutionary process will take place to bring it about. This seems 
to imply that consciousness arises out of a need. So the more complex and detailed an 
interpretation of the world is written down in a book, the more aspects its author must have 
been in need of This again provides Nietzsche with a justification to apply his ad hominem 
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arguments to writers and thinkers, and it also gives us a new point of view of Nietzsche's 
perspectivism. In addition to this he developed a much more plausible version of 
consciousness, than Descartes, for example, who thought that all our „thinking is conscious" 
[ed. Honderich (1995): P. 152]. 
After I have briefly dealt with the topics subject and consciousness in respect to 
perspectivism, I will come back to the initial topic - namely Nietzsche's attacks on the 
theories of knowledge of the truth as corresponding to the world. I wish to show why for 
Nietzsche it is not a shame that the theories of knowledge cannot provide us with any 
knowledge. 
e. VALUE OF TRUTH 
Due to the close link between the will to power and perspectivism, we can understand why 
Nietzsche can hold that we do not desire truth for the truth's sake. He often claims: 
„No, this bad taste, this will to truth, to 'truth by any price', this youthful madness in the 
love of the truth have lost their charm for us: for that we are too experienced, too serious, 
too gay, too burnt, too deep." [NCW Epilogue, 2] 
„You think you are seeking 'the truth'? What you are looking for is a leader; you really 
want to get yourself put under order." [IB 2, 652, PF] 
„The 'will to truth'develops itself in the service of the 'will to power'. Its proper task, if 
you look at it with precision, is to assist a certain kind of untruth to victory and endurance, 
to make a coherent mass of falsifications into the basis for the preservation of a particular 
kind of livmg creamre." [IB 2, 835, PF] 
These aphorisms represent one of Nietzsche's most original ideas. He questions the value of 
the truth. In Plato the true, the good, and the beautifiil are linked to another. In Nietzsche the 
truth is separated from the other two categories and even portrayed as something ugly which 
does not serve our survival. However, this is not a problem for him either, because human 
beings do not aim for the truth, but only for power. To claim that one possesses the truth can 
be a good means to gain power, since one still believes that the value of the truth cannot be 
doubted, but this does not render false the statement that we do not seek truth for the truth's 
sake. Nietzsche does not deny that men can have a will to truth, but the will to power 
underlies this will , and what we seek is not the truth, but an untruth, a falsification according 
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to him. The will to power helps the will to truth to establish the victory of a certain untruth^^, 
because we cannot gain THE TRUTH and as I will soon explain it is essential for our survival 
that we are unable to do so. This is another reason for me to translate „philosophy" as love of 
wisdom in Nietzsche, and not as love of the truth, as I explained earlier. 
So the will to truth is a will to establish a certain untruth for ourselves, a stable picture of the 
world which can serve as a basis for our actions in the world. Yet, every perspective is an 
interpretation, and it cannot provide us with THE TRUTH. This is why Nietzsche calls 
perspectives which are essential for our survival perspectival falsifications. So a limited 
perspective, or rather a certain stupidity in respect to THE TRUTH, is beneficial to our lives. 
„perspective..., the basic condition of all life." [BGE preface] 
..synthetic judgements a priori should not 'be possible' at all: we have no right to them, in 
our mouths they are nothing but false judgements. But belief in their truth is, of course, 
necessary as foreground belief and ocular evidence belonging to the perspective optics of 
life." [BGE 1, 11] 
„it is 'nature' in it... which teaches the narrowing of perspective, and thus in a certain sense 
stupidity, as a condition of life and growth." [BGE 188] 
„I put my fmger on this vast perspectival falsification, by which the human species carries 
on." [IB 2, 835, PF] 
Here Nietzsche goes a step fiarther than we have come so far. Firstly, I explained how in 
Nietzsche's metaphysics perspectives come about, and that they are interpretations of the 
world based on who one is. Now, he claims that it is necessary to have a perspective, an 
interpretation, and not THE TRUTH, because only this enables us to cope with the world. 
Among the perspectives relevant for our survival, the synthetic a priori judgements which are 
made by the intellect are mentioned again; these are typical for all men, because they are 
essential for our survival. They are falsifications of the world, but beneficial ones in respect to 
our lives. 
We have to realise that in many of these aphorisms Nietzsche is talking about a falsification 
when he describes perspectivism- a perspectival falsification or a false truth or even untruth. 
Yet, what does he mean by claiming that every perspective is false? I f there is a false truth, 
should not there also be a true truth? At this point I wil l turn to the topic 'truth', because the 
claim that each perspective is a falsificafion or a false truth can only be understood i f we know 
what truth means for Nietzsche. 
25 We need TRUTH, stability, or a leader on whose commands we can base our actions. 
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f. TRUTH 
Truth in Nietzsche has a couple of different meanings. There is NIETZSCHE'S TRUTH 
(which is not be understood purely subjectively, as I already said. It is important to bear this in 
mind), TRUTH, OUR TRUTH ('our' refers to the set of human beings), and THE TRUTH. I 
will soon clarify these four different uses of the notion 'truth' in Nietzsche. 
g. THE TRUTH 
I will start with the notion THE TRUTH, because this is the one he talks about when he says 
that each perspective is a false truth or that there are only perspectival falsifications. A closely 
related thought is expressed when one reads that there is no truth. The denial of the truth 
implies the theory of perspectival falsification, but goes beyond it by holding that there is no 
power-constellation and therewith organism which has THE TRUTH. A perspectival 
falsification, for Nietzsche after all, is a condition for survival.. All this will soon become 
clearer. 
„There are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes - amd consequently there are many 
kinds of 'truths', and consequently there is no truth." [WP 540] 
„Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual 
fiction that posited a 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject'; let us guard 
against the snares of such contradictory concepts as 'pure reason', 'absolute spirituality', 
'knowledge in itself: these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely 
unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting 
forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; 
these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective 
seeing, only a perspective 'knowing'; and the more effects we allow to speak about one 
thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete 
will our 'concept' of this thing, our 'objectivity' be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to 
suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this - what would that mean 
but to castrate the intellect?-" [GM 3, 12] 
Whenever he talks about „eyes" Nietzsche is referring to individual perspectives - either of a 
power-quantum or of a power-constellation. Each of these perspectives represents an 
interpretation of the world. Since there are many eyes or perspectives, there are many truths. 
And so Nietzsche concludes that there can be no absolute truth, but what does he mean by 
this? 
82 
This question is obviously related to the one I asked before when I was wondering what it 
means to say that every perspective falsifies. For there to be a truth, according to Nietzsche, 
there must be someone to have the truth, as we can infer from the last aphorism mentioned. 
Yet, no organism can possess knowledge of the world, because all the traditional theories of 
knowledge do not work, and his perspectivism provides every bearer of a perspective with a 
falsification of the world. The individual perspective is always brought about by the whole 
body or organism, and is therefore in the end caused by the will to power. Nothing is 
completely detached from the rest [Z „The drunken Song", 10]. As nothing is detached from 
anything else, everything also interacts with everything else, e.g. i f we apply this awareness to 
human beings, we can conclude that there is no such drive in them as knowledge for 
knowledge's sake or art for art's sake. At the bottom of the will to creation and knowledge is 
the will to power, as is at the bottom of every other interest or action. 
So every perspective is through one eye and it holds one interpretation of the world which was 
brought about in relation to its own interest and will to power. Each of these interpretations is 
a TRUTH, and because there are many such TRUTHS, there is no THE TRUTH. A TRUTH is 
the individual perspective of a power-quantum or a power constellation. A power-
constellation has a r/?{777/constituted as a mixture of the individual TRUTHS of its 
constituent power-quanta. What then could THE TRUTH be? The traditional understanding of 
THE TRUTH is abstractly expressed through the correspondence theory of truth. By means of 
reason and/or experience we used to believe we could gain access to an absolute realm of the 
Kantian things in itself or Plato's true world as opposed to the apparent one. This procedure, it 
was believed, provided us with THE TRUTH. Nietzsche, however, as we have just seen 
denies that we can achieve knowledge of the truth as correspondence to the world, and indeed 
has to do so given his metaphysics. He stresses this point very often: 
„The 'real world', however one has hithero conceived it - it has always been the apparent 
world once again." [WP 566] 
„The 'true world' and the 'apparent world' - that means: the mendaciously invented world 
and reality..." [EH Preface, 2] 
„Overcoming of philosophers through the destruction of the world of being: intermediary 
period of nihilism: before there is yet present the strength to reverse values and to deify 
becoming and the apparent world as the only world, and to call them good." [WP 585] 
„The history of an error 
1. The true world - attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it. 
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A cicumlocution 
for the sentence, '1, Plato, am the truth.')... 
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5. The 'true worid' - an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating - an 
idea which has become useless and superfluous - consequently, a refiited idea: let us abolish 
it! (Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; 
pandemonium of all free spirits.) 
6. The 'true worid' - we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one 
perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one. (Noon; 
moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT 
ZARATHUSTRA.)" [TI „How the 'true world' finally became a fable"] 
Nietzsche refers to Plato's realm of forms or Kant's things in themselves when he mentions 
the real world, but these hypotheses are ill-founded. When Nietzsche talks about the apparent 
world, he means the world that we perceive with our five senses. Yet, he does not regard 
himself as justified anymore in refering to it as the apparent world, because „apparent" world 
implies that there is another real world, but this is not the case. 
Since Nietzsche denies the real world beyond the appearances, he cannot have held the 
correspondence theory of truth in its traditional manner; his metaphysics is significantly 
different from traditional ones. But now the relationship between the apparent world, which in 
Nietzsche is no longer just apparent, and his definition of THE TRUTH needs to be explained. 
This will also clarify why Nietzsche does not regard himself as justified in calling the apparent 
world „apparent" anymore, and how it can be that according to Nietzsche there is nothing 
which appears. 
Before finally being able to answer what THE TRUTH in Nietzsche means, I have to mention 
a part of Nietzsche's metaphysics which I have left out so far, but alluded to before in the 
section „A THING IS THE SUM OF ITS EFFECTS". 
„The properties of a thing are effects on other 'things'; if one removes other 'things', then a 
thing has no properties, i.e., there is no 'thing-in-itself". [WP 557] 
„The 'thing-in-itself nonsensical. If I remove all the relationships, all the 'properties', all 
the 'activities' of a thing, the thing does not remain over; because thingness has only been 
invented by us owing to the requirements of logic, thus with the aim of defming, 
communication (to bind together the multiplicity of relationships, properties, activities)." 
[WP 558] 
,,'Things that have a constitution in themselves' - a dogmatic idea with which one must 
break absolutely." [WP 559] 
„That things possess a constimtion in themselves quite apart from interpretation and 
subjectivity, is a quite idle hypothesis: it presupposes that interpretation and subjectivity are 
not essential, that a thing freed from all relationships would still be a thing." [WP 560] 
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A thing is nothing but the sum of the effects it produces on other things. We have said before 
that a thing is a power-quantum or a power-constellation^^. According to Nietzsche's 
metaphysics, the paper lying in front of you with these words on it is a power-constellation. It 
has certain qualities, e.g. it has A 4 size, it is mainly white, but it also contains some black 
signs which are the text. The paper is not very sfiff, can be bent, ripped, and burned.... The 
description of course is not complete. In addition to the qualities it has on me which I did not 
mention, it has certain qualities for a caterpillar or a sea gull which are different to the ones I 
have attributed to it. Some qualities might even be similar. Yet, one cannot presume that how 
the world occurs to the sea gull and to me is similar. The entity I perceive as a paper, might 
not exist as a seperate entity for the sea gull at all. I wish to stress that entities such as sea 
gulls, tables, and human beings having a perspective (in appropriate circumstances) on the 
paper is a feature of Nietzsche's metaphysics which is to a certain extent very similar to 
Leibnitz's and which becomes obvious again at this point. What is important is that given 
Nietzsche's metaphysics even the table on which this paper is (probably) lying has got a 
certain perspective of this paper, because the power-constellation table also has „mental" 
qualities. The more perspectives of this paper another power-constellation has, the more 
objective [GM 3, 12] is its view of the thing. A thing, in our case the paper, is nothing but the 
effects it has on all other possible power-constellations (of which there is only a limited 
number, as I have argued in main part 1). Yet the perspective any of these individual objects 
has on the paper is bound to be a false perspective, because there have to be other perspectives 
which contain different qualities of the power-constellation. (Even the phrase „Different 
qualities of the power-constellation" shows how language leads us away from Nietzsche's 
world view, as he himself says. This sentence clearly implies that there is a thing which exists 
besides the qualities we can perceive of it. Nietzsche does not think that this is the case)'^ .^ 
'*One might be tempted to claim that one has discovered a clear inconsistency in Nietzsche's though at this point. 
On the one hand he claims that a thing is a power-constellation, which is constimted out of many power-quanta. 
A power-quanta being a point of will surrounded by power. On the other hand Nietzsche is holding that a thing is 
nothing but the sum of its effects. It can either be only the one or the other, one might be tempted to think. This is 
not the case. Every effect it produces is its power, which is driven by the will as a point. This is what one has to 
understand. 
^^According to Poellner [Poellner (1995): P. 284] the claim that a thing is nothing but the sum of its effects is 
incoherent: „it may be intelligible to say that this tree exists only as my 'idea', but I cannot also maintain that at 
the same time I exist only as an idea of some other mind or minds, and that other mind or minds in their turn exist 
only as an idea ('effect') in some yet further mind and so forth. 
It is clear that on this interpretation of Nietzsche's anti-essentialism, which is the one most straightforwardly 
suggested by his explicit staments, we encounter an infinite regress. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if 
this is how we are to understand his assertion that nothing has a constimtion in itself - i.e. that that notion is 
ultimately unintelligible - then this claim itself is an incoherent one." 
I have to reply that the T Poellner is talking about in Nietzsche is the whole body or organism, and that within a 
body there are many power-quanta who interact with one another. This interaction can be so intense, as in the 
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Why does a perspective have to be false? Because the whole universe cannot be one organism, 
for only i f the whole universe was one organism all the time, then one could say that this 
organism has THE TRUTH, because it would incorporate all possible perspectives on 
everything. However, since an organism can survive only i f it nourishes itself with something 
external of itself, there cannot be such an organism and with it no truth. Here we can see that 
Nietzsche's conception of THE TRUTH again is some sort of GOD'S EYES view, and his 
denial of THE TRUTH goes hand in hand with his famous claim that GOD IS DEAD [GS 
108]. THE TRUTH would comprise all possible perspectives on everything taken together -
again this would bring in the correspondence theory of truth, but different from the traditional 
ones. Now, as we have got the concept of THE TRUTH, it is even easier for us to explain 
what a thing is, given Nietzsche's metaphysics: the sum of all its effects. I f we took away 
these effects, we would not be left with the thing in itself, but with nothing: 
„But I shall reiterate a hundred times that 'immediate certainty', like 'absolute knowledge' 
and 'thing in itself, contains a contradictio in adjecto: we really ought to get free from the 
seduction of words." [BGE 1,16] 
With the treatment of what things are, I have finally fulfilled what I promised in the first main 
secdon. I have also clarified what THE TRUTH stands for in Nietzsche's philosophy. Given 
these conceptions I can finally explain why every perspective is necessarily a false 
perspective, or why every perspective falsifies, although I think that the line of thought in that 
respect should already be obvious. THE TRUTH would be owned by an organism, i f it united 
all possible perspectives of all times within itself Therefore every organism which does not 
unite all possible perspectives of all times within itself, necessarily has to have a falsified 
perspective. Each of these falsified perspectives are TRUTfTS. They are the truths of the 
power-constellation or the organism who holds it. They are their way of interpreting the 
world, the basis for their actions. As I have said before, falsification is essential for survival 
which again serves the underlying will to power. One could not survive with THE TRUTH, 
for THE TRUTH could not provide us a basis for our choices, because it incorporates all 
case of a headache, that it becomes conscious. Yet, there is no consciousness seperate fi-om the interacting forces 
which are part of a power-constellation. So the T does not exist only as an idea of other minds, but the T or 
rather the body exists as its effects on other things, plus the effects it has on itself This, however, does not mean 
that there can be a 'thing in itself, because the body can effect itself, for it is constituted out of many power-
quanta. One must not forget that a power-quanmm permanently strives for power - it is the striving for power. 
Nietzsche's denial of the 'thing in itself means that there cannot be just one power-quantum, analogously he 
denies that the world can be one organism. Power always implies a multiplicity, and thereby a power difference. 
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perspectives. In addition THE TRUTH could only be reached, i f the universe was, is and wil l 
always be only one organism and this is impossible, as I argued before. 
h. TRUTH = A PERSPECTIVAL FALSIFICATION 
What then can we say about individual perspectives? Al l of them are false in respect to THE 
TRUTH, but are all of them equally false or are their differences in their degree of falsity? 
Nietzsche held that the more perspectives of a thing are incorporated in ones point of view, 
the closer to THE TRUTH we get. It is, however, irrelevant for us how close we get to THE 
TRUTH, because as I argued before we are not interested anyway in THE TRUTH, there is no 
drive within us which aims for THE TRUTH, for THE TRUTH'S sake. We are aiming for 
power, and so is everything else. Our survival is in most cases a matter of gaining power, and 
our perspectives are false in respect to THE TRUTH so that we can survive. In addition to 
this, I think that we could not even decide which perspective incorporates the most 
perspectives, and is therewith closest to THE TRUTH, because to be able to decide which 
perspective incorporates the most perspectives, one would have to know THE TRUTH with 
all its perspectives and one would have to be able to grasp all our own perspectives, and the 
ones of the power-constellation with whom one wants to compare one's perspective in respect 
to THE TRUTH. This we cannot do, because as I said before our consciousness reduces the 
awareness of all our own perspectives to a level at which it is bearable for us. We are just 
conscious of a very limited amount of perspectives that we have. It is, of course, even harder 
to get to know how many perspectives another power-constellation has and can have on a 
thing. Due to this we are bound to say that all our perspectives are equally legitimate in 
respect of THE TRUTH. We have to remain agnostics about the comparisons of our 
perspectives in respect to THE TRUTH within Nietzsche's metaphysics. 
It might be replied that this is clearly false; we do compare perspectives and in many cases can 
clearly say which perspective is superior and which is inferior. And this reply might be 
strengthened by introducing a further distinction: We distinguish between explanatory 
quantity and explanatory quality. Explanatory quantity is how much a theory can explain. The 
Phillips curve in economics is a theory whose explanatory quantity is very small, because it 
has only a very limited field of application. The explanatory quantity of Aristotle's philosophy 
on the other hand is enormous. There are hardly any areas of life and the world Aristotle did 
This should answer the problem pointed out by Poellner, and make clear that Nietzsche's claim that a thing is 
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not deal with. The explanatory quality deals with the content of the theory. The more 
contradictions a theory contains, the less valuable its explanatory quality. I f a theory does not 
contain any contradictions, then the value of its explanatory quality has reached its maximum. 
Whenever we compare perspectives in respect to THE TRUTH, we consider the explanatory 
quality of a theory. In comparing two theories that which contains many internal 
contradictions is usually regarded as inferior in respect to THE TRUTH to one with less 
internal contradictions. Thus it might be said that we do have a basis on which to decide a 
hierarchy of perspectives. 
Nietzsche would not deny that we have ways of ordering perspectives hierarchically, but he 
would reject that this says something about how the respective theories are related in respect 
to THE TRUTH. We always have to remember: 
„In the formafion of reason, logic, the categories, it was need that was authoritative... the 
utilitarian fact that only when we see things coarsely and made equal do they become 
calculabel and usable for us... The categories are 'truths' only in the sense that they are 
conditions of life for us... The subjective compulsion not to contradict here is a biological 
compulsion... But what naivete to extract from this a proof that we are therewith in 
possession of a 'truth in itself! - Not being able to contradict is proof of an incapacity, not 
of'truth'." [WP515] 
It is the intellect with its logic and the categories of reason which enables us to create a 
hierarchy of perspectives. It does so not in respect to THE TRUTH, but in order for us to 
survive: 
„To what extent even our intellect is a consequence of conditions of existence - : we would 
not have it if we did not need to have it, and we would not have it as its is if we did not need 
to have it as it is, if we could live otherwise." [WP 498] 
The intellect is necessary for us, and it is also essential that the intellect works the way it does. 
It could not be different from the way it is. Therefore the intellect in its current form is 
indispensable for us, and this is also the reason why Nietzsche's theory has to and does appeal 
to the intellect. 
„As far as our own experiences go, we should always remain sceptical. For example, we 
ought to say that we can never claim an eternal validity for any 'law of nature'; that we can 
never claim a lasting persistence for any chemical quality. We are not subtle enough to 
detect the supposed absolute flux of events. What is persistent is there because of the 
nothing but the sum of its effects is not incoherent. 
coarseness of our organs, which manufacUire unities and surfaces where in fact there is 
nothing of the sort. At every instant, a tree is something new; we assert its form because we 
cannot perceive the most delicate movement of it. We lay down a cross-section upon 
movement that is absolute; we impose lines and surfaces upon it, at the behest of the 
intellect. And that is the mistake - we presuppose equality and persistency, for we can see 
only what persists, and can recollect only what is similar [equal]. But reality itself is not so; 
we must not transfer our scepticism to the essence itself of things." [IB 2, 73, PF] 
Here Nietzsche explains how he thinks that the intellect fianctions. Since the permanent 
changes, the wil l to power, the struggle could not enable us to have any sense of stability, any 
stable concepts, anything certain or anything reliable, we could not survive while having 
Nietzsche's real world in our consciousness, because human beings need stability and 
reliability. I f a human being had nothing stable, but regarded everything as contingent and 
historical, then he would have to die, as I have tried to make plausible in D. Here the intellect 
comes in again. The intellect creates stability, similarity, concepts, pattern, forms, according 
to which we can structure our lives. They are delusory in respect to THE TRUTH of course, 
but they enable us to survive. Among the stability's the intellect has created are the categories 
of reason and logic. 
„The inventive force that invented categories labored in the service of our needs, namely in 
our need for security, for quick understanding on the basis of signs and sounds, for means of 
abbreviation: - 'substance', 'subject', 'object', 'being', 'becoming' have nothing to do with 
metaphysical truths.- It is the powerfiil who made the names of things to law, and among the 
powerfiil it is the greatest artist in abstraction who created the categories." [WP 513] 
„ExactIy the same thing could have happened with the categories of reason: they could have 
prevailed, after much groping and fumbling, through their relative utility- There came a 
point when one collected them together, raised them to consciousness as a whole, - and 
when one commanded them, i.e. when they had the effect of a command- From then on they 
counted as a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. And yet they represent nothing 
more than the expediency of a certain race and species - their utility alone is their 'truth'.-" 
[WP514] 
The utility of the categories (causality...) and the synthetic a priori judgements [BGE 1,11] in 
respect to our survival (more accurately our will to power) makes them appear to us as 
unconditional truths. However, according to Nietzsche they are all no more than aids to our 
species for survival. They are OUR TRUTH, and we cannot help believing in them, because i f 
we stop trusting them, we cease existing, and this goes against our will to power. It is in our 
interest to believe in what the intellect makes us believe in as a necessary truth, but which is 
only an aid to our species for survival. The same applies to our ideas of time and space, both 
of them are man made, as Nietzsche explains in the „Truth and Lies in the Extramoral Sense" 
[TLN end of 1]. 
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i . LOGIC 
OUR TRUTH refers to everything the intellect makes us think of as necessary. This applies 
not only to the categories of reason and time and space, but also to logic. 
„The conceptual ban of contradiction proceeds from the belief that we are able to form 
concepts, that the concept not only designates the essence of a thing but comprehends it- In 
fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) applies only to fictitious entities that we have 
created. Logic is an attempt to comprehend the actual world by means of a scheme of being 
posited by ourselves; more correctly, to make it formulatable and calculable for us-" [WP 
516] 
„Logic itself as a consistent notation, build on developing the supposition that there are 
identical cases." [IB 2, 178, PF] 
„Logic too depends on presuppositions with which nothing in the real wodd corresponds, 
for example on the presupposition that there are identical things, that the same thing is 
identical at different points of time." [HAH 1,11] 
Logic functions in the same way the intellect does, for it is a part of it. Logic makes things 
calculable. In the case of logic we create identities without there being any - (this will become 
clear when I am discussing logic and language which I will do next). Given Nietzsche's 
metaphysics, there is no possibility of there being any two identical objects [HAH 1, 19] -
Identity taken in the strongest Leibnitzian sense (Leibnitz's Law 'a = b i f f all and only those 
predicates which are true of a are true of b' including predications as to spatiotemporal 
location) -, because a thing is the sum of its effects, and no two things can have the same 
'locational' qualifies (to stress this point. It is trivial given the above definifion of Leibnitz's 
Law), therefore it is impossible for two things to be absolutely identical. However, in logic we 
apply the nofion of identity, as i f two things actually could be idenfical. The argument 
Nietzsche puts forward to claim that logic and the law of non contradiction do not tell us 
anything about the world goes as follows: 
A (universal) notion is a thought, desciption, proposition, or whatever, which applies to any 
case of a given kind. 
The intellect presupposes that (universal) notions contain THE TRUTH (correspondence 
theory) about a thing. 
Every (universal) notion (in the world of language) implies a concept and only that concept. 
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A concept (in the world of language) is made up of a certain limited amount of qualities (the 
ones essential to the universal notion). 
THE TRUTH about a particular thing has to include all perspectives (qualities) of this thing 
(within one circle of the eternal recurrence). 
However, a (universal) notion can never contain all the qualities of a particular thing, because 
it always includes only the essential qualities of the (universal) notion and can therefore never 
include all the qualities of the particular object which it would have to, i f it was to bear THE 
TRUTH (correspondence theory) about that thing. 
Therefore, the presupposition of the intellect, namely that (universal) notions contain THE 
TRUTH (correspondence theory) about a thing, is false in respect to THE TRUTH. 
Thereby, we can conclude that the intellect provides us with another falsified perspective of 
the world. 
Of course, one might want to say that the very idea of a (universal) notion, i.e. one which 
applies to many, differing members of a kind, already means it does not cover all the qualities 
of each of the things it pertains. This implies that the above argument starts from a 
presumption that no philosopher has ever held, and to prove such a presumption false, as 
Nietzsche did, might appear to be silly. However, I do not think that it is as silly as it might 
appear to be, for what he wishes to say has some important implications for his understanding 
of THE TRUTH. Since THE TRUTH about a thing implies all possible perspectives on that 
thing, a (universal) notion, however, only picks out certain qualities of this thing, THE 
TRUTH about a thing cannot be expressed via these notions, and this implies that THE 
TRUTH about any thing carmot be expressed in language at all, because it is in the nature of 
language to abstract in respect to the qualities of a thing. Therefore, even i f the world was one 
organism (which it cannot be according to Nietzsche), THE TRUTH about this world could 
not be expressed by that organism in language, but could possibly just be experienced by that 
organism. So even i f the argument goes against the presumtion which no philosopher has ever 
held, it elucidates Nietzsche's high demands on what is needed to present THE TRUTH, and 
it makes us question the possibility of presenting THE TRUTH about the world. 
The above argument can be applied in various ways. For example we can apply it at numbers: 
Numbers can be used for counting. 
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I f one counts things, then one always has to use a nofion which describes the various 
particular things in an abstract manner (e.g. 1, 2, 3 apples). 
However, i f we have to use abstract notions whenever we count things, then the sum of what 
we have counted can never tell us something about THE TRUTH (correspondence theory) 
about the world, because THE TRUTH (correspondence theory) about the world has to 
include the sum of all perspectives, yet by using abstract nofions we only select some specific 
perspectives. 
In case we take only a few selected perspecfives of a thing, we have a falsified perspective 
{TRUTH). 
Therefore whenever we employ numbers, we cannot expect to get THE TRUTH. We can get a 
77?C/77/only. 
The same principle can be applied at language in general as well, and Nietzsche does so, too. 
Language just creates another world, but it does not describe the world [HAH 1, 11]. 
Nietzsche does have a lot to say about language, but I will not be concerned with this topic in 
this thesis, because it is not of primary importance for my present concerns. All I wish to 
mention is the gap between perspectives which can be expressed via language, and the sum of 
perspectives which make up a thing. This remark should make it obvious that according to 
Nietzsche we can never express the truth (correspondence theory) about the worid via 
language. 
However, there is a reason why logic, language, numbers, only contain a very abstract and 
limited range of perspectives onto the world, namely the reason to survive. Only because we 
create these simple stable structures, can we get a basis for our acfions. Logic and language 
make our life easier. This is their purpose, and it is no shame that they caimot provide us with 
THE TRUTH, because we do not desire THE TRUTH, but we desire power, and logic and 
language support that desire. 
„Logic does not spring from will to truth." [WP 512] 
„Logic was intended as faciliation; as a means of expression - not as truth - Later it acquired 
the effect of tmth-" [WP 538] 
Here one can see again that logic as well as the categories of our intellect falsify the world, but 
are usefiil for our survival. Out of these falsifications, truths were created either by becoming 
essential constituents of our conceptualisation of the world, or by integrating them into our 
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interpretations of the world. At the moment I am interested in the former, because we have 
already dealt with the latter. 
j . O U R TRUTH 
„The most strongly believed a priori 'truths' are for me - provisional assumptions; e.g., the 
law of causality, a very well acquired habit of belief, so much a part of us that not to belive 
in it would destroy the race. But are they for that reason truths? What a conclusion! As if 
the preservation of man were a proof of truth!" [WP 497] 
„Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live. The value 
for life is ultimately decicive." [WP 493] 
„Ultimate skepsis.- What are man's truth's altimately? Merely his irrefutable errors." [GS 3, 
265] 
„The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement: it is here 
that our new language perhaps sounds strangest. The question is to what extent it is life-
advancing, life-preservind, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding; and our 
fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest judgements (to which synthetic judgements 
a priori belong) are the most indispensable to us, that without granting as true the fictions of 
logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and 
self-identical, without a continual falsification of the world by means of numbers, mankind 
could not live - that to renounce false judgements would be to renounce life, would be to 
deny life. To recognize untruth as a condition of life: that, to be sure, means to resist 
customary value-sentiments in a dangerous fashion; and a philosophy which ventures to do 
so places itself, by that act alone, beyond good and evil." [BGE 1, 4] 
So OUR TRUTHS are simply our irrefutable mistakes, the necessities of our thinking 
(Intellect, logic, categories of reason, synthetic a priori judgements, categories of space and 
time...). They are necessary, because without them the human race could not survive. I have 
talked about TRUTH before when I was referring to the interpretations (falsifying 
perspectives) that power-constellations have of the world. OUR TRUTH is a sub-group of the 
group of TRUTHS. TRUTH and THE TRUTH taken together constitute the notion 'truth'. 
TRUTH can never be THE TRUTH. r/?C/r//necessarily falsifies. Therefore OUR TRUTH 
also has to refer to a falsifying perspective. 
The main question which arises now at this stage is the following: Nietzsche holds that every 
TRUTH, therefore also OUR TRUTH, necessarily presents a falsified perspective in respect to 
THE TRUTH. In addition to this it is necessary for the perspective to be false in respect to 
THE TRUTH, because we could not survive with THE TRUTH, for it could not give us a 
determinate interpretation by which we could live. What now are we to make out of 
Nietzsche's own philosophy? I f he claimed it to be THE TRUTH, then he would contradict 
himself, yet contradictions do not appeal to our intellect, and in addition to this he would be 
93 
doing something which endangers the human race, because falsification is essential for it, as 
he claimed before. Can this be Nietzsche's posifion after all he has said about the importance 
of logic and stability as a means for our survival? His philosophy is meant to be life 
enhancing, but this clearly would not be the case i f he was putting forward THE TRUTH, 
because men could not bear THE TRUTH and cannot reach it anyway. 
This cannot be what Nietzsche meant, because in that case he would never have been 
considered the important thinker he is. In addifion to this Nietzsche himself says that this is 
the wrong way to interpret him: 
„- an interpreter who could bring before your eyes the universality and unconditionality of 
all 'will to power' in such a way that almost any word and even the word 'tyranny' would 
finally sem unsuitable or as a weakening and moderating metaphor - as too human - and 
who none the less ended by asserting of this world the same as you assert of it, namely that 
it hasa 'necessary' and 'calculable' course, but not because laws prevail in it but because 
laws are absolutely lacking, and every power draws its ultimate consequences every 
moment. Granted this too is only interpretation - and you will be eager enough to raise this 
objection? - well, so much the better.-" [BGE 1, 22] 
So Nietzsche remains consistent with his prior claims. Everything he says is also a falsifying 
perspecfive. It is a TRUTH. Nietzsche being a human being also has to stick to the laws of our 
species and take into consideration what we need for our survival, namely the intellect and 
this he does. So NIETZSCHE'S TRUTH incorporates or includes OUR TRUTH which is a 
sub group of all TRUTHS which is always a perspectival falsification and opposed to THE 
TRUTH. This should have clarified the different meanings of truth in Nietzsche, his 
understanding of perspectivism and the place of his own philosophy in respect to all these 
claims. Still the most important question is left unanswered: Why should we believe 
Nietzsche, i f he himself says that what he says is a perspectival falsification, and therewith 
false in respect to THE TRUTH? I will not answer this now, because the whole main part 
three is reserved for this purpose. Before I can answer the last question, I will have to deal 
with some other topics which concern some consequences of this chapter, namely nihilism. 
This will be the focus of the next and last section of this main part (DIONYSUS). 
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2.2. 
a. NIHILISM 
The topic of this section follows directly from the denial of THE TRUTH in the last section, 
for NIHILISM is the view that there is no justification for any absolute standard. It is therefore 
closely related to such views as relativism. The relationship between NIHILISM and 
relativism is as follows: relativism claims that there is no eternal justification for an absolute 
standard, and that the standards which one can find in a certain domain are based upon the 
criteria which are presently relevant within this domain. This implies that it is possible that all 
criteria are subject to change. NIHILISM holds that there is no justification for any absolute 
standard. So relativism implies NIHILISM, but not vice versa. This type of NIHILISM can 
turn up in a stronger and weaker form - the stronger one defending NIHILISM on a 
metaphysical level, the weaker one on an epistemological level. The weaker version of 
NIHILISM leaves open the possibility that there are absolute standards in respect to 
metaphysics (i.e. a set of absolut values might exist, but I cannot become aware of it), whereas 
the stronger version denies this possibility. In both cases a nihilist has to believe in nothing. It 
is, however, questionable, whether this traditional definition of NIHILISM is at all possible -
in practice and in theory. It might be the case that this is a variant of the liar paradox: 
A says: I am a nihilist. 
This means: I believe in nothing - that there is no justification for any absolute standard. 
However, i f A believes that there is no justification for any absolute standard, then he does 
believe in an absolute standard, namely the absolute standard that there is no absolute 
standard. 
This is a self-defeating position. 
To me it seems that this is a good objection to NIHILISM as defined above. Yet,Nietzsche's 
understanding of NIHILISM is significantly different and does not suffer from the defects of 
the above mentioned definition. However, it seems to me as i f most of the Anglo-American 
commentators have not realised the depth of Nietzsche's concept of NIHILISM, the fact that it 
does not suffer the defects of the previously mentioned definition and the importance of 
Nietzsche's interpretation of NIHILISM, because they mostly have avoided this topic 
completely. This attitude towards NIHILISM has to be sharply contrasted with the relevance 
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continental thinkers attributed to NIHILISM, for example Heidegger, Sloterdijk, Camus were 
deeply affected by this topic, to mention only a few. My position is that an understanding of 
Nietzsche's NIHILISM is essential for an understanding of his philosophy as a whole. This 
position, I hope, will be made clear at the end of this thesis. 
One has to bear in mind that NIHILISM, as well as truth in the previous chapter, has several 
different meanings for Nietzsche. I will distinguish three different conceptions of NIHILISM, 
to which I attach the following names: SCHOPENHAUER'S NIHILISM, PLATO'S 
NIHILISM, and Nietzsche's NIHILISM. I will be mainly concerned with the last type, which I 
will later on divide into ACTIVE and PASSIVE NIHILISM to reveal the significance of this 
form of nihilism for Nietzsche's metaphysics and his philosophy of history. In addition to this, 
this form of nihilism is the one which is directly related to the previous chapter, for 
NIHILISM is directly linked to the loss of THE TRUTH, whereas the other two concepts are 
not directly related to what I have been discussing so far. The importance of the other two 
concepts in respect to this thesis is rather limited, and therefore my treatment of them will be 
rather short. 
With Nietzsche, „NIHILISM becomes conscious for the first time", according to Camus. 
[Camus (1962): P. 57] This praise alone should provide one with enough reason to deal with 
NIHILISM as a general theme in Nietzsche's work. The statement, however, is not supposed 
to mean that there was no idea of NIHILISM in life or thought before Nietzsche, but that 
Nietzsche was the first to characterise the concept clearly in its many varieties. Yet, there were 
other nihilists before him; it is arguable that Protagoras' relativism was one of the first 
nihilistic theories in philosophy. Yet, I do not wish to deal with the history of nihilism, but 
would like to make some further comments on the history of the word 'nihilism'. The word 
'nihiliste' was used for example in the French Revolution to refer to an attitude of political 
and religious indifference. In philosophical discourse it was probably first used in a letter to 
Fichte by F. H. Jakobi (1799) who refers to the idealism of the former. From then on the 
notion of nihilism is significant in various respects. It was employed to refer to the French 
socialist movement of the nineteenth century as well as to the Left Wing Hegelians who 
inherited the accusation of being nihiUstic from its idealistic predecessors Fichte, Schelling, 
and Hegel. These critical uses effect the transmissions of the word in the Russian political and 
social culture, from where they influenced Western Europe again. Especially in the great 
Russian novelists of the nineteenth century the concept of nihilism can be found in various 
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manners. It is common practice to ascribe the invention of the notion „nihilism" to Turgenev 
who employed it to refer to young rebels in Tsarist Russia. Even Robert Solomon makes this 
mistake in his definition of „nihilism" in „The Oxford Companion to Philosophy" [ed. 
Hondrich (1995): P. 623]. Miiller-Lauter [(1971): P. 66] shows that Turgenev was not even 
the first author in Russia who used this word. 
In the last section I discussed truth and perspectivism in Nietzsche. There I established that 
Nietzsche thought that no power-constellation can have THE TRUTH, but that each of the 
power-constellations has a TRUTH which is necessarily false in respect to THE TRUTH. 
Nietzsche reached this position by carefully thinking through his metaphysics of the will to 
power. „Thinking through what the will to power implies" means that he was using his 
intellect to make logical inferences from his initial premise that the world is will to power. 
The intellect then told him that what follows is that everything what was taken to be THE 
TRUTH is just a TRUTH which is necessarily different from THE TRUTH. The worldviews 
which have been taken to be THE TRUTH usually also provided people with an absolute 
foundation for their values. Due to this foundation the values were eternally and universally 
valid, that is, valid everywhere and at every time. With the loss of all these absolutes, human 
beings also got rid of the absolute foundation for their values. The denial of THE TRUTH or 
in other terms the loss of God brings NIHILISM along with it and this means: 
„the radical repudiation of value, meaning, and desirability" [WP 1] 
„What does nihilism mean? - That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is 
lacking; 'why?' finds no answer." [WP 2] 
However, i f for Nietzsche this was what NIHILISM was all about, then his conception would 
not be different from the common sense understanding of the term. Yet, this is not the whole 
of Nietzsche's conception. NIHILISM in Nietzsche is always part of a process of change. It is 
the result of something and brings about something new. 
„Overconiing of philosophers through the destruction of the world of being: intermediary 
period of nihilism: before there is yet present the strength to reverse values and to deify 
becoming and the apparent world as the only world, and to call them good. B. Nihilism as a 
normal phenomenon can be a symptom of increasing strength or of increasing weakness: 
partly, because the strength to create, to will, has so increased that it no longer requires 
these total interpretations and introductions of meaning ('present tasks', the state, etc.); 
partly, because even the creative strength to create meanuig has declined and 
disappointment becomes the dominant condition. The incapability of believing in a 
'meaning', 'unbelief." [WP 585] 
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„Nihilism as a normal condition. It can be a sign of strength: the spirit may have grown so 
strong that previous goals ('convictions', articles of faith) have become incommensurate 
(for a faith generally expresses the constraint of conditions of existence, submission to the 
authority of circumstances under which one flourishes, grows, gains power). Or a sign of the 
lack of strength to posit for oneself, productively, a goal, a why, a faith. It reaches its 
maximum of relative strength as a violent force of destruction - as active nihilism... 
Nihilism... as a sign of weakness. The strength of the spirit may be worn out, exhausted, so 
that previous goals and values have become incommensurate and no longer are believed; so 
that the synthesis of values and goals (on which every strong culture rests) dissolves and the 
individual values war against each other: disintegration - and whatever refreshes, heals, 
calms, numbs, emerges into the foreground in various disguises, religious or moral, or 
political, or aesthetic, etc." [WP 23] 
„Nihilism. It is ambiguous: 
A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism. 
B. Nihilism as decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as passive nihilism." [WP 
22] 
What can we infer from these three aphorisms? Firstly, we get to know that there is a 
NIHILISM which arises out of strength which Nietzsche calls ACTIVE NIHILISM, and a 
NIHILISM which arises out of weakness which he calls PASSIVE NIHILISM. Secondly, we 
are told that NIHILISM is only dominant in an intermediary period, in between periods with 
absolute standards, i.e. epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, or aesthetic criteria. It is not 
said that this applies only to the global political level, but it can also be essential for an 
understanding of the personal ethical development, as I will show later. 
How do these points apply to our discussion? Since NIHILISM is only dominant in an 
intermediary period, in between periods with absolute standards, it tells us that we need three 
different stages of progression. Absolute standards can be applied or taken in respect to 
epistemological, metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic criteria, as well as any combination of any 
of these domains. It can also apply on a personal, as well as on a global level. This means that 
we can talk about the development from a protected spoiled child to an heroic adult, as well as 
the change from a Buddhist to a Capitalistic materialistic society, or a Christian to a Scientific 
one, i f we want to reveal the possibilites of use of this notion. One cannot generalise about 
whether a development involving the intermediary state of nihilism is an improvement or an 
impoverishment of a society, for it can be both. So one does not have to give a peculiar 
judgement about NIHILISM - it is not an object of praise or blame per se. It depends upon 
whether it is ACTIVE or PASSIVE NIHILISM, i.e. whether it enhances or impoverishes the 
life of the group or the individual in question. Let me give some examples for ACTIVE and 
PASSIVE NIHILISM. I will explain the problem in question through the example of an 
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individual human being who is a power-constellation constituted by many individual power-
quanta. In the next main part I will apply this principle to societies, for this is what Nietzsche 
does. 
In the first example I will deal with PASSIVE NIHILISM. Imagine a boy, twelve years of age, 
who is an excellent football player. He wants to become an professional, and everyone 
supports and expects him to become one - especially his father. His Uber-Ich demands that he 
becomes a professional football player; this Uber-Ich is the set of absolute standards. Yet, it 
happens that the boy has a car accident and loses a leg. It is impossible for him to fu l f i l his 
aim anymore. His actual strength does not enable him to do what he wanted to do anymore. 
He is too weak for the aims he set himself, so he has to give up this aim. This brings him into 
a period of PASSIVE NIHILISM. He does not know what to do with his life, because he lost 
his old aim. For some time he loses his sense in life, there is no more structure to which he 
can stick. Suddenly he realises that he is quite a good writer, and he writes a novel. It gets 
published and sells well. In this way he has found a new absolute standard to which he can 
dedicate himself, and which appeals to his actual power potential. Due to his finding or 
creating such a new aim (erecting an Ideal-Ich which demand lower aims of him than the ones 
he initially aimed for. The boy still regards a professional football player to be more powerful 
than a novelist), he manages to transcend the intermediary period of NIHILISM. The actual 
development of course is much more complicated, but this schematic progression should have 
made clear the concept of PASSIVE NIHILISM. 
In the next example I will be concerned with ACTIVE NIHILISM. Imagine a tall, slim, very 
beaufiful, poor girl, thirteen years old. She is not very educated and not very clever either. 
Everybody expects her to become a waitress or something comparable. Her Uber-Ich just 
expects her to get a normal job, marry someone as soon as possible, and have some children. 
This is the initial set of absolute standards. However, at Victoria tube station a man 
approaches her, tells her that he wants her to become a model, gives her his card, and leaves. 
She is very flattered, and straight away gives up all her old aims. She wants to become a 
model, and yet, she is not sure, whether the man was serious, or whether he has rather dubious 
intentions. This uncertainty leaves her in a state of insecurity. She has abandoned her old 
aims, but is not yet sure whether the new ones are realistic for her. Yet, she abandoned the old 
ones out of strength, because her actual abilifies are higher than what the old aims demanded 
for her. So this NIHILISM came about out of strength, it is ACTIVE NIHILISM. A couple of 
weeks later, after she has found out that the model agency in question is a genuine one, she 
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phones the company, goes to them, and gets employed. She integrates her aim to be a model 
within her Ideal-Ich, and thereby has managed to transcend NIHILISM and build up a new 
absolute standard for herself which is higher than her prior aims. Of course the actual 
development here is far more complicated as well. This schema should have provided with an 
initial understanding of ACTIVE NIHILISM. 
As one can see through these two examples, one can find nihilism in many different disguises. 
In Freud it turns up under the heading of narcissism. According to Freud we evaluate our 
acfions on the basis of our Uber-Ich until we are satisfied with its demands. The Uber-Ich is 
constituted out of the morals of our parents and teachers et cetera, yet, it is not likely that its 
demands correspond to our actual ones. Therefore there will be a time, usually during our 
teenage years, when we become so dissatisfied with our aims that we start to abandon them. 
Then a period of personal nihilism begins. At some stage we try to create a new Ideal-Ich 
according to our own demands which, i f done well, does correspond to our actual potential. 
From then on we strive to reach our Ideal-Ich. This stage of personal orientation is referred to 
as narcissism by Freud. So narcissism is an essendal part of our development, and it does not 
have to be unhealthy. Only i f the goals we have set for ourselves are too high and we do not 
give them up but strive unrealistically towards them, then we can get caught in an unhealthy 
form of narcissism. Once we reach our Ideal-Ich, the period of nihilism is over, and we can 
live according to our new set of values. 
Another way to describe a period of nihilism in an individual human life can be found in C. 
G. Jung - though Nietzsche does not only apply it at that personal level, but also at a political 
global level. The phenomena in question is the same as in Freud, but in Jung's case it takes on 
a more complex form. Jung divides a human life into four essential phases. After birth we 
enter the childhood phase, then early maturity, middle age, and finally late maturity which is 
ended by our death. In between these phases we find transitory phases: there is the adolescent 
transition, mid-life transition, and late life transition. In each of these transitory phases, we 
have to revaluate our values; we have to abandon our old aims, for they no longer apply to our 
demands and needs, and have to find new ones better suited for our potentials, needs and 
demands. The Archetypal programme for the adolescent transgression reveals that this theory 
refers to the same phenomena Freud explained before. Anthony Stevens in his book „0n 
Jung" describes the developmentary processes of this phase as follows: „if one is to leave 
home, support oneself in the world, attract (and keep) a sexual partner and eventually start a 
family of one's own, then the bonds of the parents must be loosened, a job prepared for and 
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found, sexual development completed, an appropriate persona acquired and enough 
confidence and self-esteem achieved to be able to hold one's head up in society." [Stevens 
(1990): P. 117)]. Yet in the process of this development one has to face nihilism, because the 
new absolute standards are yet uncertain and the old ones already abandoned. 
Let me repeat that NIHILISM out of strength is what Nietzsche refers to as ACTIVE 
NIHILISM and the NIHILISM out of weakness is PASSIVE NIHILISM. To understand why 
he uses the terms active and passive we have to reconsider his metaphysics. Given Nietzsche's 
metaphysics the whole world is will to power with a limited amount of power-quanta - some 
exist on their own, others in power-constellations. The highest feeling of power a power-
constellation can achieve is i f it has managed to interpret the world in such a way that the 
world of Becoming is seen as a world of Being. This can only be done by one's Spirit. While a 
power-constellation is working on such an interpretation, it has to have the strongest wil l to 
power. Al l power quanta, and power-constellations permanently strive for an increase of their 
own power. 
Given this background one can understand that an increase of power is related to activity, 
while a decrease is linked with passivity. We all aim for power, because we are wil l to power, 
and only the power-constellations which manage to increase their power are the ones who 
fulf i l their drive actively. I f a power-constellation does not increase its power, then this cannot 
have happened due to the activity of the power-constellation itself, but had to be caused by the 
influence of other power-constellations. Because the power-constellation was passive in 
respect to that development, we can now understand where the terminology of active and 
passive comes from. 
After dealing with the vague rationality of progression, we can go a bit deeper into the actual 
process of change, for Nietzsche says more about it than I have mentioned so far. A process of 
change starts from absolute standards, moves into nihilism, and ends up with absolute 
standards again. How can one see that the original set of absolute standards is about to fade 
away? What are the symptoms of decay? 
„Consequences of decadence., .pessimism" [WP 42] 
„Pessimism as a prelimary form of nihilism" [WP 9] 
„Concept of decadence. - Waste, decay, elimination, need not be condemned: they are 
necessary consequences of life, of the growth of life... A society is not free to remain 
young." [WP 40] 
„0n the concept of decadence. 
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1. Skepticism is a consequence of decadence, as is libertinism of the spirit. 
2. The corruption of morals is a consequence of decadence (weakness of the will, need for 
strong stimuli). 
4. Nihilism is no cause but merely the logical result of decadence. 
... so pleasure and displeasure become foreground problems." [WP 43] 
These four aphorisms tell us a lot about the actual progression of change, and how it can be 
that the set of absolute standards to which an individual or a society adheres can alter. As 
Nietzsche says it is a necessity of the dynamics of life that nothing remains young and that 
decay has to come about for everything. This decay is called decadence, and decadence arises 
when ACTIVE as well as when PASSIVE NIHILISM comes about. So decadence is not 
necessarily something that has to be rejected. Decadence arises whenever the actual strength 
of the body (individual, society...) in question no longer corresponds to its own absolute 
principles, i.e. what demands are placed on it. It can be that the body is too strong for his own 
principles as well as that it is too weak. 
The last aphorism states that decadence effects a liberation of the Spirit. We should briefly 
remember which ftinction Nietzsche attributed to Spirit. According to Nietzsche, the highest 
form of power is achieved i f Spirit imposes Being on Becoming, interprets the world so that 
one sees it as unchanging, although in fact it is permanently changing. This is the highest form 
of power, and it can only be brought about by Spirit. Given that the whole world is will to 
power for Nietzsche, one should be aware of the importance of Spirit now. We all are will to 
power and therefore want to gain as much power as possible. Spirit can enable us to gain the 
highest form of power at the moment, by interpreting the world of change as a world of 
stability. It can do so by imposing structures, forms and order or certain categories on 
Becoming, and in this way Spirit develops specific forms and becomes more and more 
powerfiil. Yet, i f we say the Spirit gets liberated with the beginning of decadence, then this 
means that all the forms which were developed dissolve and vanish. Since the forms of the 
Spirit are categories which enable us to have a stable picture of the world, categories which 
help us to interpret the world, and senses and values according to which we can act and 
judge^^, all our knowledge which is buiU out of these categories vanishes and leave us in a 
*^When Spirit is creating forms, it is simply filling in content into the different branches of philosophy, as 
mentioned m D, e.g. epistemology, metaphysics, ethics. 
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senseless, purposeless, valueless, alien world. This is exactly the point Nietzsche makes in the 
aphorisms in question. 
Al l our habits get corrupted in an age of decadence. This is a consequence of the vanishing of 
the forms of our Spirit. NIHILISM is not the cause but the logic of decadence, and this means 
that NIHILISM was not there before decadence and brought it about, but that NIHILISM and 
decadence are necessarily inter-linked. The forms of the Spirit start to vanish and with that 
NIHILISM begins, that is, the world loses its sense, purpose, order and values for us. Due to 
these developments pain and pleasure become our primary problems, as Nietzsche points out. 
This is also apparent in Nietzsche's remark that pessimism follows from decadence, and that 
pessimism is closely linked to nihilism. Pessimism is the view that in every life the pain 
outweighs the pleasure experienced. Given Nietzsche's metaphysics it becomes obvious why 
pessimism and pain and pleasure as our primary problems arise, because once all the forms, 
principles, senses, values are gone, all that we are left with are our experiences of pain and 
pleasure, and as one can see at the respective discussion (in main part one) pain always has to 
outweigh pleasure, e.g. that pessimism has to follow, once we estimate everything on the basis 
of pain and pleasure. The fact that pain and pleasure become our primary problems, because 
they are everything on which we are basing an judgement for our actions, is called 
PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM. Out of this pessimism is bound to arise, according to 
Nietzsche. One can take various attitudes towards this pessimism - one can either accept it and 
try to minimise both pleasure and pain (main aim avoid pain, yet with this pleasure vanishes 
as well), or one can rebel against it by attempfing to aim for as much pleasure as possible, 
even though this causes one a lot of pain as well which is called HEDONISM in the next 
aphorism. Of course it could also be the case that one can come across a combination out of 
these two reactions: 
„the 'predominance of suffering over pleasure' or the opposite (hedonism): these two 
doctrines are already signposts to nihilism. For in both of these cases no ultimate meaning is 
posited except the appearance of pleasure and displeasure. But that is how a kind of man 
speaks that no longer dares to posit a will, a purpose, a meaning: for any healthier kind of 
man the value of life is certainly not measured by the standard of these trifles. And suffering 
might predominate, and in spite of that a powerful will might exist, a Yes to life, a need for 
this predominance." [WP 35] 
This aphorism clearly explains the difference between nihilistic periods, and periods with 
absolute standards. In nihilistic times all actions are judged on the basis of pain and pleasure, 
whereas in times with absolute standards one simply sticks to one's absolute standards 
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irrespective of the pain and pleasure accompanied by them. This seems to go against all our 
intuitions. One usually believes that one justifies one's actions by reference to pain and 
pleasure. I f one is asked, why one is not doing some action X (washing up, tidying up...), then 
one usually replies that one does not like, enjoy it, e.g. it makes us experience pain. I f one is 
asked, why some other action Z (eating chocolate cake...) is one's hobby, one usually replies 
that one enjoys it, one has a good time whenever one is doing it, e.g. it is pleasurable. 
Nietzsche, however, reveals to us that all these sort of replies show that we are living in 
decadent times, in a period of the resurgence of NIHILISM. He thinks that life can even be 
worth living i f we permanently have to suffer, because according to him a healthy individual 
does not evaluate actions on the basis of pain and pleasure, but on the basis of a system of self 
imposed values. This, however, can only be the case, i f one has created strict forms within 
one's Spirit which provide oneself with senses, values et cetera. This is a point which one 
cannot stress often enough. This does not mean that in sticking to absolute principles one has 
to suffer permanently, rather that it does not matter whether one suffers or experiences 
pleasure. 
At this stage the development from psychological states with absolute standards to nihilism 
should be clear. It progresses from an age of absolute standards, to decadence, pessimism and 
nihilism - no matter whether it is ACTIVE or PASSIVE NIHILISM. Yet, Nietzsche 
distinguishes between classic and romantic pessimism; classic pessimism brings about 
ACTIVE NIHILISM, and romantic pessimism PASSIVE NIHILISM (IB 1, 1276).Nietzsche 
identifies the present times with nihilistic times. He was not the only one to see it that way, as 
one can imagine given the variety of thinkers who employed the notion of „nihilism". As I 
said before, the problem of NIHILISM in relation to our present times is more often discussed 
in continental philosophy, and continental writers in general, than it is in Anglo-American 
philosophy. It might be helpful to consider some of the others cultural innovators for whom 
the problem of NIHILISM was extremely relevant. Nietzsche himself referred to some of 
them in his work: Tolstoy and Wagner, belong to the artistic decadence [AC 7]. This does not 
have to be construed as a dismissal of them, as I have explained before. However, he objects 
against all forms of romantic pessimism which arise according to him in the following 
thinkers and movements: 
„The pessimism of Schopenhauer for example, and so for Alfred de Vigny's, 
Dostojewsky's, Leopardi's, Pascal's - the pessimism of all great nihilistic religions 
(Brahminism, Buddhism, Christianity; they may all be termed 'nihilistic', because they have 
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all glorified the concept opposed to life - Nothing - as their goal, as their highest good, as 
'God')" [IB 1, 1276, PF] 
I wil l deal with the nihilistic religions later on. Here I just wish to say that even in the case of 
the thinkers he has objections against, he can have a high respect for them as well, as one can 
see in the case of Dostojewsky: 
„Dostojewsky, the only psychologist, incidentally, from whom I had something to learn; he 
ranks among the most beautiful strokes of fortune in my life, even more than my discovery 
of Stendhal. This profound human being who was ten times right in his low estimate of the 
Germans, lived for a long time among the convicts of Siberia - hardened criminals for 
whom there was no way back to society - and found them very different from what he 
himself had expected: they were carved out of just about the best, hardest, and most 
valuable wood that grows anywhere on Russian soil." [TI „Skirmishes of an Untimely Man" 
45] 
He could not have praised Dostojewsky any more highly. He clearly regarded him even more 
highly than Stendhal, of whose formula „the only excuse for God is that he does not exist", 
Nietzsche was overtly envious, according to Camus [Camus (1962): P. 58] Nietzsche had not 
only read Dostojewsky, but also other Russian nihilistic novelists like Turgenev. Let me 
briefly reflect upon some aspects of their nihilism. 
Firstly I wish to mention Turgenev who has been falsely regarded as the inventor of the word 
„nihilism" by Robert Solomon and many others as well. In his novel „Fathers and Sons" the 
main character Bazaros is called a nihilist which is a person who is defined as someone „who 
recognises nothing" by Nikoplai Petrovich, but also as someone who „looks at everything 
critically" according to Arkady [Turgenev (1965): P. 94]. InBazarov's case the notion implies 
that he rejects the importance of art and religion, but he himself says „I do not believe in 
anything: and what is science - science in the abstract? There are sciences, as there are trades 
and professions, but abstract science just does not exist." [Turgenev (1965): P. 98] This 
however seems to me to be not a proper form of nihilism, because he does acknowledges the 
truth of the particular sciences, although he claims not to believe in anything anymore. A 
nihilist, according to the former analysis, could not do this. 
Yet, there are other novelists who come closer to Nietzsche's analysis of NIHILISM, e.g. 
Lermontov and Oscar Wilde. Both these novelists aim at an exploration of HEDONISM, yet I 
do not think that they agree with Nietzsche that pessimism is necessarily linked with 
PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM, i.e. the view that we judge all our actions on the basis of 
pain and pleasure. Lermontov's HEDONISM especially becomes obvious in his chapter 
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„Princess Mary" in his „A Hero of our Times" [Lermontov (1966): P. 91 - 174], where 
Lermontov's hero, Perochin, is playing around with the feelings of young Princess Mary: „I 
shall enjoy myself Enjoy myself! I've passed that stage in life when all one seeks is happiness 
and when the heart feels the need to love someone with passion and intensity." [Lermontov 
(1966): P. 111]. In Oscar Wilde HEDONISM is best expressed in the second chapter of his 
master work „The Picture of Dorian Gray" [Wilde (1974)]. Here Lord Henry, one of the main 
characters of the work, explains the concept of „A new Hedonism" [Wilde (1974): P. 22] 
which implies that „The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it." [Wilde (1974): P. 
18] However, there are other thinkers who come even closer to Nietzsche's understanding of 
NIHILISM, namely the ones who take pessimism as a basis for their estimation of the world. 
In that respect, Schopenhauer, Camus, and Dostojewsky have to be mentioned. 
Due to Camus's pessimism, for him the question whether to commit suicide or not was the 
only philosophical question. His answer to this question was not to seek as much pleasure as 
possible, as the previous thinkers did, and also not to avoid pain. He accepted that he would 
have to experience more pain than pleasure, but was giving himself new values which are 
implicit in his formulation of the Myth of Sisyphus - in this way he belongs among 
Nietzsche's philosophers of the Future, the creators of new values. Camus' new values are 
explicitly stated in his chapter „Quality instead of quantity" [Camus (1956): P. 54 - 57]. There 
he states his goal in life: it is not to live as well as possible, but to live as long as possible. 
This is a suggestion worth considering, for it clearly rejects the option of suicide. By putting 
forward new values, he has done the same as Nietzsche did, or as Dostojewsky, whom we 
shall consider next. 
„Dostojewsky knew nothing about Nietzsche or his work. On the other hand, Nietzsche read 
Dostojewsky and was enamored by of his writings. He read 'Notes from the House of the 
Dead', a garbled version of 'Notes from the Underground', 'The Devils', and probably 'The 
Idiot'. It appears that he did not read 'Crime and Punishment' or 'The Brothers Karamasov'... 
Nietzsche certainly found in Dostojewsky rich material confirming his notion of the crisis of 
nihilism... Nietzsche sought a 'countermovement' in the creation of new values, in a 
philosophical outlook that would accept the world as it is... Dostojewsky, on the other hand, 
turned to traditional Christian values for a solution to the problem of nihilism." [Jackson 
(1993): P. 20 - 21]. However, Dostojewsky's solution to nihilism seems to me rather to have 
been a choice due to his temperament, than to his actual conviction. Dostojewsky himself said 
in a letter to N. D. Fonvizina [Jackson (1993): P. 246]: „if somebody proved to me that Christ 
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was outside the truth, and it really were so that the truth was outside of Christ, then I would 
rather remain with Christ than with the truth." It is interesting to note that for Dostojewsky 
Christianity and love of humanity is necessarily linked to the belief in the immortality of the 
soul (in „Diary of a Writer" December 1976 issue. [Jackson (1993) P. 294]): „I declare (once 
again for the time being) without proof that love for humanity is even quite unthinkable, 
incomprehensible and quite impossible without concurrent faith in the immortality of the 
human soul.." Whatever the reasons for Dostojewsky to put forward his solution to nihilism -
and I will not go into any further detail here -, let us consider his attitude towards the world 
first. I think that his attitude is represented very well in what Ivan in „The Brothers 
Karamasov" is referring to when he talks about the suffering of all the innocent children. Yet, 
it comes out in his other works as well, for example the prisoners in the „Notes from the 
House of the Dead" or Liza and the Underground man in his „Notes from the Underground". 
It then becomes obvious that Dostojewsky's analysis of the world is pessimistic, and given 
Jackson's analysis of Dostojewsky's work it becomes obvious that Nietzsche was far from 
alone in his understanding of the world. Nietzsche and Dostojewsky - two men with great self 
awareness (and my two favourite thinkers and writers) - agree in their basic outlook on the 
world, although in their reaction to this world view they differed. 
Nietzsche describes how different types of human beings become effected by pessimism and 
its accompaniment NIHILISM. 
„The develoment from pessimism into nihilism.... one discovers of what material one has 
built the 'true world': and now all one has left is the repudiated world, and one adds this 
supreme disappointment to the reasons why it deserves to be repudiated.At this point 
nihilism is reached: all that one has left are the values that pass judgement - nothing else. 
Here the problem of strength and weakness originates: 
1. the weak perish of it; 
2. those who are stronger destroy what does not perish; 
3. those who are strongest overcome the values that pass judgement. 
In sum this constitutes the tragic age." [WP 37] 
As mentioned before, Nietzsche believes that pessimism is a consequence of decadence. Once 
pessimism becomes accepted among the members of a society or by any individual, this view 
has various effects on the different types of individuals. For this purpose he divides human 
beings into the weak, the stronger, and the strongest in Spirit. I f the weak estimate life solely 
on the basis of pain and pleasure, then this will destroy them fairly soon, because they are not 
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in a position to gain much and intense pleasure and avoid the pain. They are sickly, often i l l , 
with lesser capacities, and do not have the appropriate means to get many kicks, high jinx, and 
pleasure. That is the reason why they only ever get little pleasure, but have to endure a lot of 
pain. The stronger ones keep on destroying the principles, values, believes, senses, and also 
the weaker people that have not been destroyed yet, because this provides them with a way to 
gain some pleasure and with this some sort of justification for their life. For as one can infer 
from the section on pain and pleasure (in main part one), it is painful to create new forms, but 
pleasurable to get rid of them. This sort of justification is a typical option for individuals in 
decadent times. At least these men have got some means to gain pleasure and can therefore 
relate to the Spirit of the times which is formless - in respect to absolute principles. Only the 
strongest can overcome NIHILISM by creating new values, senses, truths et cetera. This 
corresponds to what I have mentioned already in main part one, where I discussed what the 
highest form of power is. One has gained the highest form of power, and belongs therefore to 
the strongest i f one has managed to impose Being on Becoming, put forward an interpretation 
of the world which makes the world of change appear as a stable world, impose forms and 
order onto the existential flux. Some of these forms stand for values and senses - others for 
positions on other philosophical issues. Senses are values and vice versa; they are absolute 
principles on which one can base ones actions, and they are independent of pain and pleasure. 
It is not the case that i f one judges every action on the basis of pain and pleasure only 
(PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM), one has already created new values, because new values, 
senses, and standards become absolute when they are independent of pain and pleasure. 
Senses and values are types of action grouped together in a consistent fashion, however this 
consistency which is a necessary constituent of absolute standards, and principles, is not 
given, i f on acts on the basis of pain and pleasure only - for what can give us pleasure in one 
situation can cause us pain in another one (a bar of chocolate, after one has not eaten an3^hing 
for 3 days & a bar of chocolates, after one has had ten bars already). This should make it clear 
that i f one takes pain and pleasure as a basis for the estimation of our actions, then one cannot 
have a consistent set of types of action which is an essential precondition for times with 
absolute principles. 
b. SCHOPENHAUER'S NIHILISM & PLATO'S NIHILISM 
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I have already explained that Nietzsche, Dostojewsky and Camus created new values to 
escape from NIHILISM. I have also explained thatLermontov and Wilde also judged 
everything on the basis of pain and pleasure (without necessarily having a pessimistic outlook 
onto the world), but that they simply tried to maximise their pleasure, e.g. they did not create 
new values. The other option mentioned which one can take, i f one judges everything on the 
basis of pain and pleasure, is to avoid pain (and together with this one also carmot get any 
pleasure, as it will turn out). This option was turned into a religion - namely Buddhism. One 
could refer to Buddhism also as Buddhist nihilism or SCHOPENHAUER'S NIHILISM [WP 
17], because Nietzsche takes them to be identical. Of course, there are many different kinds of 
Buddhism, and not all of them correspond to the concept Nietzsche attributed to them, but I 
think that there are enough reasons for holding that this is a sensible way of expression. 
„I hope that my condemnation of Christianity has not involved me in any injustice to a 
related religion with an even larger number of adherents: Buddhism. Both belong together 
as nihilistic religions - they are religions of decadence - but they differ most remarkably.... 
Buddhism... does no longer say 'struggle against sin', but, duly respectful of reality, 
'struggle against suffering'." [AC 20] 
„The two great nihilistic movements: (a) Buddhism, (b) Christianity... The latter has only 
now attained to approximately the state of culture in which it can fulfil its original vocation 
- a level to which it belongs - in which it can show itself pure." [WP 220] 
„The exhausted want rest, relaxation, peace, calm - the happiness of the nihilistic religions 
and philosophies; the rich and living want victory, opponents overcome, the overflow of the 
feeling of power across wider domains than hithero. All healthy functions of the organism 
have this need - and the whole organism is such a complex of systems strugglmg for an 
increase of the feeling of power —". [WP 703] 
„Buddha against the 'Crucified'. Among the nihilistic religions, one may already clearly 
distinguish the Christian from the Buddhist. The Buddhist religion is the expression of a 
fine evening... [it] is lacking: bitterness... a lofty spiritual love...even from these it is resting. 
The Christian movement is a degeneracy movement composed of reject and refuse elements 
of every kind:it is not the expression of the decline of a race, it is from the first an 
agglomeration of forms of morbidity crowding together and seeking one another out it 
takes the side of idiots and utters a curse on the spirit. Rancor against the gifted, learned, 
spiritually independent: it detects in them the well-constituted, the masterful." [WP 154] 
Buddhism fights against suffering, which already implies that Buddhists also have a 
ftindamentally pessimistic conception of the world, this means that they think that a body has 
to go through more pain than pleasure. Their solution to this problem is to aim for the 
avoidance of pain, and grant that with this aim they also have to accept the loss of any form of 
pleasure. That is the reason why Nietzsche regards Buddhism as a nihilistic religion, whose 
happiness lies in calmness and peace. Given Nietzsche's own understanding of the world as 
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will to power this opinion of course also expresses something about adherents to that religion. 
I f the adherents of such a religion do not stick to their natural drive anymore, then this shows 
that they regard themselves as too weak to aim for great goals, and therefore take the best 
possible option open to them -the avoidance of pain and pleasure. Buddhism is referred to as 
nihilistic religion because it presupposes pessimism. Its reaction to pessimism is to search for 
happiness in a state beyond pain and pleasure (para-nirvana). 
One can also refer to Buddhist nihilism as SCHOPENHAUER'S NIHILISM, because of the 
similarity between these two world views. Schopenhauer's metaphysics focuses on will to life 
and this leads him to pessimism. Due to the permanent striving of the will which causes us 
pain it is impossible to achieve a permanent state of personal satisfaction. He himself says: 
„A11 willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from suffering. Fulfilment brings 
this to an end; yet for one wish that is fulfilled there remain at least ten that are denied. 
Further, desiring lasts a long time, demands and requests go on to infinity; fulfilment is short 
and meted out sparingly. But even the final satisfaction is only apparent; the wish fulfilled at 
once makes way for a new one, the former is a known delusion, the latter a delusion not as yet 
known. No attained object of willing can give a satisfaction that lasts and no longer declines." 
[Budd (1992): P. 84 - 85]. There are only two ways according to Schopenhauer to escape from 
this suffering. One option is through aesthetic contemplation; but this is only a short term 
solution. The second and more lasting option is via asceticism; this involves „chastity, fasting, 
and a general denial of the body's needs"[Hamlyn (1980): P. 148], and also „a renunciation of 
one's true namre and therefore a denial of the will itself" [Hamlyn (1980): P. 148]. For i f 
there is no more willing, then there is no more suffering either. This brief description should 
make clearer the similarity between Buddhism and Schopenhauer's philosophy, and it should 
also lend support to Nietzsche's claim that this is a form of nihilism. Due to the relation of 
Buddhism with pessimism, Nietzsche, according to his own scheme, is also justified in 
regarding Buddhism as being linked to a decadent race. 
As revealed in the foregoing aphorisms Nietzsche not only calls Buddhism but also 
Christianity a nihilistic religion. Christianity can also be thought of as PLATO'S NIHILISM, 
because, according to Nietzsche: 
„for Christianity is Platonism for 'the people'" [BGE preface] 
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Christianity does not represent the decadence of a race, as Buddhism does. What is decadent 
about Christianity is that it only appeals to the weak, the sick, the stupid, and attacks the 
strong, the talented, and the strong in Spirit, according to Nietzsche. It appeals to them 
because Christianity regards this worid as a test of God: One has to act in accord with what is 
good (charity, humility) and avoid doing what is evil (being strong, powerful), so that one has 
a chance to pass the test. I f one passes it, one will have a blissftil after-life which is the only 
true life, the only worth while life, because this is where one remains for all eternity. I f one 
does not pass the test, then one has to suffer in one's afterlife (at least for a certain period of 
time). This is an interpretation of Christianity in the Spirit of Nietzsche; more complete 
exegesis of Nietzsche's thought on Christian doctrine is not needed for our purposes. 
According to him, Christianity claims that the sick, the suffering, the good wil l have a blissfial 
afterlife, and the strong, the healthy, and the powerftil will not. Therefore it is understandable 
that the weak the sick, the suffering are the one to whom this religion appeals, for these people 
are being promised a blissful afterlife. What is nihilistic about this religion is not that 
Christians are weak people, but that this religion posits a goal which is, according to 
Nietzsche, non existent. The good believers are being promised an after-world which will 
never be reached, because for Nietzsche there is no such thing as an after-world. The meaning 
of the notion of „nihilism" in respect to Christianity is quite different than the one used before, 
because in the case of the forementioned it was always related to the loss of strict rules and 
morals, the arrival of pain and pleasure as the basis for the estimation of one's actions, and 
pessimism. These criteria do not seem to apply to what is „nihilistic" about Christianity. 
Christianity which is related rather to the opposite of these two principles, as Nietzsche 
himself points out. 
„What were the advantages of the Christian moral hypothesis? 
1. It granted man an absolute value, as opposed to his smallness and accidental occurence in 
the flux of becoming and passing away; 
2. It served the advocates of God insofar as it conceded to the world, in spite of suffering 
and evil, the character of perfection - including 'freedom': evil appeared full of meaning. 
3. It posited that man had a knowledge of absolute values and thus adequate knowledge 
precisely regarding what is most important. 
4. It prevented man from despising himself as man, from taking sides against life; from 
despairing of knowledge: it was a means of preservation. 
In sum: morality was the great antidote against practical and theoretical nihilism." [WP 4] 
I l l 
Here one can see that Nietzsche does recognize the strengths of Christianity and that it is not 
related to nihilism in the previously mentioned sense of the word but that this sort of nihilism 
which I called PLATO'S NIHILISN^^ has a different sense, e.g. Christianity is nihilistic in the 
sense that it sets aims which cannot be achieved, are non existent, according to Nietzsche's 
metaphysics. Nietzsche's metaphysics includes the claim that will can only act upon will and 
therefore the possibility that a separate world can be achieved is excluded on a priori grounds. 
This shows that it is not quite appropriate that Nietzsche used the expression „nihilistic 
religion" for Christianity as well as Buddhism, because by doing this, he seems to imply that 
the concept of „nihilism" remains the same no matter which religion he is talking about. This, 
however, is clearly not the case; in respect to Buddhism „nihilism" has the same meaning as 
„nihilism" usually has in Nietzsche. Yet, whenever it is claimed that Christianity is a 
„nihilistic religion", then the sense of „nihilism" is a completely different one, i.e. related to 
an unreachable goal or a separate world or a nothing, whose linguistic existence is based on 
the human ability to invent. So Nietzsche's use of language here is misleading and 
inappropriate, because the notion of „nihilistic religion" is ambiguous without Nietzsche 
making it obvious that this is the case. 
However, the distinction between PLATO'S NIHILISM and SCHOPENHAUER'S 
NIHILISM was not my main concern in this section, rather NIHILISM - ACTIVE and 
PASSIVE - and its role in history. 
There is another philosopher, whose main concern is the attitude one should take in respect to 
contemporary NIHILISM - Peter Sloterdijk. In his main work „The Critique of Cynical 
Reason" [Sloterdijk (1983)], he criticises contemporary cynicism which, according to 
Sloterdijk, is enlightened false consciousness. As a suitable altemative he puts forward 
Kynicism which is enlightened correct consciousness although he does not express it in these 
terms. What these attitudes have in common is that both of them are held by people with an 
enlightened consciousness. Someone has to accept all the destructive critiques which have 
taken place during the enlightenment to have an enlightened consciousness. These critiques 
destroyed the belief in Christianity, and the possibility of knowledge and absolute values, to 
put it briefly. So for someone to have an enlightened consciousness is just another way to refer 
to a nihilist. Both the cynic as well as the Kynic are nihilists. However, the consciousness of 
the cynic is false, because he is miserable due to nihilism or the loss of all his beliefs. A 
'Christianity is Platonism for the masses, according to Nietzsche. 
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Kynic, on the other hand, is cheeky, life-affirming, and joyful. AKynic affirms the whole 
body and does not let himself be restricted by old outgrown habits. Sloterdijk wants us to 
realise that we do not have to be cynics, but it would be better for us to be Kynics. 
This analysis of his world view seems to imply that he is not a pessimist. Yet the 
characterisations of these two types, and the description of enlightened consciousness make it 
clear that he also estimates one's actions on the basis of pleasure and pain alone. Sloterdijk's 
very refreshing treatment of the problem of NIHILISM shows that the problem which was 
pointed out by Nietzsche more than a hundred years ago is still a problem which has to be 
tackled. Sloterdijk's solution also includes an awareness of the failure of the two significant 
immanent solutions to nihilism which were put into practice in this century - Fascism and 
Communism - two post-Christian political systems. Therefore he does not put forward another 
system of grand values but simply aims to alter one's attitude towards the experiences one 
has. I think this is an alternative theory worth considering in this thesis, and also worth 
bearing in mind personally. 
With this section I have completed the second main part which is entitled DIONYSOS. What I 
have to do now, is to take main part one and two and show that they are not inconsistent. We 
have already had to realise the importance of consistency within Nietzsche's philosophy when 
I talked about the role of the intellect in Nietzsche. However, main part one and two appear as 
inconsistent. On the one hand, there is no truth, on the other hand the world is will to power 
and eternally recurring. On the one hand, there are no absolute universal values, on the other 
hand we all aim for power, and human beings are dissimilar in respect to value. I will show in 
the next section that all of these contradictions are only apparent contradictions, that is, that 
they all are reconciled in Nietzsche's philosophy. 
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APOLLO & DIONYSOS RECONCILED 
In this chapter I will finally put forward a solution to the problem I intended to solve with this 
thesis. As the title of my thesis suggests, I am concerned with the relation ofNietzsche's 
metaphysical claims with his remarks about truth. This relation has been a matter of great 
controversy, many commentators have regarded Nietzsche as an irrational thinker due to his 
apparently inconsistent claims in respect to these two issues. An irrational thinker is one who 
holds contradictory positions (p and not-p), i.e. who is inconsistent. Yet, as the subtitle of my 
thesis implies, I wish to show that Nietzsche is not inconsistent, and that it is important for 
him not to be so. This claim, however, seems to go against my analysis so far, because it 
might appear as i f the Nietzsche of the APOLLO section and the NIETZSCHE of the 
DIONYSOS section defend mutually inconsistent positions. This section will show that no 
such inconsistency exists. Firstly, I will briefly point out the apparent inconsistencies, then I 
put forward my solution to this problem. When I deal with my interpretation ofNietzsche's 
solution, I wil l refer to Nietzsche's philosophy of history. Only i f we take this into 
consideration, can we understand why Nietzsche's views on metaphysics and truth do not 
clash. A substantial part of my account ofNietzsche's views on the progression of history will 
concern how Nietzsche saw his own position within this progression. These reflections on 
Nietzsche's philosophy of history are also of immense relevance for the understanding of our 
contemporary culture, our attitude towards values, post-modernism, the sickness of our times, 
the increasing importance of Pop-culture, the Communist and Fascist world views, and the 
reflections about our future. 
3.1. 
a. THE PROBLEM (IN DETAIL) 
ON THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES OF NIETZSCHE'S THOUGHT 
Firstly, I wish to give some examples of major interpretations of Nietzsche regarding the 
question of consistency in his philosophy. On this matter, I will show how they interpreted the 
relation between his views on truth and his metaphysical claims. One of the clearest 
expositions of the problem is to be found in Danto: 
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„In these last pages I wish only to raise once again the obvious question regarding the status 
of Nietzsche's philosophy in terms of its own conception of philosophical activity. Was his 
philosophy, too, a matter of mere convention, fiction, and Will-to-power? To put it 
sophomorically but no less vexingly, was it his intention, in saying that nothing is true, to 
say something true? If he succeeded, then of course he failed, for if it is true that nothing is 
true, something is true after all. If it is false, then something again is true. If, again, what he 
says is as arbitrary as he has said, critically, that all of philosophy is, why should we accept 
him if we are to reject the others? And if not arbitrary, how can it be right? How can what 
he says be true if he has said what the truth is? Nietzsche was alive to these difficulties, I 
believe. As he wrote in Beyond Good and Evil: 'Supposing that this, too, is only an 
interpretation - and one will be eager enough to raise this objection. Well - so much the 
better.' I suppose that we are to judge him by the criterion we have in fact always employed, 
our philosophical ideologies notwithstanding: by whether his philosophy works in life. He 
might continue: If you do not care for the forms I give to things, you give things your own. 
Philosophy is a creative business, and the way is always open. Philosophy is a contest of 
will with will. Insofar as you oppose my philosophy, you illustrate and confirm it. 
I doubt that everyone would be satisfied with such an answer, for I am not even certain that 
it is an answer. But I have no other to offer." [Danto (1965); P. 230] 
I am not satisfied with Danto's answer, for I think it over-simphfies the issue and I think that I 
have a more complete one to offer. Ahhough, I must admit that his basic way of thinking takes 
a similar direction as mine. However, the way he expresses it, and justifies it, is far too 
narrow, limited and incomplete. A similar response was given by Nehamas. He points out: 
,J'erspectivism does not result in the relativism that holds that any view is as good as any 
other; it holds that one's own views are the best for oneself without implying that they need 
be good for anyone else." [Nehamas (1985): P. 72] 
„Having presented his perspectivism not so much as a traditional theory of knowledge but 
as the view that all efforts to know are also efforts of particular people to live particular 
kinds of lives for particular reasons, he now applies that view to itself" [Nehamas (1985): 
P. 73] 
However, these sort of replies seem to me to be completely inadequate, because they do not 
seriously take into consideration Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will to power and the Eternal 
Recurrence. On the one hand one could say that they do by claiming thatNietzsche's 
metaphysics was what he needed to live the sort of life he wanted to live, or that was good for 
him. Yet, in this case Nietzsche's philosophy does not say anything about the basis on which 
people decide what sort of life is best for them, because then his metaphysics would only be 
the one good for himself It seems as i f Nehamas' reply ends up in some sort of relativism for 
Nietzsche, although Nehamas claims that it does not, because he says that everyone is 
choosing the best life for oneself I think that this is indeed a relativistic position, because he 
does not say what a good life consists in. Nehamas might reply to this that people simply have 
a conception of a good life, or that they develop it creatively. However, this again is not an 
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adequate reply to the accusation of relativism, because he cannot articulate the conditions 
under which each individual conception of a good life arises, or on what basis we create our 
concept of a good life. Therefore we have to conclude thatNehamas' interpretation of 
Nietzsche's perspectivism does indeed end up in a relativistic position, although Nehamas 
himself thinks that it does not. In this case Nehamas' interpretation also does not do justice to 
Nietzsche's metaphysics. 
Peter Poellner even dedicated his recent study exclusively to the relationship ofNietzsche's 
perspectivism and his metaphysics [Poellner (1995)]. However, he also came to the 
conclusion that Nietzsche is putting forward a form of relativism, i.e. his solution to the 
problem in question is similar to the other two interpretations which were just mentioned: „So 
it seems that Nietzsche, in effect, concedes that while he believes the apparent metaphysics of 
the wil l to power to be 'true for him', it may actually be false (rather than just mistakenly 
considered to be false) for other subjects or 'perspectives'. Riidiger Grimm, among others, 
interprets his pronouncement: 'Nietzsche's scheme can account for both contingencies: it can 
be both true and false [in his sense] for different individuals at the same time (or the same 
individual at different times).' In other words, Nietzsche's view entails a form of relativism." 
[Poellner (1995): P. 289]. This reply again does not give a satisfactory reply to the question 
„Why should one believe in Nietzsche's metaphysics, why is it superior, or why does he put it 
forward?". I will show that Nietzsche does have an adequate reply to that question, and that 
his metaphysics is not based on a simple form of relativism. 
Brian Leiter pointed out that the standard interpretation of perspectivism, which implies that 
all perspectives are interpretations, leads to too many inconsistencies within Nietzsche's 
thinking to seriously consider it to be an adequate interpretation of Nietzsche. By representing 
his critique of the „Received View" (RV) of perspectivism, as he calls it, which is held by 
such eminent interpreters as Grimm, Kofman, Derrida, Nehamas, Strong, Wamock, Magnus, 
and Rorty, I think that I will be able to point out some distinctions and clarifications which 
interpreters have failed to make so far. According to Leiter, the RV is based on the following 
four claims: 
„(i) the world has no determinate nature or structure; 
(ii) our concepts and theories do not 'describe' 'or 'correspond' to this worid because it has 
no determinate character; 
(iii) our concepts and theories are 'mere' interpretations or 'mere' perspectives (reflecting 
our pragmatic needs, at least in some accounts); 
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(iv) no perspective can enjoy an epistemic privilege over any other, because there is no 
epistimically privileged mode of access to this characterless world." [Leiter in ed. Schacht 
(1994): P. 334] 
Subsequently, Leiter claims that this is not Nietzsche's position, and then argues for what 
seems a strange picture of Nietzsche's perspectivism. I will not be concerned with the latter 
because I think there is too much strong evidence against it. I simply do not regard his 
interpretation to be worthy of being included in this thesis. However, his critique of the RV 
can provide us with a better understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole, and enables 
me to introduce some distinctions previous interpreters of Nietzsche have failed to make. 
I think that Leiter's summary of the RV is accurate and that it does represent part of 
Nietzsche's views, namely, those I have represented in the section called DIONYSOS. The 
theses in the DIONYSOS section are based upon Nietzsche's views presented in the APOLLO 
section. My point is that it is a misrepresentation of Nietzsche's thought to regard the four 
claims contained in the RV alone. Before considering my solution of the problem in question, 
I wil l outline Leiter's critique of the RV. 
Leiter points out the problems of interpreters who regard Nietzsche as having put forward 
what we are calling the RV: 
„first, because, they must make it out as an epistemological position worthy of serious 
attention; and second, they must show how it could be compatible with the rest of his 
philosophical corpus, which seems unaffected by his radical epistemological doctrine." 
[Leiter in ed. Schacht (1994): P. 334] 
Leiter is correct in mentioning these questions. Yet, I think that they can be answered. His 
criticisms of the RV are the following: 
„Nietzsche criticises certain views on their epistemic merit, and takes his own view to enjoy 
an epistemic privilege over those he criticises." [...] Yet, given the RV „there appears to be 
no room even for Nietzschean criticism (let alone positive claims) having anything to do 
with epistemic merits." [Leiter m ed. Schacht (1994): P. 336] 
Leiter fails to make the distinction between the superiority of Nietzsche's views in respect to 
THE TRUTH, and in respect to the SPIRIT OF THE TIMES. Nietzsche does reject the idea 
that we can decide upon the superiority of any perspective in respect to THE TRUTH as I 
explained in main part two. However, Nietzsche clearly holds that there are hierarchies of 
perspectives in respect to the SPIRIT OF THE TIMES. Nietzsche would be foolish, i f his 
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philosophy was not able to explain on which basis we decide upon the value or plausibility of 
a perspective, because human beings clearly always regard some theories as better than others. 
I will soon clarify the underlying thought behind this reply. 
The second main objection Leiter puts forward is the following [Leiter in ed. Schacht (1994): 
P. 338]: 
„0n his view, the world of'appearing' is just all the wodd there is - though it is, of course, 
no longer a 'merely' 'apparent' world. 
Yet the Received View, by holding that no view gives 'a better picture of the world as it 
really is' than any other, reinstates the distinction. For on this account there are, on the one 
hand, epistemically equivalent 'mere' perspectives, and on the other, the indescribable (and 
hence unknown) world 'as it really is', a world to which no perspective is adequate. Hence 
the paradox: Although Nietzsche rejects the ATR distinction, on the Received View 'mere 
perspectives' seem to have the same status as the metaphysician's 'mere appearances' that 
Nietzsche sought to abolish." 
However, this paradox does not arise, i f one interprets Nietzsche in the way I did. Nietzsche 
does reject the A/R distinction, and he also holds that no view which a power-constellation 
can take in, consciously gives „a better picture of the world as it really is". I f one bears in 
mind Nietzsche's artistic metaphysics as represented in APOLLO, and also that THE TRUTH 
is the sum of all possible perspectives taken together, then it is no problem for Nietzsche to 
hold both of the former claims. Again I have only alluded to the solution I will put forward to 
the problems Nietzsche has to face, but these hints should aheady give a clear idea of my 
reply to this problem. 
It seems that the problem of consistency within Nietzsche's philosophy, and especially in 
respect to his views on truth and metaphysics, has been an issue of great perplexity for 
Nietzsche interpreters so far, and I have not yet come across a convincing solution to them. 
Brian Leiter's essay was published in 1994, and I have not found a treatment of perspectivism 
published after that date which has put forward a new and convincing theory on that topic. 
3.2. 
a. MY SOLUTION (IN DETAIL) 
Due to the close link between Nietzsche, the person, and his philosophy, I briefly have to 
come back to the person Nietzsche to be able to present my solution in detail. 
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b. NIETZSCHE 
Remember that Nietzsche was brought up as a Christian, then at school came into close 
contact with Ancient Greek world views, and from that time on believed in the contingency of 
all world views. Although he held that all world views are contingent, he started interpreting 
the world in a special way, somewhat related to the way the Greeks used to develop their 
Apollinian beauties, because it was the Ancient Greek way of thinking which influenced him 
most in the development of his own world view. It would, however, be false to say that his 
own philosophy is simply a return to the Ancient Greek way of thinking and living: 
„This antithesis of the Dionysian and the Appolinian within the Greek soul is one of the 
great riddles to which I felt myself drawn when considering the nature of the Greeks. 
Fundamentally, I was concerned with nothing except to guess why exactly Greek 
Appolinianism had to grow out of a Dionysian subsoil why the Dionysian Greek had to 
become Appolinian; that is, to break his will to the terrible, multifarious, uncertain, 
frightful, upon a will to measure, to simplicity, to submission, to rule and concept. The 
inmioderate, disorderly Asiatic lies at his roots; the bravery of the Greek consists in his 
struggle with his Asiaticism; beauty is not given to him, as little as is logic or the namralness 
of customs -it is conquered willed, won by struggle - it is his victory." [WP 1050] 
His special way of his seeing the world which he had gradually gained (via his body), 
provided him with an explanation for the question why a certain type of person developed a 
certain type of world view. Nietzsche simply could not help but to see the world in the way 
provided by him by his insights in respect to metaphysics. These insights were that the whole 
world is wil l to power, and that all the philosophies and all world views were always brought 
about by the respective power-constellation they were. Of course, he permitted or rather 
demanded that the same applies to his own theories as well which becomes clear in the 
section of BGE cited by Danto. Given that the world is will to power, he also wondered what 
provides a power-constellation with the greatest power. The greatest power, as we have seen 
in APOLLO is to impose Being on Becoming, to interpret the world in such a way, so that one 
sees the world of Becoming in a determined way, that is, as a world of Being. Nietzsche's 
world of Being was constituted out of ER as the form and the Will to power as the content of 
Being. This world of Being, this artistic metaphysics which I presented as Nietzsche's insights 
in APOLLO were his way of seeing the worid, NIETZSCHE'S TRUTH, as I called it later on. 
NIETZSCHE'S TRUTH of course being separate from THE TRUTH, and also only one 
interpretation of or hypothesis about the world, as he was well aware: „Supposing that this, 
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too, is only an interpretation - and one will be eager enough to raise this objection. Well - so 
much the better." This together with what I have said before in DIONYSOS should make it 
clear that his conception of the world is also only one interpretation. Still, it is a very special 
one, as we will soon realise, when I explain why the objection „Why should I believe in it?" 
cannot be used against him, according to Nietzsche himself 
As I already said in section D, for Nietzsche philosophy is the love of wisdom and not the love 
of the truth: 
„Philosophy as love for wisdom, and so for the wise man as the most fortunate and most 
powerful who justifies all becoming and would have it recur. Philosophy is not love for 
men, or for Gods, or for truth; it is love for a certain condition, for a feeling of completion 
in mind and in senses; it is an affirmation and approval that comes from an overwhelming 
feeling of shaping power The high excellence." [IB 2, 263, PF] 
Wisdom is concerned with values. - the values which one needs to act, to give our lives 
meaning, sense, stability, because human beings need stability or Being, for human beings 
cannot stand or bear a completely indeterminate world, as Nietzsche also pointed out [UM 2, 
1]. To impose Being on Becoming is the highest power, because one ends up with a world 
view which also implies values, and which can provide our lives with sense or meaning. 
Whoever creates values which are accepted creates the face of the world. This is the reason 
why it provides the creator or inventor of the values (the one who imposes Being on 
Becoming) with the highest power: 
„Not around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values does the 
worid resolve." [2 „0n great Events"] 
„Around the inventors of new values the world resolves; invisibly it resolves." [Z „0n the 
Flies of the Market"] 
„Far from the market place and from fame happens all that is great: far from the market 
place and from fame the inventors of new values have always dwelt." [Z „0n the Flies of 
the Market"] 
Nietzsche saw himself as such an inventor of new values by putting forward his interpretation 
of the world as will to power. He was not someone on the market place who was mainly 
concerned with his fame while he was alive - but he did aim to be an inventor of a culture, of 
new values, of a new era. One can see this in section D, in which I mentioned that Nietzsche is 
concerned with values rather than with metaphysics, and as we have just seen the world turns 
120 
around the inventors of new values. This position finds further support in a letter Nietzsche 
wrote to Overbeck: 
„That whole millenia will swear their most solemn oaths in my name - if I do not push 
things as far as that, then in my own eyes I have achieved nothing." [Nietzsche's letter to 
Overbeck 21.5.1884 in Jaspers (1947): P. 411, PF) 
He does not only intend to be a major inventor of values, but he even thinks that he is human 
being pre-destined to decide upon the values for the forthcoming centuries. The reason why he 
might be justified in saying that he is the „pre-destined human being" is very problematic, 
because pre-destination does not seem to fit into his world view. However, at the end of this 
main part I will put forward some possible explanations for why Nietzsche might have used 
this expression to refer to himself The aphorism, in which he mentions this, is one with which 
one could reflect upon for a long time: 
„1. Great sound of the trumpets; Blessing of the loud tones. 
I am the predestined man, who is determining values for thousands of years to come; a 
hidden man, a man who has been everywhere, a man without joy, a man who has thrown 
away from himself everything that is home, everything that brings repose. What constitutes 
the great style - being master of one's good and bad fortune alike. 
2. The gift I have to offer is able to be received, if those capable of receiving it are there -
there is an order for precedence for it. The greatest events are the last to be understood: so I 
must be a law-giver. 
3. The time of his appearing: that most dangerous middle period, a time, in which things 
may go to 'the last man', but also...; a time characterized by the greatest of all events: God 
is dead. Only men are still unaware of it, unaware that they are just living on inherited 
values. The all-pervading neglicence and wasteftilness." [IB 2, 1411, PF] 
Here, one can clearly see that he thinks of himself as the inventor of new values which will 
govern the forthcoming millennia. However, that is all I wish to take from this aphorism at the 
moment. I will definitely come back to it later on, because I think that it contains a lot of 
material which reveals a lot about himself, his intentions, and his philosophy. 
Yet, what does Nietzsche have to do to become what he intends to be - the inventor of new 
values? He has to be convincing, to actually be able to change the perspectives people have 
onto the world, and he thinks that this is exactly what he can do: 
„Now I know how, have the know-how, to reverse perspectives: the first reason why a 
'revaluation of values' is perhaps possible for me alone." [EH „Why I am so wise" 1] 
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So far we have got some ideas about what Nietzsche intends to do and also why he wants do 
it. He does impose Being on Becoming, he interprets the world in a specific way, and does so 
mainly for the sake of creating a new system of values. This of course also demands a new 
metaphysics, although his primary concern are the values. Why does he want to do this? 
Because his metaphysics and his value system is based upon or rather are his will to power 
theory. This theory says that all power-constellations aim for power; the one who manages to 
interpret the world of Becoming as a world of Being has the highest power. By doing exactly 
this Nietzsche fulfils his own drive for power. He even does so in the best possible way 
because by imposing Being on Becoming he intended to achieve the highest power possible. 
Imposing Being on Becoming, of course, is done not primarily for the sake of establishing a 
metaphysics, but for the sake of acquiring a new value system, since, as we have heard before, 
the world turns around the creator of new values. Hence, imposing Being on Becoming 
provides the power-constellation (the person) who does exactly this with the highest possible 
power. Nietzsche refers to someone who manages to do exactly this as the „highest man": 
„Order of rank: He who determines values and directs the will of millenia by giving 
direction to the highest natures is the highest man." [WP 999] 
„For the highest man shall also be the highest lord on earth." [Z „Conversation with the 
Kings"] 
„I teach: that there are higher and lower men, and that a single individual can under certain 
circumstances justify the existence of whole millenia - that is, a fiill, rich, great, whole 
human being in relation to coundess incomplete fragmentary men." [WP 997] 
„The highest man as legislator of the fumre" [WP 972] 
Besides creating the values and the will for millermia, what else, which other characteristics 
must the highest man have? 
„Our insight is the opposite of this: that with every growth of man, his other side must grow 
too; that the highest man, if such a concept be allowed, would be the man who represented 
the antithetical character of existence most sfrongly, as its sole glory and justification." [WP 
881] 
„Man is beast and superbeast; the higher man is inhuman and superhuman: these belong 
together. With every increase of greatness and height in man, there is also an increase in 
depth and terribleness: one ought not to desire the one without the other - or rather: the 
more radically one desires the one, the more radically one achieves precisely the other." 
[WP 1027] 
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So the highest man has to represent the antagonistic character of existence or the UNITY OF 
OPPOSITES in the world, he has to glorify and justify it. This is exactly what Nietzsche 
himself has done. The will to power metaphysics represents a worldview of permanent 
Becoming, change and strife, however, this strife culminates in ER which means in Being, in 
stability, in its direct opposite. His views begin with his artistic metaphysics of stability, order, 
and harmony, but they end up in a position of perspectivism, denial of THE TRUTH, and 
NIHILISM. Again we have both extremes united in one system. So by referring to the highest 
man, and its qualities, he is referring to himself perhaps not exclusively, but at least as one 
among others^ .^ 
Before dealing with the role Nietzsche attributes to himself his intentions, and his position in 
the progression of history, I wish to analyse something mentioned a short while ago. Nietzsche 
thinks that he is able to change perspectives enabling him to bring about a transvaluation of 
values. I f he wishes to change perspectives, then different perspectives must be dominant at 
present. Nietzsche's view on the history of perspectives dominant in the previous centuries or 
millermia, can help us understand what he intends to do for the future, why he thinks his 
position is suitable for the future, in what relation he stands to the previous positions, and how 
his theories about the progression of history are related to his own philosophy. 
c. CHRISTIANITY 
Christianity is the movement which has dominated the western world in the previous two 
millennia, according to Nietzsche. So the Christian world view as well as its value system and 
multiple practices of worship have dominated the previous millennia. However, as I have 
already explained in the section on NIHILISM, for Nietzsche it is natural for everything which 
comes into existence to fade out of existence again and vanish. Christianity first had to grow 
out of its fragile roots to become the multi-national organisation it has been for a long period 
of time. It grew bigger and bigger, until it started to fade away again at the beginning of the 
Enlightenment. Decadence then became more and more prominent, and this lead to 
Pessimism, reaching a period of nihilism in the end, out of which something new should be 
able to grow. We dealt with the stages of this progression in the section NIHILISM, now we 
°^ The UNITY OF OPPOSITES claim plays a very important role in such thinkers as Heraclitus, Dostojewsky, 
and Jung as well. 
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have to apply these insights to the end of Christianity, because, according to Nietzsche, the era 
of Christianity is completed: 
„The time has come when we have to pay for having been Christians for two thousand 
years: we are losing the center of gravity by virtue of which we lived; we are lost for a 
while. Aprupdy we plunge into the opposite valuations, with all the energy that such an 
overvaluation of man has generated in man." [WP 30] 
„Nihilism stands at the door: whence comes this uncanniest of all guests?... 
The end of Christianity- at the hands of its own morality (which cannot be replaced), which 
turns against the Christian God... Skepticism regarding morality is what is decisive. The end 
of the moral interpretation of the worid, which no longer has any sanction after it has tried 
to escape into some beyond, leads to nihilism." [WP 1] 
„ At the deathbed of Christianity. - Really active people are now inwardly without 
Christianity, and the more moderate and reflective people of the intellectual middle class 
now possess only an adapted, that is to say marvelously simplified Christianity." [D 92] 
„Destiny of Christianity. - Christianity came into existence in order to lighten the heart; but 
now it has first to burden the heart so as afterwards to be able to lighten it. Consequently it 
will perish." [HAH 1, 119] 
„But the struggle agamst Plato, or, to express it more plainly and for 'the people', the 
struggle against the Christian-eccesiastical pressure of millenia - for Christianity is 
Platonism for 'the people' - has created in Europe a magnificent tension of the spirit such as 
has never existed on earth before: with so tense a bow one can now shoot for the most 
distant targets....we good Europeans and free, very free spirits - we have it still, the whole 
need of the spirit and the whole tension of its bow! And perhaps also the arrow, the task 
and, who knows? the target..." [BGE Preface] 
All these excerpts point in the same direction: Christianity is nearly dead, the age of nihilism 
is at hand. This is no more than a description of what has happened in the previous centuries, 
according to Nietzsche, but of course it does not yet include an explanation of why this 
happened. Now we have to bear in mind that with Christianity we have an Absolute world 
view which provided us with answers to all the BIG QUESTIONS (value questions, the 
meaning of life and so on). At the moment we are living in an intermediate period of nihilism. 
As we earlier realised, nihilism comes about when the absolute world view, previously 
dominant, no longer appeals to the strength of the majority of the people. The absolute world 
view can either demand too much or too little of them, in either case it does not appeal to the 
people anymore and they start to abandon it. So decadence and with it nihilism do not have to 
be a sign of weakness of the people; they could also mean that the people have become 
stronger: 
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„For it could be the precondition of greatness to grow to such an extent in violent tension. 
Dissatisfaction, nihilism could be a good sign." [WP 111] 
„Overall insight.- Actually, every major growth is accompanied by a tremendous crumbling 
and passing away: suffering, the symptoms of decline belong in the times of the tremendous 
advances; every fruitful and powerfiil movement of humanity has also created at the same 
time a nihilistic movement. It could be the sign of a crucial and most essential growth, of 
the transition to new conditions of existence, that the most extreme for of pessimism, 
genuine nihilism, would come into the world. This I have comprehended." [WP 112] 
At this Stage again we find the claim about the UNITY OF OPPOSITES within Nietzsche's 
philosophy of history which is what the highest man manages to represent. Here one can find 
his claim that growth and decline are always linked; this idea turns up at various places in 
Nietzsche. He also says that men tend to see opposites in nature, where there are merely 
differences of degree [HAH 2, 67], or that it is a basic belief of the ,JVIetaphysicans" to 
believe in antagonistic values, whereas he thinks that there are many good reasons to doubt 
that there are any opposites [BGE 1, 2]. He even says explicidy that inZarathustra all 
opposites are cormected to a new unity [EH „Thus spoke Zarathustra", 6]. Especially in 
Zarathustra itself this principle becomes extremely clear: 
„Only where there is life is there also will: not will to live but - thus I teach you- will to 
power.... Verily, I say unto you: good and evil that are not transitory, do not exist. Driven 
on by themselves, they must overcome themselves again and again. With your values and 
words of Good and Evil you do violence when you value; and this is your hidden love and 
the splendor and trembling and overflowing of your soul. But a more violent force and a 
new overcoming grow out of your values and break egg and eggshell. And whoever must be 
a creator in good and evil, verily, he must first be an annihilator and break values... And 
may everything be broken that caimot brook oiu- truths! There are yet many houses to be 
built! -Thus spoke Zarathustra." [Z „On Self-Overcoming"] 
„To esteem is to create: hear this, you creator!... Through esteeming alone is there value: 
and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear this, you creator! 
Change of values - this is a change of creators. Whoever must be a creator always 
annihilates... Good and evil have always been created by lovers and creators... Zarathustra 
saw many lands and many peoples. No greater power did Zarathustra find on earth than the 
works of the lovers: 'good' and 'evil' are their names." [Z „0n the thousand and one 
Goals"] 
„Fundamental thought: the new values must fu-st be created - we shall not be spared this 
task! For us the philosopher must be a legislator. New types. (How the highest typey hithero 
(e.g. Greeks) were reared: to will this type of'chance' consciously)." [WP 979] 
Here we come across the idea of the unity of creation and destruction and the unity of good 
and evil. Al l this confirms our prior hypothesis that when Nietzsche mentioned the higher 
man, he was including himself in this category. In addition to this we are told that a creator of 
new values first has to destroy the old ones. This is exactly what Nietzsche did, with 
125 
vehemence, especially in the „Antichrist", where he used ad hominem arguments to make the 
reader feel uncomfortable about Christianity, linking everything men usually esteem highly, or 
regard as a positive quality, as something Christianity tries to destroy out of resentment'. In 
his conception one could only be a Christian out of weakness, but who wants to be weak? I 
just wish to hint at his method by citing the following two aphorisms: 
„Parasitism as the only practice of the church; with its ideal of anemia, of 'holiness', 
draining all blood, all love, all hope for life; the beyond as the will to negate every reality; 
the cross as the mark of recognition for the most subterrenean conspiracy that ever existed-
against health, beauty, whatever that has mmed out well, courage, spirit, graciousness of the 
soul, against life itself. This eternal indictment of Christianity I will write on all walls, 
wherever there are walls -1 have letters to make even the blind see. 1 call Christianity the 
one great curse, the one great innermost corruption, the one great instinct of revenge, for 
which no means is poisonous, stealthy, subterranean, small enough -1 call it the one 
immortal blemish of mankind. And time is reckoned from the dies nefastus with which this 
calamity began - after the first day of Christianity! Why not rather after its last day? After 
today? Revaluation of all values!" [AC 62] 
„why the notion of another world has always been unfavorable for, or critical of 'this' world 
- what does this indicate? The places of origin of the notion of 'another world': the 
philosopher who invents a worid of reason, where reasons and the logical functions are 
adequate: this is the origin of the 'true worid'; the religious man who invents a 'divine 
world': this is the origin of the 'denaturalized, anti-natural' worid; the moral man who 
invents a 'free worid': this is the origin of the 'good, perfect, just, holy' world... The 'other 
world', as illumined by these facts, as a synonym fornonbeing, nonliving, not wanting to 
live-... Consequence: philosophy, religion, and morality are symptoms of decadence." [WP 
586] 
It seems obvious that people do not wish to become associated with a community which 
attacks out of resentment beauty, health, life, bravery... So although Christianity was already 
declining, Nietzsche tried to hasten this decline by attacking the Christian community by 
attributing qualities to its members which are not thought very highly of, such as sickliness, 
and weakness^ .^ This attack implicitly contains the new set of values which Nietzsche has 
created, because health, beauty, life affirmation, and bravery cleariy all are abilities, or 
powers. Whereas resentment, sickness, and so forth, i.e. the qualities he attributes to 
Christians, are weaknesses. So the metaphysics of the will to power and ER which he is 
building up are already being used by him as a basis in his criticism of Christianity. 
The dissolution of the Christian system has been followed by an age of nihilism with exactly 
the characteristics and brought about in the manner described in the section on NIHILISM. 
'^it is not the case that Nietzsche commited the genetic fallacy by arguing against Christianity, for all his claims 
are not intented to represent THE TRUTH, as I have stressed in main part 2. 
^-Nietzsche was not alone in attacking Christianity. Feuerbach, Marx, Freud are some others who were very 
engaged in that task. 
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This age of nihilism probably started with the begirming of the enlightenment and increased in 
intensity perhaps until the present. Of course, it is difficult to make a judgement about what is 
going on in one's own time, and I am not inclined to say whether the progression has already 
reached its peak, or whether this is still to come. Yet, I also do not think this is of great 
relevance for the present thesis, because all I am doing is setting out Nietzsche's ideas, but I 
am not evaluating their worth or their appropriateness. 
d. SCIENCE 
We need to bear in mind that the age of NIHILISM is only transitory. It started with the 
beginning of the enlightenment, was brought about by the loss of the belief in 
CHRISTIANITY, and will be transcended at some stage by a new movement. The values for 
this new movement Nietzsche is attempting to create, believing that his world view will 
dominate the forthcoming millermia. I will firstly give some characterisation of this new age, 
then I explain why Nietzsche thinks that it will dominate, and what he has done to make this 
goal come about. 
I have called this section SCIENCE because Nietzsche's worldview is according to his own 
criteria a scientific one. By accepting this stipulation I am not implying thatNietzsche's 
worldview actually corresponds to the way science is dealt with in the twentieth century, but I 
am not excluding the possibility either. A more specialised study would be required to 
determine a well founded answer to this question. 
Nietzsche was conscious of the fact from fairly early on in his writing career that the next age 
will be a scientific one. In „Human-all-too-Human" he was already able to see the schemes of 
the future development: 
„Now, to be sure, we are still living in science's youthfiil era." [HAH 1, 257] 
Nietzsche scholars might reply that it was only in that (his middle) period that his thinking 
was scientific. This, however, is an incorrect understanding of Nietzsche, as I wil l show soon. 
Here we have to bear in mind what he said in a letter to Brandes from the fourth of May 1888: 
„to see my entire conception from top to bottom, with the immense complex of problems 
lying, as it were, spread out beneath me, in clear outline and relief This demands a 
maximum of power which I scarcely any longer hoped were mine. It all hangs together, for 
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years it had all been on the right track, one builds one's philosophy like a beaver, one is 
necessary without knowing it." [Nietzsche letter to Brandes in Danto (1965): P. 23] 
This provides us with one reason not to reject all of his remarks from his earlier works. Only 
when Nietzsche's earlier views are blatantly inconsistent with his later positions, should we 
regard the positions from his earlier works with some suspicion. However, this is not the case 
in respect to SCIENCE; although, Nietzsche attributes various meanings to the notion 
„science", there is one he employs to refer to his own philosophy, and this is the one relevant 
for my own purposes. I will not analyse the other meanings of the notion „science", but I cite 
one aphorism as evidence that Nietzsche operated with several meanings of „Science": 
„Any science which attributes a practical significance to itself is not yet a science - for 
example national economy." [IB 1, 59, PF] 
This aphorism makes it clear that there are many separate forms of science. That there are 
many different meanings of science should be self-evident, i f one takes into consideration how 
the methods and goals of science have changed throughout the centuries, and the number of 
meanings of the notion „science" increases even fiirther i f we add all the theoretical 
conceptions of „science" - Nietzsche's own being just one of them. What is Nietzsche's 
conception of „science"? 
„Today we possess science precisely to the extent to which we have decided to accept the 
testimony of the senses, - to the extent to which we sharpen them further, arm them, and 
have learned to think them through." [TI ,,'Reason' in Philosophy" 3] 
„I observe with astonishment that science has today resigned itself to the apparent worid." 
[WP 583] 
These aphorisms tell us that science solely depends on the apparent world, and only trusts 
human sense perceptions. And for Nietzsche, let us remember, the apparent world is the only 
real world. There is no other world separate from this one with perfect forms (Plato), „things 
in i tself (Kant), or even the „thing in itself (Schopenhauer). 
„Friends, we are advancing science. In the long run, that simply means that we are helping 
human beings to advance, making them firmer and more unchangeable. We do this however 
much appearances at times are against us, and in doing so we certainly cut the ground from 
under the feet of much that more lunited ages saw as the foundation of all human capacity 
and survival. An example - customary morality." [IB 2, 93, PF] 
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„Science has, moreover, become something very usefiil for everyone." [D 41] 
By promoting science and with it belief in human senses, we promote humanity as well, 
through development towards the Ubermensch. In addition to this, Nietzsche's science is also 
supposed to transcend PLATO'S NIHILISM which is linked to CHRISTIANITY, and the age 
of NIHILISM which dominates the period of time following the Christian era. 
According to Nietzsche, science and the Christian religion have never been able to accept each 
other. Christianity has always used its best weapons to fight science. For example, in its 
original exposition of the story of Adam and Eve, Christianity was already launching an attack 
upon science. Science is getting to know something: 
„The priest knows only one great danger: that is science, the sound conception of cause and 
effect. But on the whole science prospers only under happy circumstances - there must be a 
surplus of time, of spirit, to make 'knowledge' possible." [AC 49] 
„Has the famous story that stands at the beginning of the bible really been understood? The 
story of God's hellish fear of science?... 
'From Woman comes all calamity in the world' - every priest knows that, too. 
'Consequently it is from her too that science comes.' Only from woman did man learn to 
taste of the tree of knowledge. What had happened? The old God was seized with hellish 
fear. Man had mmed out to be his greatest mistake; he had created a rival for himself; 
science makes godlike - it is all over with priests and gods when man becomes scientific. 
Moral: science is the forbidden as such - it alone is forbidden. Science is the first sin, the 
seed of all sin, the original sin." [AC 48] 
What is the essential difference between the Christian and the scientific worid conception? 
„A religion like Christianity, which does not have contact with reality at any point, which 
crumbles as soon as reality is conceded its rights at even a single point, must naturally be 
mortally hostile against the 'wisdom of this world', which means science." [AC 47] 
Christianity is completely detached from the world, whereas science is linked to the wisdom 
of the world. What does this mean? We have to bear in mind that Christianity is Platonism for 
the masses, whereas science only accords credence to the apparent world, the world accessible 
to the senses. Christianity is essenfially dualistic: the worid we are living in being of no value, 
and serving only as a preparation for the next world which has all the value. This implies that 
the apparent world becomes the only world, the real world. In addition to this, it is scientific to 
see the world as the will to survive (as this accords with Darwin's thesis). Although Nietzsche 
does not regard the theory of the will to survive to be correct, because we do not wish to 
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survive for the sake of the survival, but always to gain something else instead [WP 647; WP 
649]. This something else in Nietzsche's case is power. Yet, Nietzsche's will to power theory 
is very similar to Darwin's will to survival theory (both hold evolutionary theories about the 
origin of the different species). Therefore Nietzsche also regards himself as justified in seeing 
his will to power metaphysics as scientific. As his Ubermensch theory is closely linked to his 
will to power metaphysics, there was no need for him to state any ftirther reasons why it is 
scientific as well. Strength and power in general are qualities science demands and promotes: 
„Our air.- We know very well how science strikes those who merely glance at it in passing, 
as if they were walking by, as women do and unfortunately also many artists; the severity of 
its service, its inexorability in small as in great matters, and the speed of weighing and 
judging matters and passing judgement makes them feel dizzy and afraid. Above all they are 
terrfied to see how the most difficult is demanded and the best is done without praise and 
decorations. Indeed, what one hears is, as among soldiers, mostly reproaches and hard 
rebukes; for doing things well is considered the rule, and failure is the exception; but the 
rule always tends to keep quiet. This 'severity of science' has the same effect as the forms 
and good manners of the best society: it is frightening for the uninitiated. But those who are 
used to it would never wish to live anywhere else than in this bright, transparent, vigorous, 
electrified air - in this virile air." [GS 293] 
Now it only remains for me to explain why Nietzsche regarded his theory of ER to be 
scientific - that this is the case he said quite explicitly: 
„Extreme positions are not succeeded by moderate ones but by extreme positions of the 
opposite kind... 'The eternal recurrence'... is the most scientific of all possible hypotheses... 
There is nothing to life that has value, except the degree of power - assuming that life itself 
is the will to power." [WP 55] 
„At that time Nietzsche planned to lapse into silence for the following ten years, in order to 
make himself ready for the develoment of the thought of return." [Heidegger (1984): P. 13] 
Nietzsche even planned to retreat and remain silent for ten years. This, in his case, does not 
mean that he did not want to say anything during this period, but that he did not wish to 
publish a book. Instead he planned to go to Paris or Vienna to study natural sciences in order 
to be able to prove ER [Andreas-Salome (1994): P. 256 - 257]. This shows that Nietzsche 
himself must have taken ER very seriously. We get the same impression i f we read what 
Danto wrote about Nietzsche's attitude towards ER in respect to his relationship to other 
human beings: 
„Overbeck tells us that Nietzsche spoke of it in whispers (as Zarathustra speaks to the 
dwarf) and alluded to it as an unheard-of revelation. Lou Salome tells of the 'unforgettable 
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moment' when Nietzsche confided this teaching to her 'in a low voice'. Nietzsche himself 
speaks of the precise time and place - in a place near the towering rock in Sils Maria during 
august, 1881, - 'six thousand feet beyond man and time' - that this idea, which he 
characterised as 'the highest formula of affirmation that can ever be attained' came to him 
with the apparent impact of an mystical experience. He was, according to Lou Salome, 
reluctant to disclose it to the world until he could fmd the scientific confirmation he thought 
it must have if it was to be accepted. He regarded it as the 'most scientific of hypotheses'." 
[Danto(1965): P. 203] 
Again I think we can make sense out of his attitude towards ER, i f we take into consideration 
the details of this theory. The way I have set it out in main part 1, ER appeals to the intellect 
and whatever is scientific has to appeal to the intellect as well. The ER follows from this 
following line of thought: 
Logic, as a part of the intellect, tells us that the sum total of will to power is either infinite or 
finite, and that the total number of will to power states in the world is either infinite or finite. 
The intellect does not enable us to think that the sum total of will to power is infinite. 
The intellect also does not enable us to think that the total number of wil l to power states in 
the world is infinite. Therefore the intellect makes us think that the sum total of will to power 
is finite and that the total number of will to power states in the world is finite. 
Once we have secured these two premises and combine these with Nietzsche's metaphysics, 
ER follows by necessity. This line of reasoning shows us that we can derive ER by reference 
to our intellect because whatever appeals to our intellect is scientific. Therefore Nietzsche is 
justified in referring to ER as the „most scientific of hypotheses". 
e. SPIRIT 
The last remarks should have brought out some essential differences between the Christian 
world view and Nietzsche's scienfific world view; as well it should have cleared up the 
relationship between Nietzsche's metaphysics and science, and why Nietzsche thinks that his 
metaphysics can be regarded as scientific. 
So far I have mostly focused my attention onNietzsche's philosophy of the progression of 
history in this main part. Christianity has governed the previous two millennia. At the 
beginning of the Enlightenment decadence began, because from then on more and more 
people started to reject the belief in God, absolute standards, or any form of ideal. The age of 
nihilism which is just an intermediate period between two ages of absolute standards began. 
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The more the effects of decadence made themselves felt, the more intense and extreme 
nihilism became. Nietzsche's intention was to create new values which were supposed to 
govern the forthcoming millennia. This was his intention because, i f he managed to do this, 
then he would have fulfilled his will to power which, according to his own metaphysics, is the 
basic drive of everything, in the best possible way, and he would have become the highest 
man. The question we have to answer now is: Why should anyone accept Nietzsche's artistic 
metaphysics? 
This question arises, because, according to Nietzsche in main part two, no perspective (i.e. 
every metaphysics) can correspond to THE TRUTH, because every perspective is necessarily 
false. Since we cannot get to know THE TRUTH, it is also impossible for us to create a 
hierarchy of perspectives in respect to THE TRUTH, because there is no basis for us to order 
different perspectives. 
Now I wish to cite the comer stone of my whole interpretation, and essential component for 
my solution to the main question posed at the start of the thesis: 
„What, then, is the law and belief with which the decisive change, the recently attained 
preponderance of the scientific spirit over the religious, God-inventing spirit, is most clearly 
formulated? Is it not: the world, as force, may not be thought of as unlimited, for it carmot 
be so thought of We forbid ourselves the concept of an infinite force as incompatible with 
the concept 'force'." [WP 1062] 
The crucial idea in this aphorism is that it expresses Nietzsche's position in respect to the 
SPIRIT of our times. He says that the majority of people are governed by the SCIENTIFIC 
SPIRIT, and therewith has defeated the RELIGIOUS SPIRIT which has been dominant over 
the last two millennia. Nietzsche mentions this distinction at another place to explain why 
Schopenhauer created his philosophy in the way he did: 
„But in our century, too, Schopenhauer's metaphysics demonstrates that even now the 
scientific spirit is not yet sufficiently strong: so that, although all the dogmas of Christianity 
have long been demolished, the whole medieval conception of the world and of the nature 
of man could in Schopenhauer's teaching celebrate a resurrection." [HAH 1, 26] 
Both of these aphorisms tell us that even i f at the beginning of the nineteenth century the 
RELIGIOUS SPIRIT was still dominant, its superiority in comparison to the SCIENTIFIC 
SPIRIT had vanished by the end of the nineteenth century. At this stage I firstly have to clarify 
what the concept of SPIRIT implies. 
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On the three Metamorphoses 
O f three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you: how the spirit becomes a camel; and the 
camel, a lion; and the lion, fmally, a child... 
What is difficult? asks the spirit that would bear much, and kneels down like a camel 
wanting to be well loaded... 
Al l these most difficult things the spirit that would bear much takes upon itself like the 
camel that, burdened, speeds into the desert, thus the spirit speeds into its desert. 
In the loneliest desert, however, the second metamorphosis occurs: here the spirit becomes a 
lion who would conquer his freedom and be master in his own desert. Here he seeks out his 
last master: he wants to fight him and his last God; for ultimate victory he wants to fight 
with the great dragon. 
Who is the great dragon whom the spirit will no longer call lord and god? 'Though shall' is 
the name of the great dragon. But the spirit of the lion says 'I will.'... 
To create new values - that even the lion cannot do; but the creation of freedom for oneself 
for new creation - that is within the power of the lion... 
But say, my brothers, what can the child do that even the lion could not do?... 
The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a 
first movement, a sacred 'Yes'. For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred 'Yes' is 
needed: the spirit now will his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now 
conquers his ovm world. 
O f three metamorphoses of the spirit I have told you: how the spirit became a camel; and 
the camel, a lion; and the lion, fmally, a child." [Z „ 0 n the Three Metamorphoses"] 
I have quoted nearly the whole passage, because it not only elucidates what the SPIRIT is, but 
also provides further evidence in favour of my interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy of 
history. The camel clearly represents the Christians, the lion the nihilists, and the children the 
philosophers of the future [the creators of new values, willing to experiment - BGE „We 
scholars", 210 -, not believing in THE TRUTH anymore - BGE „The Free Spirit", 43; IB 1, 
582]. 
It depends on the SPIRIT of a person which sort of world view appeals to them. The 
disfinction between RELIGIOUS and SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT corresponds to the distinction 
between CHRISTIANITY and SCIENCE mentioned earlier on. The RELIGIOUS SPIRIT is 
the Spirit of the people who believe in two world theories; the SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT that of 
the people who believe in their senses and therewith in one world only. 
By introducing the RELIGIOUS and the SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT, we get to know two types of 
Spirit. I have already talked about Spirit, but only very briefly, when discussing the highest 
power in Nietzsche's will to power theory. Here I wish to add a couple of remarks about it, for 
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it is essential to know that one has to be in need of SPIRIT to get it, that one loses it again i f 
one does not need it anymore, and that it is closely linked to self-discipline [TI „Skirmishes of 
an Untimely Man" 14]; its fimction is the will to give or impose form [WP 658]; it enables 
human beings to attribute value to sense perceptions a process which is essential for a whole 
human being [WP 1045]; it enables us to become master of many things [IB 2, 204]; the 
person who has acquired most of it, is the most powerful one [IB 1, 1087]; it is not distinct 
from the body [PTG 10]; it provides us with the heart, and the heart gets us excited [IB 1, 
745]. There is much more to be said about the SPIRIT, but for my purposes this enumeration 
of various qualities associated with Spirit should be sufficient. 
Which type of Spirit one has, however, does not say anything about whether a person belongs 
to the rule-givers, or the rule-receivers. Whether a person is a rule-giver or rule-receiver 
depends on the intensity or strength of the respective type of Spirit a person has. There are 
always only very few rule givers, but many rule-receivers: 
„that commanding is harder than obeying" [Z „ 0 n Self-Overcoming"] 
There are only very few who are strong enough to give orders and have the ability to impose 
form on chaos, who manage to interpret Becoming as Being, and also to make this 
interpretation appealing to other people. The rule giver has to try to impose the form and order 
of their own world view on the rule receivers, whose Spirit is only formed by those who 
influence them. Initially, only a few educated people are influenced; these spread the world-
view in question fiirther and further, until it is dominant, i f it is a succesful world view. 
Nietzsche, in his own opinion, was just such a rule giver. He not only manages to create such 
an interpretation, but also claims to have known how to present it appealingly, and even to 
make it necessary for a period of time: 
„The more abstract the truth that one wishes to teach is, the more one must begin by 
seducing the senses to it." [Nietzsche in Heidegger (1984): P. 35] 
, J'rinciple.- An inescapable hypothesis to which humanity must have recourse again and 
again is more powerfiil in the long run than the most firmly believed faith in an untruth (the 
Christian faith, for example)." [GS 133] 
So Nietzsche tried to seduce our senses by employing metaphors (see Zarathustra) to make his 
theory appealing. He even tried to make his hypothesis inevitable, because in the second 
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aphorism he was referring to his own theory. On first glance, the latter aphorism might sound 
not very convincing. Why should an inevitable hypothesis be more powerfial in the long run 
than the strongest held belief in something untrue, e.g. ChrisUanity? Christianity has history 
and custom in its favour. In addifion it is far from clear how a hypothesis can be inevitable? 
Nietzsche's hypothesis is inevitable, according to himself, as I will show now. I have already 
explained why Nietzsche thinks that his interpretation of the world is scientific. In addition to 
this, he also thinks that the SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT has finally defeated the RELIGIOUS 
SPIRIT^^ which implies for him that he expects more and more people to see the world on the 
basis of the SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT. And this means that they believe that there is only the 
world of appearance, that an evolutionary account of the development of organisms is 
accurate, and that a rather physical view about the progression of the universe is correct. Yet, 
i f Nietzsche's theory is scientific and presented in such a way that it appeals to the people, and 
i f the majority of people are governed by the SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT, thenNietzsche is justified 
in expecting that his own hypothesis about the world is inevitable and will govern the 
following centuries. What it means for his world view to dominate the following centuries, 
and whether he has actually achieved what he was aiming for are different issues.^ "* 
One should bear in mind at this stage that he did not create the worldview which appeals to 
the people in order to appeal to the people, but created it because it was a necessity for him to 
see the world from such a perspective: 
„There was no psychology at all before me. - To be the fnst here may be a curse; it is at any 
rate a destiny." [EH „Why I am a destiny" 6] 
Nietzsche, of course, does not want to please the herd. Yet, he expects the herd to accept his 
conception of the world in the long run. This is no more than a necessary consequence of 
Nietzsche's belief that the SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT will govern the following millennia, that his 
hypotheses are scientific, and that he is able to change perspectives. I f all this turned out to be 
^^This change in respect to the governing Spirit also implies that the people have become stronger and therefore 
that the nihilism we are living in is an A C T I V E N I H I L I S M , for the S C I E N T I F I C SPIRIT presupposes more 
strength in human beings than the R E L I G I O U S SPIRIT. 
I personally think that he even might have achieved what he was aiming for. Al l the philosophers of Post-
modernism can be seen as the personification of Nietzsche's philosophers of the ftjture. They all agree to 
Nietzsche's denial of T H E T R U T H or the death of God. Nietzsche is the Father of Postmodernism, for he has 
initiated the beginning of a new era - the era of the loss of truth. The postmodern philosophers also aim for 
power, by trying to impose their own forms on Being, while denying that they are putting forward the only 
possible solution. However, this is only my personal opinion, and I do not have the space to defend this claim in 
an academic manner. 
One should not underestimate Nietzsche's influence on hermeneutics, existentialism, and deconstructionism. 
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correct, Nietzsche would actually have become the inventor of a new age, and with that the 
highest man, the centre of the new world. In this way, he could fulfil his will to power in the 
best possible way. The masses are only a means for him to ftilfil his natural drive for the 
highest power. 
„Basic error: to place the goal in the herd and not in single individuals! The herd is a means, 
nothing more!" [WP 766] 
It is obvious that this is a more Nietzschean position than i f one held that Nietzsche just 
created his world view to please the masses or the herd. After the discussion about the two 
types of SPIRIT, it should be clear how to answer the question: In what respect is his world 
view superior to all the others? It appeals to the SPIRIT OF THE TIMES of the present and 
near ftiture, and the SPIRIT OF THE TIMES is the SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT.Nietzsche's world 
view appeals to this SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT, because it is very scientific. His will to power 
theory is an improved version of Darwin's theory, and ER appeals to the intellect (for science 
always appeals to the intellect). The intellect comprises logic and the categories of reason, and 
it provides us with OUR TRUTH, e.g. we cannot help thinking in its given limits. However, 
even i f the intellect provides us with OUR TRUTH at the moment, it has not necessarily 
always done so. OUR TRUTH is only OUR TRUTH for a certain period of fime, just as the 
SCIENTIFIC will govern or the RELIGIOUS SPIRIT has governed human thinking only for a 
certain period of time. Yet, because Nietzsche thinks that the SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT will 
govern the judgements of human beings in the near future, and that Nietzsche's theory appeals 
to this way of thinking, human beings are and will be bound to regard it as superior. This 
means that after the AGE OF CHRISTIANITY, and the intermediary AGE OF NIHILISM, 
Nietzsche expects the AGE OF SCIENCE to be dominant for a significant period of time. 
f. TRAGEDY. DIONYSOS & THE CRUCIFIED 
The AGE OF SCIENCE is linked to a tragic outlook on life. The claim that a tragic world 
view can be combined with the scientific one is opposed to Nietzsche's views on science in 
Ancient Greece. In that era he regarded scientific thinking to be related to a form of optimism. 
I am even tempted to say that in Nietzsche, his own prediction of the „Birth of Tragedy" came 
true: 
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„and only after the spirit of science has been pursued to its limits, and its claim to universal 
validity destroyed by the evidence of these limits may we hope for a rebirth of tragedy - a 
form of culture for which we should have to use the symbol of the music-practicing Socrates 
in thes sense spoken above." [BT 17] 
Socrates in the „Birth of Tragedy" was linked to the scientific way of thinking and music was 
linked to tragedy. So, the music-making Socrates with whom the rebirth of tragedy comes 
about is fulfilled through Nietzsche. Nietzsche is the music-making Socrates. Nietzsche is 
proclaiming this tragic age of Europe [WP 864], and that INCIPIT TRAGOEDIA [GS 342] by 
which he refers to his own world view as the dominant one. It is the ability to affirm all the 
terrors of life, to say yes to life, to reach an AMOR FATI which is linked to the beginning of a 
tragic age, for it is the sign of strength that a tragic age comes about. A l l this is what 
Nietzsche is describing in his own world view. Especially ER is the best test whether one can 
affirm life, and say Yes to life. It is a matter of strength to hold ER, without it being the reason 
for one's own destruction, because the person in question must accept that everything that has 
happened to him and will happen to him will happen to him an infinite amount of times. So 
someone who accepts ER and can stand it, expresses this person's capability for the highest 
affirmation of life. This thought is linked with the concept of the AMOR FATI, but a more 
detailed treatment of this topic would lead me too far astray. Al l I wished to show here was 
the relation between Nietzsche's metaphysics, saying Yes to one's life, and the tragic age: 
„I promise a ttagic age: the highest art in saying Yes to life, tragedy, will be reborn when 
humanity has eathered the consciousness of the hardest but most necessary wars without 
suffering from it." [ E H „The Birth of Tragedy" 4] 
„Pleasure in tragedy characterizes strong ages and natures." [WP 852] 
Accepting life, saying Yes to life, given ER, is the highest form of life affirmation. Once the 
people have the strength to bear such a world view, and Nietzsche thinks that human beings 
are starting to acquire the appropriate strength, the new tragic era or the AGE OF SCIENCE 
wil l begin. This is also supposed to be the time when tragedy as a form of art is supposed to 
be reborn in its proper manner. 
Nietzsche's philosophy and his way of thinking in general is very similar to the scheme of 
Ancient Greek tragedy. This should not surprise us, however, since his philosophy originates 
in his reflections on the Appolinian and the Dionysian force in Ancient Greece. Tragedy finds 
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its source in the Dionysian celebrations in Ancient Greece, and it is possible that originally all 
tragedies were adaptations of the story of Dionysos. Ancient tragedy is constituted from the 
interplay between two groups; the chorus on the one side, and the actors on the other. 
Originally there was only the chorus; tragedy began when the first actor or protagonist was 
selected to present his individual character. Gradually, more and more individual actors were 
permitted to interact on stage. The chorus represents the Dionysian unity of the world, and the 
individual actors the Apollinian creations. In Ancient tragedies the scenes were alternatively 
dominated by chorus and individual actors, i.e. the plot consisted of a permanent interplay 
between Dionysos and Apollo or destruction and creation. We can find this distinction again 
in Nietzsche's philosophy: the age of nihilism is related to Dionysos and the age of science to 
Apollo. This distinction is my inspiration for the headings of the first and the second main part 
of my thesis. 
However, we could also transform this insight to another higher level. In that case, we can 
find the distinction between theories including a believe in THE TRUTH, as 
CHRISTIANITY, and others which do not belief in THE TRUTH, e.g. Nietzsche's 
philosophy, his APOLLO (AGE OF SCIENCE) plus his DIONYSOS (AGE OF NIHILISM). 
In this case, APOLLO and DIONYSOS formed a new higher unity which one could also refer 
to as 'DIONYSOS', standing for a model which does not believe in THE TRUTH. This 
'DIONYSOS' would have the Christian world view with its belief in THE TRUTH as its 
counterpart with the name 'APOLLO'. Again, this time at a higher level, we can find the 
tragic interplay between APOLLO and DIONYSOS in Nietzsche's way of thinking. 
I think that the basic thought behind this interpretation should have come across at this stage. 
This example shows that one can see 'Dionysos' as having two different meanings: it can 
relate only to the destructive force''^. However, 'Dionysos' can also refer to the process of 
destruction and creation, as in the case of Greek tragedies. As the Ancient tragedies were 
being performed in honour of Dionysos, his name contained both forces - the chorus 
(DIONYSOS, destrucfion) as well as the individual protagonists (APOLLO, creation). This 
meaning of 'Dionysos', which includes the destructive and the creative force, is the meaning 
Nietzsche uses in his later writings. 
In light of this Nietzsche regards himself as justified in refering to himself as the last disciple 
of Dionysos in his later writings. 
^^This is the meaning it has in my thesis when I employ it as a heading for main part two, and it is also the 
meaning Nietzsche used in the „Birth of Tragedy". 
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„Saying Yes to life even in its strangest and hardest problems, the will to life rejoicing over 
its own inexhaustibility even in the very sacrifice of its highest types - that is what I called 
Dionysian, that is what I guessed to be the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet...I, the 
last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus." [TI „What I owe to the Ancients" 5] 
„The affirmation of passing away and destroying, which is the decisitive feature of a 
Dionysian philosophy; saying Yes to opposition and war; becoming" [EH „The Birth of 
Tragedy" 3] 
„I, the last disciple and initiate of the God Dionysus" [ B G E „What is noble?" 295] 
„I am a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus; I should prefer to be even a satyr to being a 
saint." [ E H Preface 2] 
However, Nietzsche, the disciple of Dionysos, is also the ANTICHRIST: 
„It was against morality that my instinct tumed with this questionable book, long ago; it was 
an instinct that aligned itself with life and that discovered for itself a ftmdamentally opposite 
doctrine and valuation of life - purely artistic and And-christian. What to call it? As a 
philologist and man of words I babtized it, not without taking some liberty - for who could 
claim to know the rightful name of the Antichrist? - in the name of a Greek God: I called it 
dionysian.-" [BT „Attempt at a Self-Criticism" 5] 
„I am, in Greek, and not only in Greek, the Antichrist." [ E H „Why I write such good 
books" 2] 
Nietzsche regards himself as the ANTICHRIST. Who is the Antichrist? According to the 
Bible: „For many deceivers have gone out into the world, men who will not acknowledge the 
coming of Jesus Christ in the flesh; such a one is the deceiver and the Anfichrist" (2 Jn, 7). 
„Children, it is the last hour; and as you have heard that Anfichrist is coming, so now many 
Antichrists have come; therefore we know that it is the last hour." (Jn 2, 18) „Who is the liar 
but he who denies that Jesus is the Christ? This is the Antichrist, he who denies the father and 
the son." (Jn 2, 22) „every spirit which confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of 
God, and every spirit which does not confess Jesus is not of God. This is the spirit of 
Antichrist, of which you heard that it was coming, and now it is in the world already." ^n 4, 
2-3) [All Bible quotes taken from ed. Lindsell (1971)]. Al l these descriptions apply to 
Nietzsche himself, and he says explicitly that he assumes the counter position to Christianity, 
since for him Platonism is Christianity for the masses, and his philosophy is inverted 
Platonism: 
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„My philosophy is inverted Platonism: the further you are away from 'true Being', the 
clearer, fairer and better it all is. My goal - life as in appearances." [IB 1, 79, PF] 
„for Christianity is Platonism for 'the people'" [ B G E Preface] 
In addition to this he has written a Gospel for the future as he himself says: 
„For one should not make a mistake about the meaning of the title that this gospel of the 
fiiture wants to bear. „The will to power: Attempt at a Revaluation of all Values" - in this 
formulation a countermovement finds expression, regarding both principle and task; a 
movement that in some fiiture will take the place of this perfect nihilism - but presupposes 
it, logically and pychologically, and certainly can come only after and out of it. For why has 
the advent of nihilism become necessary? Because the values we have had hithero thus draw 
their final consequence; because nihilism represents the ultimate logical conclusion of our 
great values and ideals - because we must experience nihilism before we can find out what 
value these 'values' really had.- We require, sometime, new values." [WP 4] 
The similarity between Christianity and Nietzsche's philosophy becomes even more obvious 
i f we take „Thus spoke Zarathustra" into consideration, because it is very similar to parts of 
the new testament (i.e. the Gospels). Al l four parts of Zarathustra are mainly about 
Zarathustra, in the same way as all four Gospels are about Jesus Christ (New Testament: three 
parts by synoptic writers, one was seperate - John. Zarathustra: Three parts written around the 
same time, one much later). One might even go so far as to compare Nietzsche's works 
published before the Zarathustra with the Old Testament and the ones after Zarathustra with 
the New Testament. In the same way as the style in the Bible varies immensely from piece to 
piece, Nietzsche employs very many different styles. Nietzsche writes poetry as in the Song of 
Songs, and parables as in the Gospels. In addition, the Bible like Nietzsches work is filled 
with metaphors, and symbols. Both works employ the art of the mythology of numbers. A 
fascinating discussion about the mythology of numbers in Nietzsche can be found in Claus-
Arthur Scheiers article „The Rationale of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals" [ed. Schacht 
(1994): R 449-459]: 
„For note that the Genealogy is divided into three parts containing, seventeen, twenty-five, 
and twenty-eight aphorisms respectively, the sum total thus amounting to seventy - precisely 
the number of chapters of Zarathustra 1 - 3 (including the sections of the Prologue). At first 
glance this might seem to be accidental, or, in any case, irrelevant. But there are many 
examples of the fact that Nietzsche loved to count his books and their parts, chapters, 
aphorisms, and, in the case of Zarathustra, even the verses. Notoriously his favourite 
numbers were ten and seven - the latter presumably because of the New Testament book of 
revelation, the former because of the Old Testament Decalogue and the Dekas of the 
Phythagoreans. In this light it is not far fetched to discover that the rationale of the 
seemingly irrational division of the Genealogy is the golden section, first applied to the 
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complex as a whole, and then to its greater part - a device Nietzsche might have thought of 
before, but had never used in print." 
Something else should make us incline to reconsider Nietzsche's intentions even more. In 
„The Anfichrist" one can find a „Decree against Christianity", in which he not only replaces 
the Ten Commandments of Christianity with Seven of his own, but also proclaims the 
introduction of a new fime calculation, remembering that i f we say today is the 4.5.1998 we 
still calculate our fime in respect to the birth of Jesus Christ, and therefore Christian belief is 
somehow even implicit in our fime calculation only. He wants a clean break with Christianity, 
and thinks that in order for us to achieve this, we need to introduce a new time calculation: 
Decree against Christianity 
Proclaimed on the first day of the year one (on September 30, 1888 of the false time 
scheme) 
War to the death against depravity: depravity is Christianity 
The Antichrist" 
All this seem to imply that Nietzsche rejects and even despises Christianity. However, I 
wonder whether this is the only inference or even the best we can make, using the given 
premises. Should we not consider which role the Antichrist plays in the Bible? Should not we 
bear in mind the Revelation, i f we read the following passage by Nietzsche? 
„1. Great sound of the trumpets; Blessing of the loud tones. 
1 am the predestined man, who is determining values for thousands of years to come; a 
hidden man, a man who has been everywhere, a man without joy, a man who has thrown 
away from himself everything that is home, everything that brings repose. What constitutes 
the great style - being master of one's good and bad fortune alike. 
2. The gift I have to offer is able to be received, if those capable of receiving it are there -
there is an order for precedence for it. The greatest events are the last to be understood: so I 
must be a law-giver. 
3. The time of his appearing: that most dangerous middle period, a time, in which things 
may go to 'the last man', but also...; a time characterized by the greatest of all events: God 
is dead. Only men are still unaware of it, unaware that they are just living on inherited 
values. The all-pervading neglicence and wastefulness." [IB 2, 1411, PF] 
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What can we read in the Revelations 8-11? Cannot one hear the same trumpets there - the 
great sound of trumpets Nietzsche mentioned in the last aphorism? And we also should not 
forget the beast 666: 
„The seven trumpets 
1. The fu-st trumpet 8. The seventh trumpet 
„These are of one mind and give over their power and authority to the beast; they will make 
war on the Lamb", [ed. Lindsell (1971): Rev 17, 13-14] 
Does not Nietzsche stress exacfly this (the beast making war on the lamb), when he writes: 
„Have I been understood? - Dionysus versus the Crucified..." [ E H „Why I am a Destiny" 9] 
„Why did life, physiological well-constitutedness everywhere succumb?...Dionysus versus 
'the Crucified'... The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and the 
rule. There is no doubt who is the sfronger..." [WP 401] 
,JDionysus versus the 'Crucified': there you have the antithesis. It is not a difference in 
regard to their matyrdom - it is a difference in the meaning of it... One will see that the 
problem is that of the meaning of suffering: whether a Christian meaning or a tragic 
meaning of suffering..." [WP 1052] 
„to overcome everything Christian through something supra-Christian, and not merely to put 
it aside - for the -Christian doctrine was the counterdoctrine to the Dionysian;" [WP 1051] 
The question which arises for me is not the one which traditionally comes to mind for the 
standart interpreters. One used to see Nietzsche only as the philosopher, psychologist, and 
artist who attacked, rejected and despised Christianity who did not wish to have anything to 
do with it any more - but is this correct? The parables he wrote, the metaphors he used, the 
styles he wrote in, the expressions he used to refer to himself as well as others, the philosophy 
of the progression of history which he has been putting forward - all this provides one with 
reasons to interpret him differently from how one used to. I am not denying that Nietzsche is 
rejecting Christianity, and puts forward a world view based on the importance of appearance, 
a new ontology of ER and the Will to Power - but still I wonder whether this is not the result 
of another deeper belief within himself Nietzsche refers to himself as the Antichrist, and does 
everything to create his own philosophy as an inverted version of Platonism which, according 
to him, is the intellectual version of Christianity. Nietzsche with his methods of style of 
expression remains within the Christian tradition. This makes me ask the question: Does not 
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Nietzsche in referring to himself as the Antichrist, in addifion to all the other things he does, 
make himself fit into the Christian world view? Is not he himself part of the Christian 
scheme? He says that he is a predestined human being - does this pre-destination arise out of a 
divine necessity - even under his own decree? Does he not have to have accepted the Christian 
metaphysics by doing all that he has done? 
One could even go so far as to ask: Is Nietzsche a Chrisfian? 
I am defining a Christian as a person who believes in the Chrisfian metaphysics, but this 
leaves open the question of worship. It is pretty clear that Nietzsche does not worship the 
Christian God. Still might he not believe in this God? Might he accept that he will be damned 
for being the person he is or even has to be? 
Is Nietzsche a Christian? 
I wil l leave this question open to further investigation - perhaps it cannot be answered. Al l I 
was aiming to do in this last main part I have done. I have explained why Nietzsche put 
forward his own philosophy, although he regards it to be as false as every other perspective -
namely because it appeals to the spirit of the present and fiiture fimes, according to him. In 
this way I have managed to answer a question which has puzzled many eminent 
commentators. Yet, somehow I seem to have laid open the basis for another very puzzling 
question: 
Is Nietzsche a Chrisfian?'^ ^ 
I feel obliged to dedicate a longer footnote to a philosopher, whom I have hardly ever mentioned within this 
thesis, but of whom one can be reminded very often when one reads my interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy. 
The philosopher I have in mind is Hegel. Due to the close relationship in respect to time, location and ideas of 
these two philosophers, at this stage I feel obliged to mention some of the most important similarities and 
dissimilarities of Nietzsche's thought to that of Hegel. It is astonishing how closely related the concepts of these 
two philosophers are. The first point which is to mention are their philosophies of history. Hegel was the first to 
mtroduce the historical nature of our knowledge. According to him, the process of the development of knowledge 
is a determinate one. One stage follows onto the other by necessity. His philosophy is a teleology, so the process 
of history aims for an end which in Hegel is absolute knowledge. It is reached, when the absolute has managed to 
comprehend itself, and with it the absolute idea. The absolute idea contains every determinateness and it „alone is 
being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and the whole of truth" [Singer (1983): P. 80]. Absolute knowledge 
is „spirit knowing itself as spirit", for reality is constituted by spirit. Ultimately, there is only one universal Spirit, 
and all the individual Spirits are to a greater or lesser degree part of it. The determinate way of progression 
toward this aim (spirit comprehending itself) in Hegel can be described in an abstract way by his dialectical logic 
which says that the movement progresses from the tension between the thesis and the antithesis towards their 
synthesis. In some cases the synthesis can then be taken as another thesis, with which the process starts anew. The 
very final synthesis is absolute knowledge. 
This brief outline of Hegel's main ideas reveals to us that there are some striking similarities between Hegel's 
philosophy and my interpretation of Nietzsche's thought. The two most significant points are the importance of 
Spirit and historical nature of knowledge in both thinkers. However, one should not take the similarities too far. 
Hegel's account of the historical progression is teleological, whereas Nietzsche's is circular. The underlying 
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CONCLUSION 
This brief, last chapter provides me with some space to stress what I have tried to convey with 
this study, namely that Nietzsche had good reasons to put forward his philosophy even though 
he said that it is not true. Danto, Nehamas, and Poellner did not grant Nietzsche this position. 
They claimed that all of Nietzsche's claims are merely his own truth. Yet, I hope that I have 
managed to show that this is not the case. Nietzsche did not regard his philosophy to be only 
his own truth. He thought that it would be dominant in forthcoming millennia because human 
beings will have become more powerfiil, their SPIRIT longs for a more demanding theory, 
and his philosophy is suitable for this purpose. Nietzsche's philosophy appeals to the 
SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT which will govern the forthcoming centuries. This claim also explains 
why Nietzsche is not inconsistent in holding that all perspectives are equally false in respect to 
THE TRUTH, but that his philosophy is superior to others, it is so because it appeals to the 
SPIRIT OF THE TIMES, i.e. the SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT. So according toNietzsche, the AGE 
OF SCIENCE began with himself This is the thought advanced at the end of my last chapter. 
rationality in Hegel's progression of history can be described with his dialectical logic, whereas in Nietzsche it 
can only be said that the will to power brought about the change of the dominant world views. Here a Hegelian 
might object that in my interpretation of Nietzsche the S C I E N T I F I C A G E which follows onto the C H R I S T I A N 
A G E is the inverted version of the latter, so Hegel's dialectical logic applies to this description of the historical 
progression as well. This, however, is not the case. Firstly, it is the intermediate A G E O F N I H I L I S M which 
follows immediately onto the A G E O F C H R I S T I A N I T Y . I f the Hegelian says that, in this case, this age can also 
be seen as an application of the dialectical logic of Hegel, then Hegel's dialectical logic is simply an empty term 
to explain whatever progression actually takes place (Schopenhauer makes a nice point, when he says that 
Hegel's philosophy proves that whatever exists exists). Secondly, in case we do not wish to let the A G E OF 
N I H I L I S M count as a separate A G E , for it is only an intermediate position, then I could still reply that the A G E 
O F S C I E N C E is not the only possible inverted version of the A G E O F C H R I S T I A N I T Y , but only one possible 
inverted version of it. It is one interpretation which portrays itself as the inverted version of the formeriy 
dominant world interpretation, but is only one among many. In this case again, if the Hegelian claimed that 
Hegel's dialectical logic still applies, it would have to be regarded as empty, for it is arguable that any two ages 
can be interpreted as being antagonistic. 
The similarities of Hegel and Nietzsche in respect to the importance of Spirit in both of their works should not be 
taken too far either. Firstly, Hegel believes that the absolute can actually comprehend itself (Spirit can know itself 
as Spirit) and it even has comprehended itself within the last sections of his Phenomenology. Thereby, he claims 
to have established the truth with his philosophy, and the truth is connected with the universal Spirit. However, as 
we have seen Nietzsche does not claim to put forward T H E T R U T H , thinks that T H E T R U T H is not desirable 
and is ugly, and that it is impossible to get to know T H E T R U T H . The different kinds of Spirit, which turn up in 
Nietzsche ( R E L I G I O U S SPIRIT, S C I E N T I F I C SPIRIT) , and the various forms within each Spirit, are all 
different kinds falsifications. Although he refers to them as TRUTfTS, they are necessarily distinct from T H E 
T R U T H , for all TRUTffS are different in respect to T H E T R U T H and are falsifications. So, whereas in Hegel 
Spirit is always linked to the truth, it is linked to a kind of falsification in Nietzsche. However, one might be 
tempted to argue that in Hegel it is only the universal Spirit which is linked to the truth, and that it is the same 
conception in Nietzsche, for T H E T R U T H in Nietzsche is constituted out of all perspectives taken together in 
one organism. So the only difference between Hegel and Nietzsche would be that in Hegel human beings can 
grasp the truth, whereas in Nietzsche they cannot. This, however, oversimplifies the discussion, because in Hegel 
only human beings can have Spirit, but in Nietzsche it is a universal phenomena, for whenever I mention „mind" 
in my interpretation of Nietzsche I just refer to a special type of Spirit. This discussion should have given us a 
grasp of the similarities and differences of Nietzsche to such a historically very closely related figure as Hegel. 
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However, it is also a thought with which another discussion could begin. I only put forward an 
exegesis of certain aspects of Nietzsche's thought, yet on the basis of this exegesis one could 
ask how plausible Nietzsche's account appears to oneself Heidegger would have said that 
Nietzsche was right in what he said about science, given my exegesis. „Technology, we are 
told, is 'a desfiny within the history of Being', its latest and perhaps most enduring phase, and 
one which, in the shape of national economic self-aggrandisement, 'completes' a longer 
standing tendency towards 'subjectivity's unconditioned self-assertion' (BW 220 f ) . " [Cooper 
(1996): P. 54] 
What do I think of Nietzsche's claims? I do not agree with Nietzsche's metaphysics. My 
reasons for this I will state in another study. However, I am very sympathetic towards his 
philosophy, and grateftil to Nietzsche for making me aware of the importance of power and 
stability. 
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